Intellectual Property Brief
Volume 1
Issue 1 Spring 2010

Article 1

1-1-2010

Volume 1, Issue 1
AU Intellectual Property Brief

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/ipbrief
Part of the Intellectual Property Commons
Recommended Citation
American University Intellectual Property Brief, Spring 2010, 1-58.

This Entire Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @
American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Intellectual Property Brief by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

Volume 1, Issue 1

This entire issue is available in Intellectual Property Brief: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/ipbrief/vol1/iss1/1

Washington College of Law | American University

Intellectual
Property Brief
ipbrief.net
Volume 1 Issue 1

Spring 2010

In this issue:
Software Patents: The Case for Harmonization of
European and American Law Through
American Decisiveness and Leadership
By Andrew G. Haberman

South Africa’s Movie Piracy Challenges
By Matilda Bilstein

Settling for Less? An Analysis of the Possibility
of Positive Legal Precedent on the Internet if the
Virtual Confusion: How the Lanham Act Can Pro- Google Book Search Litigation Had Not Reached a
tect Athletes from the Unauthorized Use of Their
Settlement
Likenesses in Sports Video Games
By Brooke Ericson
By Lindsay Coleman
Regulation of Medicine Patents by the Anti-CounPharmaceutical Patents, Paragraph IV, and Pay-for- terfeiting Trade Agreement to Broaden Access to
Delay: The Landscape of Drug Patent Litigation
Medicine
and the Lessons Provided for the Recently Passed
By Daniel Lee
Biosimilar Approval Pathway
By Brett Havranek
Online Auction Sites and Inconsistencies: A Case
Study of France, China, and the United States
By Won Hee Elaine Lee
American University Intellectual Property Brief

1

The American University Washington College of Law Intellectual Property Brief is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License.

2009-2010
Staff
Editor-in-Chief
Leeah Odom
Senior
Managing Editors
Dana Nicoletti
Marynelle Wilson
Senior Articles Editor
Rocco Sainato
Copyright Section Editors
Colleen O’Boyle
Lizzy Han
Patent Section Editors
Taiwoods Lin
Brett Havranek
Trademark
Section Editors
Marynelle Wilson
Lindsay Coleman
Senior Web Editors
Dan Rosenthal
Rachel Gordon
Junior Staff
Lisa Bienik
Matilda Bilstein
Brooke Ericson
Rachel Gordon
Rose Hess
Jeesun Kim
Jack Korba
Daniel Lee
Elaine Lee
Eric Perrott
Daniel Rosenholtz
Ali Sternburg
Ellen Wong

Software Patents: The Case for Harmonization of
European and American Law Through American
Decisiveness and Leadership
By Andrew G. Haberman

4

Virtual Confusion: How the Lanham Act Can Protect Athletes from the Unauthorized Use of Their
Likenesses in Sports Video Games
By Lindsay Coleman

9

Pharmaceutical Patents, Paragraph IV, and Pay-forDelay: The Landscape of Drug Patent Litigation
and the Lessons Provided for the Recently Passed
Biosimilar Approval Pathway
By Brett Havranek

16

South Africa’s Movie Piracy Challenges
By Matilda Bilstein

27

Settling for Less? An Analysis of the Possibility
of Positive Legal Precedent on the Internet if the
Google Book Search Litigation Had Not Reached a
Settlement
By Brooke Ericson

33

Regulation of Medicine Patents by the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement to Broaden Access to
Medicine
By Daniel Lee

44

Online Auction Sites and Inconsistencies: A Case
Study of France, China, and the United States
By Won Hee Elaine Lee

50

Spring 2010

Submissions
The IP Brief is looking for papers that address a legal topic
relating to any area of intellectual property. Please submit completed papers and a cover page with the name and title of the
article to intellectualpropertybrief@gmail.com. Any questions
can also be sent to this e-mail address. Submissions should be
10-20 pages long, in 12 pt Times New Roman font with 1”
margins.
		
Articles can also be submitted on ExpressO,
at:
http://law.bepress.com/expresso

Find us on Facebook and Twitter at:

facebook.com/ipbrief

@IPBrief

www.ipbrief.net
The Intellectual Property Brief provides daily commentary on intellectual property law at www.
ipbrief.net. Here, readers can find daily blogs,
columns, upcoming events, and past issues of the
Intellectual Property Brief.
American University Intellectual Property Brief

3

Software Patents: The Case for Harmonization of European and American Law
Through American Decisiveness and Leadership
By Andrew G. Haberman1
I. Introduction 1
In 2005, the owner of patents for a method of
enabling users to receive e-mail over a wireless network
sued a competitor for infringement.2 Patent protection
for the method derived from a conglomerate of patents
in multiple nations, but the owner sued in the United
States.3 Despite the fact that this
invention was the same worldwide,
the patent owner was unable to seek
damages for its foreign patents in
American courts due to the court’s
reluctance to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction. The court further
questioned the ability of the patent
owner to even receive compensation
for the violation since the competitor’s infringing
software was relayed through Canada.4 This type of
transnational patent litigation costs corporations, like
NTP, Inc., millions of dollars to protect their inventions
worldwide, and exemplifies the necessity for change.
The combination of jurisdictional boundaries
and subtle differences between many countries’ national
laws concerning protection of software patents makes
protecting software patents a formidable task. Although
the ideal solution would be a harmonized — solitary
standard of law — worldwide patent system to protect
innovations, multilateral negotiations have proven
fruitless. As such, the United States should attempt
to lead the way in international harmonization by
beginning to align their patent laws with those of foreign
nations, even if this requires lowering the protection
afforded to American inventors, in order to alleviate the
1. Andrew Haberman is a second year law student at American
University’s Washington College of Law. This article is a shortened
version of a comment written for the Journal of Gender, Social
Policy and the Law.
2. See NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (deciding a suit based on NTP’s BlackBerry technology).
3. See id. at 1287-92. (pursuing infringement in Virginian courts
for a system relayed through Canada).
4. See id. at 1293, 1313 (asserting that although NTP’s global
patents stem from one “parent” patent, RIM cannot be held liable
for their extraterritorial activities under 35 U.S.C. § 271).
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difficulties in multilateral negotiations. Alignment can
be accomplished through efforts by the legislature and
the judiciary to clarify and synchronize American law
with the law of other world leaders.
II. Background
Because software patenting is a highly debated
topic worldwide, the laws surrounding
it constantly shift and evolve over time.5
Further, software innovations are, by
definition, innovations in electronic
form, making them exceedingly easy to
move across borders.6 Thus, software
patents exemplify the problem with a
non-harmonized system of international
patent law.7 Specifically, if infringement
occurs within a country that does not offer the same
protection as the patent-granting nation, the inventor
will lose his exclusive right, and he or she will have no
remedy due to jurisdictional complications.8
In Europe, the differences between countries’
software patent laws may seem subtle, but the differences
affect the patentability of all computer-implemented

5. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments-Results of
the Uruguay Round, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement], available at http://www.wto.org/english/
docs_e/legal _e/27-trips.pdf, at arts. 68, 71(1) (including a basis for
further negotiation which authorizes the TRIPs Council, established
in Article 68, to undertake reviews if necessary to remain consistent
with current law).
6. See A Report by the Business Software Alliance, October 2009
at 1, available at http://global.bsa.org/internet report2009/2009int
ernetpiracyreport.pdf (asserting that software and computers have
become “indispensible tools in our businesses, school and personal
lives”).
7. See Business Software Alliance, Sixth Annual BSA-IDC Global
Software Piracy Study 1 (May 2009) (estimating that the software
business lost $53 Billion in 2008 based on a study on 110 countries).
8. See, e.g., NTP, Inc., 418 F.3d at 1313-18 (allowing NTP to
recover for infringement on its method patent, despite questioning whether this was possible because the infringed process relayed
through Canada and NTP was unable to recover on its other claims
abroad); see also id. (documenting losses sustained when no remedy
is available).
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subject matter.9 Until 2007, the European Patent Office
(EPO) had statutorily banned patents for software and
business methods, but awarded patents to this subject
matter under the “as such” language contained within
the European Patent Commission (EPC).10 The Board of
Appeals, established under the EPC, took the approach
that the role of the patent office was to give protection
to technological developments, and that since such
developments were happening in software, they should
be protected.11
Despite the addition of the phrase “all fields
of technology” to the EPC in 2007, the EPO still
requires a “technical aspect”, while the United Kingdom
requires a “new and novel” analysis that implicitly
considers the technical effect and Germany requires
“technical character”.12 Although these analyses usually
reach similar results, the analyses are all somewhat
different, and it remains possible that they may arrive at
different conclusions about the patentability of the same
invention.13
Meanwhile, in the United States, the courts
began to broaden the scope of patent protection in 1998
with the State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin.
Group, Inc. decision, which allowed patents for software
innovations and business methods so long as the
inventions had a useful purpose.14 This decision made
9. Compare In re CFPH L.L.C.’s Applications, [2005] EWHC
1589 (Pat), [2006] R.P.C. 5 [hereinafter CFPH Applications], available at http:// www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Patents/2005/1589.
html, at ¶ 104 (requiring software innovations to be new and useful
regardless of their technical character), with Convention on the
Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 268 [hereinafter EPC], available at http://www.epo.org/patents/law/ legal-texts/
html/epc/2000/e/contents.html, at art. 52 (requiring a technical
effect to be incorporated in the inventive step of a software patent).
10. See EPC, supra note 9, at art. 52. See Vicom, 1987 E.P.O.R.
74 (EPO Tech. Bd. App. 1986), available at http://legal.europeanpatent-office.org/dg3/biblio/ t840208ep1.htm [hereinafter Vicom]
(assessing software patents for the first time, the EPO granted a patent for digitally processing images stored in a digital format).
11. See, e.g., Vicom, supra note 10, at 75 (protecting a method
for image enhancement on a computer based off of a mathematical
formula, but not the formula itself ).
12. See EPC, supra note 9, at art. 52 (determining patentable
subject matter under the EPC); CFPH Applications, supra note 9,
at ¶ 104 (holding that all inventions, technical or not, must be new
and novel); Johannes Lang, Computer-Implemented Inventions – The
German View, Intellectual Asset Management, May/June 2009, at
93, 96 (determining patentable subject matter in Germany based off
of German case law).
13. See Robert E. Thomas & Larry A. DiMatteo, Harmonizing
The International Law Of Business Method And Software Patents:
Following Europe’s Lead, 16 Tex Intell. Prop. L.J. 1, 14 (Fall 2007)
(analyzing how three tests would result in similar but still different
outcomes for the Amazon “one-click” patent).
14. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc.,

patent protection available for almost any invention, and
was extended when the courts eliminated the need for a
business method to be linked to a machine.15 These two
decisions expanded patentable subject matter to a point
at which almost anything became patentable.16 Further,
the combination of the patent office’s limited experience
with software and business method patents and the
severe increase in applications in the art area caused an
over-granting of patents.17
However, in 2008, the Federal Circuit heard
In re Bilski and rejected the usefulness test employed
in State Street. Instead, it implemented the “machineor-transformation” test.18 In order to satisfy the
“transformation” requirement, a process must “transform
any article to a different state or thing.”19 In contrast,
the “machine” half of the test is less defined. It allows
a claimed process to be patent-eligible if it is “tied
to a particular machine or apparatus”, but does not
specify whether this requires machine involvement in
the process, or mere machine implementation in the
transformation.20
III. Analysis
Although the majority of developed countries
seem to believe that the ideal solution for global
149 F.3d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that business software designed to perform financial calculations for an investment
fund was patentable).
15. See AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352,
1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (reaffirming State Street and stating that the
scope of patentable subject is independent of the whether the patent
is a machine or a process).
16. See, e.g., Method of Swinging on a Swing, U.S. Patent No.
6,368,227 (filed Nov. 17, 2000) (granting a patent for a method for
one person to swing him or herself on a swing involving nothing
but the person and the swing).
17. See United States Patent and Trademark Office, Class 705 Application Filing and Patents Issued Data, January 2009, http://www.
uspto.gov/patents/resources/methods/applicationfiling.jsp (reporting
13,779 business method patent filings in 2008, up from 1,300 in
1998); see also Carl Shapiro, Patent System Reform: Economic Analysis
and Critique, 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1017, 1018 (2004) (arguing
that the lack of examples in the subject matter caused extreme overgranting).
18. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (rejecting a
patent claim for a method of hedging risk in the field of commodities for failure to satisfy the “machine-or-transformation” test).
19. See id. at 965 (holding that an alleged transformation of
“public or private legal obligations or relationships, business risks
or other such abstractions” does not satisfy the test because it does
transform the data into anything of physical substance).
20. See id. (comparing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 18492 (1981),which involved a process operated on a computerized
rubber curing apparatus with Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 586
(1978) which involved a mathematical formula to create an “alarm
limit” for chemical reactions and finding that the former, but not
the latter, would not meet the machine formulation).
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harmonization of software patents, as well as patents
in general, is a centralized system, this is not being
achieved.21 As such, the United States should use its
status, not only as a world power, but as a leader in
intellectual property law, to lead the harmonization of
software patent law, and eventually patent law in general.
Through legislative efforts, Congress can articulate
specific standards and commit both developed and
under-developed countries to specific standards through
the ratification of treaties.22 Similarly, through judicial
efforts, courts can exert supplemental jurisdiction over
foreign patents with duplicate patents in the United
State in order to enhance worldwide protection.23
1.

A. The Legislature’s Role

Congress has already obtained “TRIPS-plus”
intellectual property provisions in bilateral trade
agreement through negotiations stemming from
“Special 301” review.24 However, Congress must also
consider that although the United States may be in the
best position to force things to move forward through
trade pressures, “TRIPS-plus” may not be a viable
global standard, since U.S. law, as it was under State
Street, may be less like that of most other countries.25
21. See International Bureau, World Intellectual Property Organization Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, Draft Substantive
Patent Law Treaty, Tenth Session, SCP/10/2, Geneva May 10 to
14, 2004 [hereinafter Substantive Patent Law Treaty], available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_10/ scp_10_2.pdf., at
art.3 (providing an example of a failed attempt to achieve harmonization); Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Patentability of Computer-Implemented Inventions, COM(2002) 92 final, at
3, Feb. 20, 2002, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu /LexUriServ/
site/en/com/2002/com2002_0092en01.pdf [hereinafter Proposed
Directive] (revealing the European desire to take action towards harmonization as discovered through a survey of Member Countries).
22. Cf., KORUS Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-S. Korea, art. 18.4,
June 30, 2007, 46 I.L.M. 642, available at http:// www.ustr.gove/
trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/final-text (requiring the implementation of “TRIPs-plus” IP protection, such as
enhanced border authority)
23. Cf., Cambridge Literary Props., Ltd. V. W. Goebel Porzellanfabik G.m.bH. & Co., 295 F.3d 59, 64 (1st Cir. 2002) (applying U.S.
copyright law, German contract law and Austrian inheritance law);
Ortman v. Stanray Corp., 371 F.2d 154, 160 (7th Cir. 1967) (approving the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over corresponding
Canadian, Brazilian and Mexican patents).
24. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-418, §§ 1301-03, 102 Stat. 1107, (codified as amended
in 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2419, 2420, 2241-2242 (1994)) [hereinafter
301 Trade Act] (requiring countries to agree to patent protection in
exchange for trade agreements). See KORUS FTA, supra note 22, at
art. 18 (requiring heightened intellectual property protections).
25. Compare State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group,
Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (allowing all business
methods, so long as they are useful), with EPC, supra note 9, at art

6

Therefore, harmonizing U.S. law “down” may be more
likely to achieve worldwide harmonization than trying to
harmonize the rest of the world “up.”
In order to accomplish this, the Supreme Court
would have to affirm the Federal Circuit’s decision in
Bilski and restrict the patentability of business-method
and software patents in the United States, as the EPO
currently does.26 Although the Federal Circuit’s rule in
Bilski and the EPO’s standard for patentable subject
matter are not the same, a Supreme Court affirmation
would make the Federal Circuit’s test appear permanent
and allow American inventors to confidently determine
what constitutes patentable subject matter. The public
would gain even more confidence if Bilski was codified
by the legislature. However, codification may be more
difficult due to the political pressures and business
influences that are more prevalent in a politicallyaccountable Congress.27
Even so, American pressure may not be sufficient
to force other countries to agree to harmonized
standards. To date, American pressure in intellectual
property negotiations has not been sufficient to force the
World Trade Organization (WTO) to adopt substantive
international patent laws.28 However, pressure may
not be vital if the U.S. can merely bring its standard
close enough to the European standard as to make
negotiations easier, as the United States has seemed to
do with In re Bilski.29 Further, the United States could
even lead the way in harmonization by lowering its
standard from the transformation-or-machine test to
the “technical affect” test, but this would likely be a
secondary and possibly desperate option.
52 (requiring a business method or software patent to have a technical effect).
26. Compare In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(requiring a technical aspect under the machine-or-transformation
test), with EPC, supra note 9, at art. 52 (requiring a technical contribution in the inventive step).
27. See, e.g., Brief of Double Rock Corp. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Bilski v. Doll, 545 F. 3d (2009) (No.
08-964), 2009 WL 2445751 at *7 (arguing against limiting the
patentability of software innovations due to the negative effects on
business).
28. See, e.g., Substantive Patent Law Treaty, supra note 21(demonstrating the U.S.’ inability to force other countries to agree
to international patent law treaties). But see World Intellectual
Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M.
65 (1997), available at www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs_
wo033.html (providing international standards for protecting
access-controlled digital information).
29. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 943 (declining to implement the
State Street test, and instead applying the machine-or-transformation
test, which more closely resembles the EPC test); see also EPC, supra
note 20, at art. 9.
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1.

B. The Judiciary’s Role

While the legislature begins to assert itself in
international negotiations, the judicial branch could
begin to protect American corporations by exercising
supplemental jurisdiction. However, the courts have
been reluctant to assert supplemental jurisdiction over
foreign software patent infringement, or even over
foreign patent infringement in general, due in part to
concerns of comity.30
Although software patent law has yet to become
harmonized, the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT),
EPO, and TRIPS agreement have achieved some success.
For example, one patent can be filed under the PCT
in multiple different countries, as well as the EPO.31
Due to the increasing similarity between the standards
applied in the United Kingdom, Germany, the EPO,
and the United States under In re Bilski, it will be easier
for American courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over foreign patents.32 Under the PCT, the same patent
is filed, albeit translated, in every nation where the
inventor seeks protection. With similar standards in
place, and identical patents being litigated, American
courts could exercise supplemental jurisdiction without
having to expend a tremendous amount of time and
resources on the trial.
American courts have asserted that comity is
reason enough not to preempt foreign courts — courts
that have not been proven inadequate to handle law —
and that doing so could prejudice the rights of foreign
governments.33 Additionally, American courts have
expressed a belief that exercising jurisdiction over cases
involving foreign patents would destroy Congress’ intent
to foster uniformity and preclude forum shopping.34
30. See, e.g., Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 900 (Fed Cir.
2007) (refusing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and add the
claims involving an EPO patent of the catheter involved in a U.S.
patent infringement case out of concerns for comity).
31. See Patent Co-operation Treaty (PCT), June 19, 1970, 1160
U.N.T.S. 231, at ch. 1, amended on Sept. 28, 1979 and modified
on Feb. 3, 1984 [Hereinafter PCT], available at http://www.wipo.
int/pct/en/texts/articles/atoc.htm (allowing innovators to file one
patent application for patents in multiple nations or the EPO).
32. Compare In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (applying the machine-or-transformation test), with CFH Applications,
supra note 9, at 46 (requiring the innovation to be new and novel
regardless of the technical aspect, but returning similar results to the
EPO), and EPC, supra note 9, at art. 52 (requiring a technical link),
and Lang, supra note 55 (asserting that Germany requires technical
character).
33. See Voda, 476 F.3d at 900-02 (asserting that there is no international duty requiring the court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over EPO catheter patents identical to the U.S. patent in question).
34. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S.

However, this logic is called into question by the number
of cases in which the court has had authority to decide
questions requiring the application of foreign law.35
American courts have continually and frequently applied
foreign laws, and concerns of comity should not prevent
courts from exercising supplemental jurisdiction.
Courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction
at their discretion, and use it in order to prevent forum
shopping and increase efficiency.36 Courts have reasoned
that the patents issued in foreign nations are not
identical, and the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction
would effectively unilaterally determine the adjudicating
body for international disputes.37 Further, American
courts have argued that the exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction would require extensive resources that the
courts do not feel are warranted.38 However, although
adjudicating disputes involving foreign patents may
require American courts to expend a larger amount of
resources, that increase is infinitesimal compared to the
amount of resources expended by the courts, parties,
and countries involved in suits around the globe over the
same patent.39
Adjudicating disputes over the same patent in
one court should increase efficiency, and possibly help
to exemplify the value of a worldwide patent court and
system.40 Applying supplemental jurisdiction will not
necessarily harmonize patent laws, but it will allow one
155, 166-67 (2004) (arguing that exercising supplemental jurisdiction would allow the plaintiff to chose U.S. courts instead of foreign
courts in an antitrust case).
35. See, e.g., Distillers Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 150 USPQ 42
(N.D. Ohio 1964) (settling a dispute over various patents on the
manufacture of acrylonitrile and concluding that, “this Court is
empowered to consider claims arising under foreign patents”).
36. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1988) (allowing supplemental jurisdiction for all claims arising from the same case or controversy).
37. See , e.g., Voda, 476 F.3d at 887 (asserting that the district
court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction would undermine the
obligation of the United States under its treaties).
38. See, e.g., Stein Assoc’s, Inc. v. Heat and Control, Inc., 748
F.2d 653, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (arguing that actions are not the
same where one action involves an American patent and the other
involves a British patent, as each would require separate claims
construction and infringement determinations, which adjudication
of would string the courts resources).
39. See Genetic Engineering & Biotechnology News, Patent Litigation: Is it Worth the Expense? If Rights Are Uncertain, Pursuing
Licensing with Alleged Infringer Might Be Best Option, Apr 1 2006
(Vol. 26, No. 7), http://www. genengnews.com/articles/chitem.
aspx?aid=1454&chid=0 (reporting that the average litigation cost
was $769,000 per party in cases where less than $1 million was at
risk, and over $2.6 million where $1 million or more was at risk).
40. See Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 877 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(Newman, J., Dissenting) (arguing for the exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction and offering efficiency as a benefit).
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court to rule on, in the case of software patents, multiple
standards that differ only slightly. In an ideal world,
this would eventually lead to the adoption of a single
standard. At the least, it should shed some light on the
differences between the standards and provide a starting
point for international negotiations.
IV. Conclusion
In order to protect and promote innovation,
patents, especially software patents, must be protected
by an extensive system of intellectual property laws.41
Although the software laws in European countries, the
EPO, and the United States currently differ slightly,
these are differences that must be reconciled. The
ideal solution to clarify these inconsistencies is global
harmonization, but the failure of international and even
inter-European negotiations over the past decades has
proven that this solution is unattainable.
As such, the United States must decisively clarify
its software patent laws, ideally along the lines of In
re Bilski, in order to enforce patentability standards as
similar to European software patent law as possible,
and must begin to claim jurisdiction over foreign
patents with corresponding U.S. patents.42 Coupled
with legislative efforts to align as many national patent
laws as possible, these efforts will begin to harmonize
international software patent law while avoiding the
downfalls of multi-lateral negotiation. Any success will
begin to provide inventors, as well as the courts, with
clarification on patentable subject matter and efficient
methods to protect these patents.

41. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 (giving Congress the power to protect innovation); Merges et al., supra note 9 (offering philosophical
justifications for the grant of exclusive patent rights).
42. Compare In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 943, 946 (implementing the
“machine-or-transformation” test), with EPC, supra note 20, at art.
52 (requiring a technical link in the innovation).
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Virtual Confusion: How the Lanham Act Can Protect Athletes from the
Unauthorized Use of Their Likenesses in Sports Video Games
By Lindsay Coleman1
Sports1in the United States has transformed from
a simple backyard game into a $150 billion industry.2
As a result of this transformation, athletes have evolved
from mere players to business investments. Aside
from developing the technical prowess of star athletes
on the field, sports teams also cultivate these athletes’
likenesses, personas and brands
off the field. Branding athletes,
particularly those athletes who
become the face of the franchise,
can reap lucrative rewards for
the team.3 Branding develops
instant recognition between
fans, athletes and their teams.
This strong connection of the
athlete with his brand and
team makes his likeness a valuable marketing tool for
third party marketers looking to capitalize on the evergrowing sports industry. Accordingly, many companies,
especially videogame producers, use prominent athletes
to help promote their products. Within their sports
games, these companies simulate the physical attributes,
movements and persona of star quarterbacks, wide
receivers, goalies and more to create as realistic a gaming
experience as possible. While many of these athletes are
compensated for the use of their image in the games,
many others are not.4 Recently, several former college
and professional athletes have filed lawsuits against
these game companies and other advertisers under the
Lanham Act5 for incorporating their likenesses into
1. Lindsay Coleman, 2011 J.D. Candidate, American University,
Washington College of Law; M.A. European Studies, Georgetown
University School of Foreign Service; B.A. History, Stanford University. Lindsay was the 2010 Senior Section Editor for Trademark and
is the 2010-2011 Senior Managing Editor of the Intellectual Property
Brief. Lindsay is also the Senior Recent Developments Editor on
the Administrative Law Review.
2. 1 Glenn M. Wong, Essentials of Sports Law § 1.2 (3d ed.
2002).
3. Dannean J. Hetzel, Professional Athletes and Sports Teams: The
Nexus of their Identity Protection, 11 Sports Law. J. 141, 167 (2004).
4. Barbara A. Solomon, Can the Lanham Act Protect Tiger Woods?
An Analysis of Whether the Lanham Act is a Proper Substitute for a
Federal Right of Publicity, 94 Trademark Rep. 1202, 1202 (2004).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (2006).

games and marketing campaigns without compensating
or receiving consent from the athletes before doing so.6
Although these cases include claims under the
right of publicity, the Lanham Act applies federal—and
therefore, more expansive—protections on the rights
an athlete has in his persona and likeness. The right of
publicity applies unevenly across states,
with varied protection in each state
based on the interpretations of state
statutes governing the right of publicity.
In general, a right of publicity claim
is more suited to an infringement case
based on an athlete’s persona because
it is triggered by a lower standard than
the “likelihood of confusion” standard
that trademark law requires.7 However,
such a claim is limited by the inability to enforce
infringement case across states, making the trademark
infringement option more attractive.8 This article will
evaluate whether Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act is
broad enough to extend to infringement claims from
former athletes over the unauthorized use of their
likenesses by applying Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc.9 to
the analysis of Lanham Act protection.10 The article
first analyzes the arguments and holding in Brown as
a means to explain the trademark issues that video
game producers like Electronic Arts (EA) raise by using
realistic, recognizable players in their sports games.
6. See Complaint, Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No. 2:09-cv01598-FMC-RZx (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2009)[hereinafter Brown
Complaint]; Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No. CV-09-1967 (N.D.
Cal. May 5, 2009) [hereinafter Keller Complaint].
7. See, e.g. Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(a) (West 2009) (“Any person
who knowingly uses another’s name, voice, signature, photograph,
or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or
goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or services, without such
persons prior consent . . . shall be liable for any damages sustained
by the person or persons injured as a result thereof . . . .”).
8. 5 Thomas J. McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair
Competition § 28:12 (4th ed. 2009).
9. Brown Complaint, supra note 5.
10. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006) (specifying that any person may
bring a civil action in relation to any goods or services that use
words, terms or symbols that create a false designation of origin,
false or misleading description or representation of fact).
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Next, the article assesses the scope of the Lanham Act in
its application to Brown and other similar cases. Finally,
the article concludes with recommendations for video
game producers and athletes on how to succeed in future
cases.
The increasingly realistic sports-themed video
games generate huge profits for game producers.11 Sports
leagues, like the National Football League (NFL) and
the National Collegiate Athletics Association (NCAA),
make money on these games by licensing their logos
and brands to the game producer.12 However, most
of the money raised through licensing fees does not
trickle down to the athletes, and this inequitable
treatment has spurred lawsuits by players against video
game producers. In March 2009, Jim Brown, a retired
professional football player in the NFL, filed suit against
EA for misappropriation of his likeness as a player on
the Cleveland Browns NFL team in EA’s Madden NFL
game.13
In the 2009 version of Madden NFL—the most
recent edition at issue in Brown’s complaint—a user
has the option to play virtual NFL football in several
ways.14 The most straightforward mode of play for
Madden users is the franchise mode, in which each user
compiles a fantasy team by drafting players among other
teams in the league. In this mode, users have access to
all of the current NFL rosters and can select any player
in the NFL. To select their teams, users flip through
11. EA’s top-selling game in the third quarter of 2008 was Madden NFL, selling 2,994,000 games—2,958,000 in the U.S.—during that period, the top global seller of video games. Matt Martin,
Madden is best global seller in Q3, Games Industry, Oct. 11, 2008,
http://www.gamesindustry.biz/articles/madden-is-best-global-sellerin-q3.
12. EA signed a licensing deal with the NFL and the NFL Players
Association for the exclusive use of official player names and likenesses. Anastasios Kaburakis et al., NCAA Student-Athletes’ Rights of
Publicity, EA Sports, and the Video Game Industry: The Keller Forecast,
27 Ent. & Sports Law. 1, 15 (Summer 2009) (citing Tim Surette
& Curt Feldman, Big Deal: EA and NFL Ink Exclusive Licensing
Agreement, Gamespot.com, Dec. 13, 2004, 2:53 PM, http://www.
gamespot.com/news/2004/12/13/news_6114977.html (“The deal . .
. is an exclusive five-year licensing deal granting EA the sole rights to
the NFL’s teams, stadiums, and players.”)). The NCAA has a similar
agreement with EA, signing its most recent deal in 2004 for licensing rights to the teams, stadiums, and schools. Kaburakis, The Keller
Forecast, 27 Ent. & Sports Law at 15 (quoting Press Release, Stage
Select.com, CLC Grants EA Exclusive College Football Videogame
License, Apr. 11, 2005, 2:43 PM EST, http://www.stageselect.com/
N1109-press-release-clc-grants-ea-exclusive-college-foot.aspx).
13. Brown Complaint, supra note 5.
14. Id. at 5, 7. Although Brown first learned about the use of his
likeness in the 2008 version of Madden NFL, he later discovered
that his likeness had been used in all yearly editions dating back to
2001, in addition to the 2009 version. Id.
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pages of players that each contain an individual player’s
headshot, current team, height and weight, position, and
game statistics.15 In franchise mode, the current players’
identities are clear to the user because EA has licensed
the rights to their images and likenesses. Once the team
is compiled, users can play an entire season with their
teams and act as team owners and managers by trading
players. At the end of each season, users have another
draft of the new players entering the league. The new
players are fictitious, computer-generated characters that
do not represent any real life players. Their player pages
are also computer generated, with a graphic headshot
instead of a photograph of the player, and names that
do not exist in the NFL. Franchise mode allows users
to act as team managers in a highly realistic setting for
multiple seasons in a row. When playing in this mode,
users recognize the current NFL players and understand
that the computer-generated future players do not
correspond to any real-life players.
In addition to franchise mode, users also have
the option of playing Madden in exhibition mode.
This allows the users to select entire teams rather than
individual players, but uses historic players in addition
to current NFL stars. Users can select either an “AllTime” team, composed of the best players on that team
from throughout history, or the complete team from
a particular year. In both of these instances, historic
players like Brown are included in the game as part of
a team. EA includes the same level of detail for all of
these players, even the historic players who have not
licensed their likeness rights to EA, but makes a few
minor changes to avoid presenting an exact copy of the
actual player on the player profile page and in the game.
Generally, the changes include switching a number,
excluding a player’s name, and distorting the player’s
appearance. Although users may not individually select
any players in exhibition mode, they can still manipulate
the appearances of and add names to historic players to
resemble the athletes that seem to be anonymous.16 In
other words, placed in the context of either the All-Time
15. Madden 2008 08 2009 09 Player ratings, http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=SlqHdYDTpYI&feature=fvw (last visited Nov. 11,
2009) (showing the pages for each available player in the first draft
of franchise mode, all of whom correspond to current NFL players).
16. See, e.g., All Time Cincinnati Bengals vs All Time Cleveland
Browns Pt 1, http://www.youtube.com/user/Franchiseplay#p/u/37/
mN-4GJFKFzQ (last visited Nov. 11, 2009) (demonstrating the
match-up of two All-Time teams, one which included Jim Brown,
number 32, in which the user manipulated the nameless players by
adding their real names and changing their numbers to simulate as
real a game as possible of these two all-star teams).
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team or the team from a particular year, fans generally
know the identities of the players, even when those
players are not given names, have different numbers, and
possibly have different appearances. With the rest of the
information about the players—like position, team, and
statistics—users know even the nameless players.
Brown’s complaint centered around Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act, specifically the unauthorized
use of his likeness in the Madden game and the false
endorsement that followed from this use. Brown is
always represented in Madden as a member of the
team he played on during his football career, the
Cleveland Browns.17 However, despite being represented
anonymously, Brown’s likeness is clearly apparent in the
physical attributes given to the virtual player, especially
because Brown is such a famous and celebrated athlete
and actor. While the current players have already agreed
to be compensated for the use of their likenesses at
the start of their careers with the NFL, older players
like Brown never had the opportunity to negotiate
such terms, leaving their likenesses uncontrolled by
the NFL and its licensees.18 Without prior agreement
as to the control of their likenesses, players like Brown
maintain propriety over their own personas and are
not precluded from bringing complaints against video
game manufacturers. This distinction is important
because current NFL athletes license their images at the
time of contract signing and cannot bring lawsuits like
Brown, but NCAA athletes do not sign away the rights
to their likenesses19 and can therefore continue to file
trademark claims against video game producers.20 NCAA
athletes retain control over their likenesses, but the
17. Id. Brown’s likeness is used as a part of the 1965 Cleveland
Browns “historical” team and on the “All-Browns” team. His
character is anonymous in the sense that his number is changed in
the game to 37, where he played with number 32, but that is the
only substantive change to the character. See Katie Thomas, Retired
N.F.L. Player Jim Brown Loses Lawsuit Against Video Game Publisher,
N. Y. Times, September 30, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/09/30/sports/ncaafootball/30colleges.html.
18. Brown Complaint, supra note 5, at 5-6.
19. Under NCAA rules, all college athletes competing in the
NCAA are strictly prohibited from receiving remuneration for their
activities as college athletes, including compensation for the use of
their names, images, or likenesses. College athletes are also barred
from authorizing the use of their names and images in commercial
use. See Matthew G. Matzkin, Getting’ Played: How the Video Game
Industry Violates College Athletes’ Rights of Publicity By Not Paying for
their Likenesses, 21 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 227, 228 (2001).
20. Former Arizona State University quarterback, Sam Keller, filed
a class-action lawsuit July 2009 against EA for the unauthorized use
of his likeness in its NCAA Football game, but did not state a claim
under the Lanham Act and instead claimed infringement under the
right of publicity theory. See Keller Complaint, supra note 5.

debate continues to rage on over whether they should
be allowed to receive compensation for their playing
time.21 NFL athletes, on the other hand, have perhaps
signed away too many of their rights by agreeing to a
playing contract in the league, and future players may
challenge the inclusion of likeness rights in the contracts,
particularly if the athlete is extraordinarily famous and
could command much more money in licensing fees
than the NFL is willing to concede.
Based on the theory that he has control over
his own likeness, Brown argued that EA used his image
without consent or compensation in the Madden game,
which constitutes false endorsement. Section 43(a)
provides for civil remedies for anyone damaged by the
use of “any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or
any combination thereof, or any false designation of
origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false
or misleading representation of fact.”22 To prove a claim
for false endorsement under Section 43(a), plaintiffs
must prove three main elements: “(1) the mark is legally
protectable, (2) the plaintiff owns the mark, and (3) the
defendant’s use of the mark to identify goods or services
is likely to create confusion concerning the plaintiff’s
sponsorship.”23 Additionally, courts have adopted a grab
bag of requirements that help them assess the merits of
the false endorsement situation. For example, the Ninth
Circuit considers the following factors, each of which
carries a different amount of weight in the infringement
analysis: (1) the level of recognition that the plaintiff
has among the segment of the society for whom the
defendant’s product is intended; (2) the relatedness of
the fame or success of the plaintiff to the defendant’s
product; (3) the similarity of the likeness used by the
defendant to the actual plaintiff; (4) evidence of actual
confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) likely degree
of purchaser care; (7) defendant’s intent on selecting the
plaintiff; and (8) likelihood of expansion of the product
lines.24 In his complaint, Brown applied only a few of
21. See Kristine Mueller, No Control Over Their Rights of Publicity:
College Athletes Left Sitting on the Bench, 2 DePaul J. Sports L. &
Pol’y 70, 86 (2004) (arguing that most athletes should be compensated for their skills at the college level because most will not make
it to professional leagues, forcing them to lose out on the profits
their universities made from their performances and personas).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2006).
23. Anastasios Kaburakis et al., NCAA Student-Athletes’ Rights of
Publicity, EA Sports, and the Video Game Industry: The Keller Forecast,
27 Ent. & Sports Law. 1, 29 (Summer 2009).
24. Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1007-08 (9th
Cir. 2001) (adapting the factors set forth in AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft
Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979) as they apply to cases
involving celebrity personas).
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the main elements required to prove false endorsement.
Brown could have strengthened his
complaint by applying the Abercrombie factors to his
Lanham Act discussion.25 Widely considered the greatest
football player of all time,26 Jim Brown was selected
to play in the Pro Bowl in each of the nine seasons he
played in the NFL and was subsequently inducted into
the Pro Football Hall of Fame in 1971.27 Based on the
fame and success that Brown achieved while in the
NFL, he is widely recognized among football fans as
the greatest football player of all time. The connection
between Brown’s success on the field and EA’s use of his
image in Madden NFL is obviously strong, with Brown’s
football skills integral to the use of his likeness in the
game. Simply put, Brown was a hall of fame running
back for the Cleveland Browns and is represented in
a football game as a running back on the Cleveland
Browns.
The similarity of Brown to his likeness in
Madden is a stretch in this case because EA only depicts
Brown as a nameless player with a different number
and an altered appearance. However, the similarities
of his team, year played, position and other athletic
attributes are enough to make him recognizable to
football fans. The Ninth Circuit in White v. Samsung
Electronics28 held that a Samsung commercial depicting
a robot with a blond wig, long gown, and large jewelry
standing in front of a game board and in the process
of turning block letters on the board was confusingly
similar to Vanna White, the popular hostess of the game
show “Wheel of Fortune.”29 The court noted that even
though plenty of women have blond hair and wear
long gowns and big jewelry, all of the facts put together
show that consumers would recognize this robot as an
impersonation of Vanna White.30 To further explain its
reasoning, the court analogized Samsung’s advertisement
to a hypothetical advertisement depicting a robot with
male features, an African-American complexion, a red
basketball uniform with the number twenty-three on
it, black hightop sneakers, and a bald head, dunking a
25. Abercrombie, 265 F.3d at 1007-08.
26. Ron Smith, The Sporting News Selects Football’s 100 Greatest
Players: A Celebration of the 20th Century’s Best (Sporting News
Publishing Company 1999), available at http://tsn.sportingnews.
com/nfl/100/1.html (nominating Jim Brown as the number one
greatest football player of the 20th Century).
27. Hall of Fame Member: Jim Brown, http://www.profootballhof.
com/hof/member.aspx?player_id=33 (last visited Nov. 11, 2009).
28. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
29. White, 971 F.2d at 1399.
30. Id.
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basketball with one hand.31 Based on this description,
the court is certain that everyone would understand that
robot to be a depiction of Michael Jordan.32 The Michael
Jordan hypothetical is largely analogous to Jim Brown’s
representation in Madden, except that Brown’s character
is even more realistic and lifelike because EA has created
a person instead of a robot with all of the same attributes
as Brown. Additionally, Brown’s team, position, and
athletic strengths are identical, where the Michael Jordan
robot only wore his team color and number.
Continuing with the Abercrombie factors that
Brown should have asserted to bolster his claim, there is
no evidence of actual confusion on the record, and it is a
difficult factor to prove without evidence. Nonetheless,
users might be confused and think that Brown endorsed
Madden NFL because they can easily recognize the
presence of his character in the exhibition mode
games. However, users might not be confused given the
difference in presentation of the current NFL players
and the historic players like Brown, particularly in use of
a computer-sculpted image of Brown’s headshot that is
different from all other current NFL players. Without
evidence of actual confusion, though, this factor would
have been difficult for Brown to prove. Football fans are
generally zealous followers of specific players and teams
for decades, which almost assures a finding that there is
a high level of consumer care about whether Jim Brown
is in Madden. EA is aware that its historic players are
also an important part of its NFL games. In addition to
the exhibition mode, EA also released a special addition
to the newest version of Madden NFL called the AFL
Legacy Pack, which allows users to play games against
the original American Football League (AFL) teams.33
Clearly, specific players from throughout the history
of professional football are just as interesting to users
as the current players. It is clear that Brown’s likeness
was specifically targeted by EA to include in the game
given his reputation as the greatest football player of all
time coupled with the strong user interest in Madden
that historic players generate. Finally, EA continues to
expand its Madden games, and with high user interest
in looking back to historic players and playing other old
teams, it is clear that without any action, Brown’s image
would continue to be appropriated by EA without his
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Alexander Sliwinski, Madden 10 AFL Legacy Pack Takes
the Field Sept. 24, Joystiq, Sept. 9, 2009, http://www.joystiq.
com/2009/09/09/madden-10-afl-legacy-pack-takes-the-fieldsept-24/.
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approval.
Without asserting the Abercrombie factors, the
court is left with a scaled down infringement argument
that does not correspond as closely to traditional
infringement analyses that apply to goods. Instead, the
court applies the basic test for false endorsement laid out
in the statute, which requires the plaintiff to first show
that he has a legally protectable mark. Courts have held
that a celebrity’s persona can serve as a legally protectable
mark,34 especially when the celebrity’s name, voice,
appearance, or likeness is well known to a large portion
of the public. Brown argued that he is well known
to the entire football-viewing public as the “greatest
football player of all time,” given his induction into
the NFL Hall of Fame, College Football Hall of Fame,
and the Lacrosse Hall of Fame.35 He also claims to have
“achieved significant fame and recognition off the field
as a star of both film and television over the last four
decades.”36 Applying Brown’s arguments to the general
pool of athletes, it is clear that athletes only have a legally
protectable mark if they have gained significant fame or
have developed a recognizable and distinctive attribute
or likeness. Without the added factor of fame, it would
be difficult for an athlete to succeed in an infringement
suit because he would have little evidence to show
damage to a persona that few people recognize.
The next step of the analysis is determining
whether the athlete owns the mark. When Brown was
a player in the NFL, he did not have the opportunity
to negotiate licensing terms of his likeness like current
players do at the start of their contracts, nor could he
have envisioned the evolution of the sports and video
games industries into behemoth money makers that
use players’ images as vehicles for profits. Because
Brown never licensed his persona to any video game
manufacturers in connection with his role as a star
athlete for the Cleveland Browns, he is the definitive
owner of his mark and has “retained exclusive ownership
34. 5 Thomas J. McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair
Competition § 28:15 (4th ed. 2009). See also White v. Samsung
Electronic American, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1992)
(“In cases involving confusion over endorsement by a celebrity
plaintiff, “mark” means the celebrity’s persona.”); Allen v. National
Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (adopting the
view that a person’s name, persona and personal attributes can be
considered a “mark” that can be protected if that person has built
up a reputation by investing in a particular public image and if the
name and likeness of the person are well-known).
35. Brown Complaint, supra note 5, at 3-4.
36. Id. at ¶ 12. See Jim Brown, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/
name/nm0000987/ (listing fifty-six movies in which Brown has appeared as an actor).

and control in his likeness.”37 Most “historical” players
who are not current professional athletes but are featured
in sports games likely face similar circumstances as those
of Brown and have retained the exclusive ownership of
their persona. Current professional athletes, however, do
not maintain ownership over their likeness in several key
areas, particularly when they are acting as employees or
representatives of their teams.
Finally, the most crucial element in proving
infringement is a showing of confusion of the plaintiff’s
sponsorship. Preventing consumer confusion is one
of the bedrocks of trademark law, and the Lanham
Act is structured around protecting consumers from
confusion in the marketplace to assist in a more efficient
economy. In addition to confusion, the Lanham Act
also rewards mark owners for the good will they have
put into the product to encourage clear and truthful
advertising. With these policy goals in mind, Brown
argued that EA’s inclusion of such a similar character
in physical attributes and team connection to Brown’s
real-life athletic image and exploits can create confusion
as to whether Brown endorsed the product. Despite
these similarities, the court in Brown held that EA’s First
Amendment right to speech through video games was a
complete defense to Brown’s false endorsement claim.38
The confusion claim would have been boosted
by a showing of other factors that the court takes into
consideration when considering false endorsement
claims such as Brown’s. Specifically, Brown should
have shown or described exactly how similar the virtual
character was to the real person. Without a visual image
of Brown’s picture next to a screenshot of the game
or a detailed description of the similarities between
the two characters on factors like height, weight, and
distinguishing characteristics, the court had a difficult
time assessing the lengths that EA went to copy the
likeness and persona of Brown.39 As one of 1,500
characters in the game, Brown failed to show how EA’s
copy of his persona was distinct from any of the other
historical players’ virtual characters, despite his place in
athletic history as one of the greatest players of all time.40
By not mentioning any of these additional factors,
Brown did not assert all of the issues courts look at to
help them decide trademark cases. Courts are rarely
37. Brown Complaint, supra note 5, at 7.
38. Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-01598-FMC-RZx,
p. 5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2009).
39. Id. at p. 8 (“Mere use of the likeness, without more, is insufficient to make the use explicitly misleading.”).
40. Id. at p. 8.
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clear about how they weigh the various factors in their
analysis, so by not making all the possible arguments,
Brown presented a weaker case than he could have.
The failure of Brown’s case is not indicative of
the strength of this claim overall, though. If athletes can
bring cases that have a substantial amount of evidence
in their favor, and can also show that the video game
manufacturers acted in bad faith and hurt the good
will that the athletes have put into their mark, the First
Amendment defense will likely not stand up to the
trademark law. However, in this case, the court did
not have any strong evidence to show that EA explicitly
copied Brown’s image, persona and likeness to sell more
video games, an action that would obviously mislead
consumers into thinking that Brown endorsed the
game.41 In the absence of strong evidence to support
Brown’s claim of false endorsement, the court took
the easy path and precluded further consideration of
the Lanham Act claim by deciding that video games
deserved First Amendment protection.42 Had Brown
presented images of his character next to screenshots
of his Madden character, the court might have better
understood the possibility of confusion presented by
EA’s use of almost identical images and attributes.
Instead, without any images of the video game, the court
had to blindly follow the trademark claims. Absent
these crucial images, it was easier for the court to err
on the side of free speech than on an individual’s right
to his likeness. The Brown case faltered because Brown
could not show how the virtual character’s representation
harmed his image with his fans or his future profitmaking potential by altering his public persona.
Despite Brown’s failure to put forth enough
facts to support his claims was a critical error, but the
court’s eagerness to skirt the substantive issue Brown
raised about protection of his likeness under the Lanham
Act in favor of a weak First Amendment argument
was equally erroneous. The court held that the First
Amendment is a complete defense to Brown’s false
endorsement claim under the Lanham Act, and that
video games count as a form of expression protected by
the First Amendment.43 The cases that the court relies
upon, however, focus on the affirmative right for violent
video games to exist under the First Amendment.44
41. Id.
42. Id. at pp. 6-9
43. Id. at p. 5 (quoting Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 958 (9th Cir. 2009)).
44. The court cites three cases to support its statement that video
games are a form of expression that can be protected by the First
Amendment. See id.; Kirby v. Sega of America, 144 Cal. App. 4th
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While some people might see football as a violent sport,
the contents of Madden, which only simulates football
game playing, does not rise to the same level of violence
depicted in video games that simulate war, death and
criminal activity. The subject matter of Madden is not
in the same category of any of the games mentioned
by the court. Additionally, the cases cited by the court
only address the question of whether the video games are
allowed to exist, and do not tackle the issue of whether
the First Amendment precludes the trademark rights of
a former NFL player whose likeness is appropriated in a
video game.
Another argument proffered by the court is that
Madden NFL contains enough creative elements that it
qualifies as an expressive work that is protected under
the First Amendment.45 Citing the creativity of the
game producers in how they “realistically replicate NFL
football” and create and compile the “stadiums, athletes,
coaches, fans, sound effects, music, and commentary,”
the court finds Madden to be an expressive work.46 In
the supporting case, Romantics v. Activision Publishing,
Inc.,47 the popular rock band, the Romantics, sued the
producer of the Guitar Hero video game that simulates
music playing. The court in Romantics found that the
game was an expressive work because of the presence of
a story line and character development.48 Madden has
a similar type of story line as Guitar Hero, in that the
users control how the story line moves, but the game
clearly moves from one moment in time to another,
especially in the franchise mode. EA has also included a
substantial amount of character development in Madden,
studying the specific movements of each player to help
mimic the athletes as realistically as possible in the
game. Both the story line and character development
are present in Madden, but it is still distinguishable from
Romantics because the contested content in Romantics
is a song, rather than the image of the band. Music
is highly creative and easily protected under the First
Amendment, but the actions of athletes in sporting
events is anything but a creative endeavor. Indeed,
the point of Madden is to create as realistic a sporting
simulation as possible, whereas Guitar Hero encourages
the creative outlet of music creation.
47, 58 (Ct. App. Cal. 2006); Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St.
Louis, 329 F.3d 954, 956-58 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that “violent”
video games are a protected form of speech).
45. Brown, supra note 37, at 7 (citing Romantics v. Activision
Publ’g, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 758, 765-66 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
46. Id.
47. 574 F. Supp. 2d 758 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
48. Romantics, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 766.
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Finally, the court dismisses the idea that just
because Madden is meant to be realistic does not mean it
cannot be protected under the First Amendment. Citing
a case about a Tiger Woods portraitist, ETW Corp. v.
Jireh Publishing,49 the court concludes that realism in
expression does not preclude protection of the First
Amendment.50 In ETW, defendant published work by
an artist who created a painting called “The Masters of
Augusta” that commemorated Tiger Woods’s victory
at the Masters Tournament.51 The court struck down
ETW’s Lanham Act theory of false endorsement in
favor of Jireh’s First Amendment claim because “in
general the Lanham Act should be construed to apply
to artistic works only where the public interest in
avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public
interest in free expression,”52 and consumer confusion
would be minimal as a result of the painting. Although
ETW presents a strong case for the protection of free
expression under the First Amendment, it deals with a
painting that was carefully recreated by hand and eye
from a live event. Instead, in Madden, EA used facts
rather than interpretations to create the video game
and the players’ pages. Without interpreting and
reimagining the facts, EA’s actions should be considered
manufacturing instead of expression. EA manufactured
aspects of Brown’s and other retired players’ likenesses
to make the game more realistic and make sure that the
statistics, appearances, team affiliations and positions
were similar enough to such a recognizable player as
Brown that the players would understand and appreciate
the addition of Brown into the line-up. The First
Amendment analysis could have been better suited to
the specific facts of this case. Without such attention
to the issues involved in Brown’s complaint, the court
in this case entered an opinion without considering the
full extent of the Lanham Act claims and instead jumped
into a First Amendment analysis that was misplaced.
The recent lawsuits filed by former athletes
for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act,
though unsuccessful thus far, are important checks on
the appropriation of images that sports marketers and
advertisers have increasingly utilized to create more
realistic video games. Athletes’ rights under Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act are the best avenue for athletes
to pursue when seeking enforcement of the rights to

their valuable persona, and should not be overlooked
merely because of these initial setbacks. Courts are
more than willing to enforce trademark claims for
celebrities and athletes, particularly when the mark
infringement directly harms the plaintiff’s public image.
The Lanham Act is sufficiently broad to include claims
such as Brown’s given past case history, but the cases
brought thus far were not strong enough to justify an
infringement decision.

49. 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003).
50. Brown, supra note 37, at 7.
51. ETW, 332 F.3d at 918.
52. Id. at 927.
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Pharmaceutical Patents, Paragraph IV, and Pay-for-Delay: The Landscape
of Drug Patent Litigation and the Lessons Provided for the Recently Passed
Biosimilar Approval Pathway
By Brett Havranek1
The1Hatch-Waxman Amendments created
a three-way intersection between pharmaceutical,
intellectual property, and antitrust law, but there is
no stop sign, and collisions are common. The laws
governing generic drug approval incentivize the
filing of patent infringement
suits, which often lead to
reverse settlements where the
manufacturers of patented drugs
pay their generic competitors
to remain off the market. In
1984, Congress passed the
Hatch-Waxman Amendments,
a major revision to the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which
hoped to strike the difficult
balance between encouraging research and development
of new drugs and the desire for a robust generic drug
industry that could supply the public with inexpensive
medication.2 To bolster the generic industry, Congress
created a unique exception to patent exclusivity, allowing
generic drug manufacturers to research, develop, and
test their products to prepare them for submission to
the FDA, all without infringing the innovator’s patents.3
The generic’s new privileges are counterbalanced in
part by allowing the patent holder to immediately
and unilaterally halt the FDA’s approval of the generic

1. Brett Havranek, 2011 J.D. Candidate at the Washington College of Law at American University. A.B. in Biology and Economics
in 2006 at Washington University in St. Louis. Prior to writing
this article, the author was employed in the pharmaceutical research
industry monitoring clinical trials, but the author was not affiliated
with any of the litigants in the cases discussed.
2. See Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 137071 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Under the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (the ‘Hatch Waxman Amendments’ to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (‘FFDCA’)),
Congress struck a balance between two competing policy interests:
(1) inducing pioneering research and development of new drugs and
(2) enabling competitors to bring low-cost, generic copies of those
drugs to market.”).
3. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2009) (excluding the use of a patented invention for purposes related to an FDA submission from
the definition of infringement).
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for up to thirty months.4 This gives the patentee5 an
advantageous legal position to exploit, where, by filing
for patent infringement, a competitor is automatically
prevented from entering the market. The unique
economics of the pharmaceutical industry provide a
wide set of legal options for the patentee,
from simply buying monopoly time by
pursuing the infringement action, to
actually paying the defendant to settle
the case and refrain from competing in
the drug market. These so-called “reverse
settlement” or “pay-for-delay” cases
have drawn the attention of government
antitrust regulators6 and Congress,7 while
causing some inconsistencies between the
circuits and some ambiguity as to where
each circuit stands on the legality of reverse payments.8
Part I of this Article briefly discusses
pharmacoeconomics and the drug development process
to elucidate why infringement actions are so common
and why reverse settlements are relatively unique to
the pharmaceutical industry. Part II details the generic
drug approval process originally set up by the HatchWaxman Act and explains how the law bypasses the
usual judicial balancing of equities in the preliminary
injunction process, which ultimately incentivizes filing
infringement suits. Part III explores the eventual results
of drug patent infringement suits and the legal issues
they create: Once filed, these suits are difficult for
the generic to challenge and may last for a long time,
4. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2009).
5. This Article uses the terms “patentee,” “innovator,” and “brand”
interchangeably, as is common in the drug industry. In some
circumstances, a generic can actually be its own brand, and these
are called “branded generics,” but here, “brand” refers only to the
innovator.
6. See, e.g., Health Care Div., Fed. Trade Comm’n, Overview of
FTC Antitrust Actions in Pharmaceutical Services and Products
(2009).
7. See, e.g., Tracy Staton, Congress Grills Generics Firms on Payfor-Delay, FiercePharma, June 4, 2009, available at http://www.
fiercepharma.com/story/congress-grills-generics-firms-pay-delay/2009-06-04 for excerpts of recent Congressional hearings on
pay-for-delay.
8. See infra Part III.

Spring 2010

thereby creating favorable conditions for the generic
to enter into a mutually beneficial reverse settlement
agreement with the brand. In these agreements, the
brand pays the generic not to market its product, and
in doing so, the brand guarantees its profitable market
exclusivity. These agreements can straddle the line
between an exercise of the innovator’s lawful patent
monopoly rights and an antitrust injury to other generic
competitors and consumers. Part IV applies the lessons
learned from twenty-five years under the Hatch-Waxman
approval regime to Congress’s latest legislation: the new
approval process for generic biologic medicines. The
current biosimilar pathway contains a set of provisions
that can be used together in conjunction with a reverse
settlement to prolong an innovator’s exclusivity period
while providing a defense to antitrust challenges.
Part I — Drug Development and Pharmacoeconomics
Unlike virtually all other patented products, new
drugs have an especially long development10 process
and require FDA approval before they can be lawfully
marketed.11 Three to six years before involving the
FDA, the research process typically begins by screening
between 5000 and 10,000 potential drug molecules,
followed by further laboratory and animal studies on
approximately 250 of the most promising candidates.12
Of these 250 candidates, only about five are suitable
for human trials, for which the sponsor must file an
Investigational New Drug Application (IND) to notify
the FDA of its intent to initiate clinical trials.13 Filing an
IND triggers a significant set of regulatory requirements
that apply throughout the remainder of the drug’s
testing,14 burdening the innovator without providing
any guarantee of success. Once the IND is in effect,
the five potential drugs are subjected to three successive
9

9. The terms “drug” and “pharmaceutical” are sometimes used
nonspecifically in the literature and may encompass both biologics/
biopharmaceuticals and traditional small-molecule drugs/pharmaceuticals. A significant part of this Article deals with the legal
interactions between generic manufacturers and patentees, but as
of this writing, there are no approved generic biologics. Therefore,
when possible, the statistics presented here disaggregate the two
markets. In this Article, “drug” and “pharmaceutical” are used to
refer to traditional small-molecule drugs.
10. When discussing the development of a new drug in this Article, the author assumes the new drug to be a new chemical entity,
not just a reformulation of an existing product.
11. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2009).
12. Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Pharmaceutical Industry Profile 2009 36 (2009) [hereinafter PhRMA
Profile].
13. See id.; see also 21 C.F.R. § 312.20 (2009) (explaining when an
IND is required to be submitted to the FDA).
14. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. pt. 312 (2009).

phases of clinical trials15 over the next six to seven
years. Statistically, only one and a half of the candidates
progress to the final stage (phase III) of the trial process16
where they are able to accumulate data demonstrating
safety and substantial evidence of effectiveness17 that
supports the filing of a New Drug Application (NDA)
with the FDA.18 Another six months19 to two years pass
during the FDA’s typical review of the NDAs, and on
average, only one drug ultimately receives approval for
sale and marketing.20 Even when the NDA is approved,
the FDA requires additional post-approval (phase IV)
research21 in 72% of new drugs.22
The entire process, resulting in one FDAapproved drug, typically takes ten to fifteen years to
complete.23 There is some disagreement about the
average cost to develop one approved new drug, but
the most recent estimates include $802 million in a
2002 study24 (excluding an additional $95 million for
post-approval research costs, adjusted down to approvalyear dollars),25 $1.3 billion in a 2005 study,26 and $1.7
billion in a 2002 study (including the costs of preparing
15. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2009) (listing the phases of clinical
trials).
16. See Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New
Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. Health Econ. 151, 162
(2003) (estimating that the probability of phase III entry is 31.4%).
17. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2009) (requiring that proof of safety
and substantial evidence of effectiveness).
18. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (2009) (listing all the requirements for
an NDA).
19. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(1) (2009) (requiring a decision by the
FDA on drug applications within 180 days, but allowing a longer
period if the applicant agrees).
20. PhRMA Profile, supra note 12, at 36.
21. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.85 (2009) (allowing the FDA to tie marketing approval with the applicant’s agreement to conduct phase IV
research).
22. See Accenture, The Pursuit of High Performance Through Research and Development – Understanding Pharmaceutical Research
and Development Cost Drivers 17 (Pharmaceutical Research Manufacturers of America 2007) available at http://www.phrma.org/files/
Accenture%20R&D%20Report-2007.pdf (“The FDA is increasingly requiring companies to commit to post-approval activities. In
2005, 13 (72 percent) of the 18 new molecular entities approved
required post-marketing activities, ranging from a single human in
vivo drug interaction study to a large randomized safety study to
assess major clinical outcomes.”).
23. See PhRMA Profile, supra note 12, at 36.
24. See DiMasi, supra note 16, at 166 (“Our base case out-of-pocket cost per approved new drug is US$ 403 million, while our fully
capitalized total cost estimate is US$ 802 million.”).
25. See id. at 173. The total out-of-pocket capitalized cost in
approval-year dollars is broken down so that the pre-approval cost is
$802 million and the post approval cost is $95 million. The money
spent on post-approval research does include an average of 15% on
improvements to already-approved drugs. Id.
26. PhRMA Profile, supra note 12, at 39.
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to market the drug).27 These extremely high research
and development costs are reflected in the industry’s
overall research spending of approximately $52 billion in
2005.28
The high cost of initial development stands in
stark contrast to the relatively simple and inexpensive
process of gaining approval for a generic drug. The most
important element of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments
to the pharmaceutical industry was its creation of
an expedited method for generic manufacturers to
gain FDA approval for their products.29 Generic
manufacturers are allowed to file an Abbreviated New
Drug Application (ANDA) in which they need only to
demonstrate that their generic is the same as a branded
drug (bioequivalence) and do not have to re-prove
that the drug is safe and effective.30 Under the more
lenient ANDA requirements, the cost of obtaining FDA
approval for a generic drug is only a few million dollars,
which creates a major dichotomy in development costs
between innovators and generics.31
As an incentive for generic manufacturers to
challenge innovator patents, the law gives the first
generic applicant to submit a substantially complete
ANDA 180 days of marketing exclusivity before other
ANDAs can be approved by the FDA.32 Originally,
the first Paragraph IV ANDA filer was required to
successfully defend against a patentee’s infringement
suit to qualify for the 180 days of exclusivity,33 but this
27. See Accenture, supra note 22, at 4 (“Though estimates differ,
one source suggests that the cost of an approved pharmaceutical
drug, including average launch costs, has gone up from 1.1 billion
in 1995-2000 to 1.7 billion in 2000-2002.”).
28. See Accenture, supra note 22, at 4 (“Approximately $51.8 billion was spent by US biopharmaceutical companies alone in 2005.
R&D spending by Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers
of America (PhRMA) member companies, representing the top
pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies in the United States,
went up 53.5 percent, from $26 billion in 2000 to $39.9 billion
in 2005.”) (citation omitted). This aggregate statistic may include
spending on the development of biologics as well as traditional
drugs but is nevertheless illustrative of the massive costs of researching new medicines.
29. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2009).
30. See id. § 355(j)(2)(A).
31. See Henry G. Grabowski, Patents and New Product Development in the Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Industries, in Science
and Cents: Exploring the Economics of Biotechnology 87, 90 (John
V. Duca & Mine K. Yucel eds., Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas)
(2003) (“Generic firms can file an abbreviated new drug application
(ANDA). The ANDA process only takes a few years and typically
costs a few million dollars.”).
32. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2009).
33. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(c)(1) (1998); see also In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (“FDA regulation in effect conditioned the first Paragraph IV
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requirement was officially eliminated in 1998.34 Now,
successful judgment on the patent for a subsequent
ANDA filer can force the first filer to either begin or
forfeit its exclusivity period.35
The extremely high costs associated with
developing a single marketable pharmaceutical product
only begin to set the stage for reverse settlements and
other arguably anticompetitive behavior. The market
for pharmaceuticals is extremely lopsided, where the
“blockbuster” drugs comprising the top decile of the
market generate eighty percent of all drug sales.36 In fact,
the drug market is so lopsided that eighty percent of all
pharmaceuticals will never recoup their own research
and development costs.37 The extreme profitability of a
small proportion of drugs creates a powerful incentive
for brand name manufacturers to preserve their
marketing exclusivity, resulting in unique legal strategies
such as pay-for-delay.
While innovators have a strong financial reason
to preserve their monopolies, generic manufacturers have
comparatively much less to gain by entering the market.
Although a generic is supposed to be equivalent in
efficacy to its brand-name competitor, the prices charged
by generics and brands are very different. The decrease
in the innovator’s profits due to the generic’s arrival
is normally much higher than the generic’s potential
profit were it to enter the market. Thus, if the innovator
were to pay its potential generic competitor the entire
amount of the generic’s expected profit in exchange for
an agreement to stay off the market or to delay entry,
the innovator would still see higher profits than if it
were competing with the generic.38 An examination of
the national drug market is illustrative: while branded
ANDA filer’s right to the 180-day exclusivity period on a ‘successful
defense’ of its Paragraph IV ANDA against the patent holder.”).
34. See 63 Fed. Reg. 59710 (Nov. 5, 1998).
35. See 21 U.S.C. §355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(AA); See also Caraco
Pharm. Lab. v. Forest Lab., 527 F.3d 1278, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(“Only the first Paragraph IV ANDA filer can trigger its 180-day
exclusivity period via the commercial-marketing trigger. However,
subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA filers can trigger the first Paragraph
IV ANDA filer’s 180-day exclusivity period via the court-judgment
trigger.”) (citation omitted).
36. See Congressional Research Service, Patent Law and Its Application to the Pharmaceutical Industry: An Examination of the
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984
(“The Hatch-Waxman Act”), Congressional Research Service 38-39
(2005).
37. See PhRMA Profile, supra note 12, at 39.
38. See FTC, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration, Federal Trade Commission viii (2002) (“a generic applicant’s potential
liability for lost profits on the brand-name drug usually will vastly
exceed its own potential profits after market entry.”).
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drugs make up only 28.5% of prescriptions dispensed,
they still account for 78.4% of the money spent on
prescriptions.39 On an individual drug level, brand name
prescriptions sold for an average of 3.5 times more than
their generic counterparts in 2007.40 In only one-year’s
time, the 2008 innovator-to-generic price ratio has risen
to 3.941 despite the preexisting disparity.
The substantial price differences between
innovators and generics, the high research and
development costs associated with new pharmaceuticals,
and the uncertainty that any drug candidate in the
innovator’s development pipeline will attain blockbuster
profitability give patentees a strong incentive to preserve
and prolong market exclusivity. These factors allow
for reverse settlements in which the brand and the
generic both make more money if the generic stays
off the market. The increasing prices of branded
drugs compared to their generic counterparts should
make these settlements even more profitable in the
future. From an economic perspective, as long as the
innovator’s potential loss vastly exceeds the generic
manufacturer’s potential gain, reverse settlements
will offer a Pareto improvement42 for pharmaceutical
suppliers when the number of potential generic
entrants is small. Accordingly, the industry association
representing generic manufacturers supports reverse
patent settlements43 as does the industry association for

innovators.44
Part II — The Unique Legal Status of
Pharmaceutical Patents

Patents typically afford the holder twenty years
of exclusivity to market a product.45 However, when
the patented article is a drug, the patent holder must
also wait for the FDA’s approval before selling it.46 For
the pharmaceutical patent holder, this means the actual
amount of sales exclusivity before a generic becomes
available is typically between ten and fifteen years.47
Not surprisingly, the increased incentive to challenge
the patents on blockbuster drugs results in these drugs
having average exclusivity periods toward the bottom of
this range.48
As part of the tradeoff for allowing generics
to rely on the original safety and efficacy data in the
innovator’s NDA, the generic is required to submit:
(A) a certification . . . with respect to each patent
which claims the drug for which such investigations were
conducted or which claims a use for such drug for which
the applicant is seeking approval under this subsection
and for which information is required to be filed . . .
(i) that such patent information has not been
filed,
(ii) that such patent has expired,
(iii) of the date on which such patent will expire,
or
(iv) that such patent is invalid or will not be
39. See Generic Pharmaceutical Association, Celebrating the Past
Defining the Future 28 (2009).
infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug
40. See Facts at a Glance | Generic Pharmaceutical Association,
for which the application is submitted . . . .49
available at http://www.gphaonline.org/about-gpha/about-generics/
To generic manufacturers, the most
facts (last visited Nov. 5, 2009) (“In 2007, the average retail price of
a generic prescription drug was $34.34. The average retail price of a
important of these certifications is the Paragraph IV
brand name prescription drug was $119.51. (source: The National
certification because it potentially leads to a challenge
Association of Chain Drug Stores, 2007)”).
41. See Industry Facts-at-a-Glance, National Association of Chain
Drug Stores, http://www.nacds.org/wmspage.cfm?parm1=6536 (last
visited Nov. 5, 2009) (stating that the average brand name prescription price in 2008 was $137.90, and the average generic price in
2008 was $35.22).
42. A Pareto improvement is a situation where resources are allocated to make one entity better off without hurting anyone else.
Here, the brand can afford to pay its generic competitors all of the
money they would have made by selling their products, or could
even agree to pay more money than the generics could have possibly
made in the market, all while still remaining better off than if it
were competing with the generics. Because no one is worse off and
some (or all) are better off, these reverse settlement agreements that
create a Pareto improvement are a natural occurrence. The allocations analyzed here which result in a Pareto improvement are only
the potential supply allocations and resulting profits among drug
manufacturers, not the allocations among suppliers and consumers.
43. Patent Settlements | Generic Pharmaceutical Association,
http://www.gphaonline.org/issues/patent-settlements (last visited
Oct. 18, 2009) (“GPhA opposes an outright ban on settlements as a
means of resolving patent litigation.”).

44. See PHRMA – PhRMA Statement on Authorized Generics,
http://www.phrma.org/news_room/press_releases/phrma_statement_on_authorized_generics (last visited Nov. 5, 2009) (“[I]t is
unfortunate that the FTC used this potentially valuable report . .
. to further its attack on patent settlements. Neither authorized
generics nor patent settlements have discouraged the availability of
generics to patients.”).
45. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2009).
46. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2009).
47. See Henry G. Grabowskia & Margaret Kyleb, Generic Competition and Market Exclusivity Periods in Pharmaceuticals, 28 Managerial & Decision Econ. 491, 493 (2007) (“The NMEs [(New
Molecular Entities)] in the two smallest [market] size categories
have the longest MEPs [(Market Exclusivity Periods)] with averages of approximately 15 years. By contrast, the average MEPs for
market size categories above $100 million are in the 10.5–12.5 year
range.”).
48. See id.
49. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A) (2009) (emphasis added).
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of the innovator’s patent.50 When generics make this
certification, they must agree to notify the patent holder
of their intention to seek approval of the drug.51 This
notice must include a statement of the legal and factual
basis for the generic’s belief that it will not infringe
the innovator’s patent.52 When the generic makes a
Paragraph IV certification, the FDA cannot make any
approval effective for forty-five days, giving the patentee
an opportunity to file an infringement suit.53 If the
patentee files an infringement suit against the generic,
the FDA cannot approve the generic’s ANDA for thirty
months,54 unless the generic wins the infringement
case.55
The key effect of Paragraph IV is to dramatically
increase the innovator’s incentive to file suit because
the existence of an infringement suit alone has the
same ultimate effect as a judicially-granted injunction:
the generic manufacturer is prevented from selling its
product because it cannot gain the necessary approval.56
The law does not provide any way for a generic with a
strong case for non-infringement to continue with the
approval process, except to get a ruling that the patent
is invalid or has not been infringed.57 Still, a ruling
may take considerable time, usually not less than thirty
months.58 By contrast, in a normal patent infringement
proceeding, the patentee would have to petition the
court for a preliminary injunction, and the court would
weigh the following four factors, the first two of which
are required: “(1) a reasonable likelihood of success on
the merits; (2) irreparable harm if an injunction is not
granted; (3) a balance of hardships tipping in its favor;
and (4) the injunction’s favorable impact on the public
interest.”59 A recent case illustrated the inconsistency of
the two approaches when an innovator pharmaceutical
company’s thirty-month Hatch-Waxman “injunction”
expired, and the innovator had to request a judicially50. See id. § 355(b)(2)(A)(iv).
51. See id. § 355(b)(3)(A); id. § 355(b)(3)(C).
52. See id. § 355(b)(3)(D)(ii).
53. See id. § 355(c)(3)(C).
54. Id.
55. See id. § 355(c)(3)(C)(i).
56. See id. § 355(c)(3)(C); id. § 355(a).
57. See id. § 355(c)(3)(C)(i).
58. See FTC, supra note 38, at iv (“The data also do not indicate
that court decisions in ANDA-related patent litigation typically are
reached much earlier than 30 months from notice of the generic’s
ANDA.”). See also, for example, Altana Pharma AG v. Teva Pharm.
USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 999 (Fed. Cir. 2009), where the infringement
proceedings were still in progress after the expiration of the HatchWaxman stay.
59. See Altana, 566 F.3d at 1005.
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imposed preliminary injunction.60 The district court
found that the patentee failed to establish a likelihood
of success on the merits and irreparable harm,61 and on
appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s
denial of injunctive relief.62 In this case, the automatic
thirty-month stay gave the patentee a significant amount
of market exclusivity that would have never been
available to a non-pharmaceutical patentee.
Part III — Pay-for-Delay and Antitrust
The economics of the pharmaceutical market
combine with the Hatch-Waxman generic approval
scheme to incentivize and facilitate reverse settlement
payments from patentees to generics. In any case,
innovators can decide to file an infringement suit
irrespective of any intent to settle, opting simply to
prolong the litigation and enjoy thirty months of
exclusivity before the FDA can approve the generic. In
either of these situations, little recourse is available to
competing generics and the public.
Challenges to the legality of reverse payments
have been made on antitrust grounds, and challenges to
the patentee’s filing of an infringement suit have been
made on both antitrust and Rule 11 grounds. Except in
cases where fraud is alleged, neither approach has been
particularly successful. If the innovator’s initial filing of
an infringement suit is fought under an antitrust theory
of delaying generic competitors from coming to market,
the innovator is often immunized from antitrust liability
because it is only trying to enforce its constitutional
patent exclusivity rights.63 If the filing of suit is contested
under Rule 11, two legal facts, that patents are presumed
valid and that filing an ANDA is a technical act of
60. See id. at 1004 (“On or about April 6, 2004, Teva filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application (‘ANDA’) pursuant to the HatchWaxman Act . . . . Sun filed similarly directed ANDA applications
on or about March 1, 2005, and June 25, 2005. Both Teva and Sun
filed paragraph IV certifications in conjunction with their respective ANDA applications. . . . Altana filed a motion for preliminary
injunction on June 22, 2007.”).
61. See id. at 1005 (“Based on Altana’s failure to establish either a
likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm, the district
court denied the motion for preliminary injunction.”).
62. See id. at 1011.
63. See Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Elan Corp., 421 F.3d 1227, 1234
(11th Cir. 2005) (“Based on this precedent, we agree with the
district court that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine shields Elan from
antitrust liability for filing two patent infringement suits against
Andrx in relation to the manufacture and sale of controlled release
naproxen. The United States Constitution expressly permits the
government to grant exclusive monopolies in the form of patents,
and therefore the Sherman Act cannot be read to impede a litigant
from seeking to defend constitutionally-permitted patent rights.”)
(citation omitted).
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infringement, combine such that there is usually a
non-frivolous basis for filing suit.64 Therefore, in many
cases, the act of filing an infringement suit cannot be
challenged with any reasonable expectation of success,
leaving only the settlement agreements themselves
potentially vulnerable to attack.
By the very nature of a lawsuit, a claimant
files suit alleging some harm in the hopes of getting
a favorable legal determination, money, or both.
Therefore, when a claimant alleging patent infringement
in a Paragraph IV suit offers money to the alleged
wrongdoer, the settlement seems puzzling. When the
patentee actually pays the infringing generic more
money to settle the case than the generic could possibly
have made selling its product, the result becomes
downright “suspicious”65 in light of the Sherman Act,
which bars contracts and combinations that restrain
trade66 and prohibits any attempt to monopolize
commerce.67 Nevertheless, the courts of appeals, except
possibly the Sixth Circuit whose position is particularly
ambiguous,68 have upheld the legality of some of these
agreements, as long as their terms stay “within the
exclusionary zone of the patent.”69
The confusion over pay-for-delay began when
the Sixth Circuit first declared a reverse settlement
agreement illegal. The Sixth Circuit decided the first
Paragraph IV settlement antitrust case, In re Cardizem
64. See, e.g., Celgene Corp. v. KV Pharm. Co., No. 07-4819, 2008
WL 2856469 at *3 (D.N.J. July 22, 2008) (“[T]he act of infringement alleged in the complaint is the filing of an ANDA—not the
manufacture or sale of the product. Because the Act has made
the act of submitting an ANDA itself an act of infringement, in a
Hatch-Waxman ANDA case, the attorney can conduct a reasonable
and competent inquiry into the act of infringement by investigating
whether a relevant ANDA has been filed.”).
65. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 208
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (“There is something on the face of it that does
seem ‘suspicious’ about a patent holder settling patent litigation
against a potential generic manufacturer by paying that manufacturer more than either party anticipates the manufacturer would earn
by winning the lawsuit and entering the newly competitive market
in competition with the patent holder. Why, after all—viewing the
settlement through an antitrust lens—should the potential competitor be permitted to receive such a windfall at the ultimate expense of
drug purchasers?”).
66. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2009).
67. See id. § 2.
68. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544
F.3d 1323, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“To the extent that the Sixth
Circuit may have found a per se antitrust violation based solely on
the reverse payments, we respectfully disagree.”).
69. See id. at 1336 (“The essence of the inquiry is whether the
agreements restrict competition beyond the exclusionary zone of
the patent. This analysis has been adopted by the Second and the
Eleventh Circuits . . . and we find it to be completely consistent
with Supreme Court precedent.”).

CD Antitrust Litigation, where an innovator agreed to
pay the first-filing generic manufacturer $40 million per
year not to sell any generic equivalent of the patented
drug and to not relinquish its right to the 180-day
exclusivity period.70 The court classified the agreement
as a per se antitrust violation, noting that the 180-day
exclusivity provision acted to delay other potential
entrants and that the agreement inhibited competition
by paying the innovator’s only potential competitor to
stay out of the market.71 The court said that “HMR’s
agreement to pay Andrx $40 million per year not to
bring its generic product to market . . . is a naked,
horizontal restraint of trade that is per se illegal.”72 The
Sixth Circuit’s reasoning looks more to the character
of the settlement agreement and its actual effects on
competition, rather than focusing as intently on the
scope of the agreement with respect to the patent.
Unlike the Sixth Circuit, the Eleventh
Circuit took a more lenient stance on reverse
settlements. Shortly after the Sixth Circuit’s decision,
the Eleventh Circuit weighed in on reverse settlements
in Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals Inc., when
an innovator entered into reverse payment settlements
with two of its generic competitors.73 Though the terms
of these settlements were similar to those in Cardizem,74
the Eleventh Circuit decided that settlements were not
per se antitrust violations.75 When determining if there
was antitrust liability, the court examined whether the
settlement agreements extended beyond the exclusionary
power granted by the patent.76 Although at least one
agreement contained a provision protecting the generic’s
180-day exclusivity77 and the agreements might have
gone beyond prohibiting only infringing generics, the
court felt the per se label was still not appropriate.78
On its face, the Eleventh Circuit’s precedent appears
to conflict with the Sixth Circuit’s holding. The
Eleventh Circuit noted that “[t]he failure to produce the
70. 332 F.3d 896, 902 (6th Cir. 2003).
71. Id. at 907-08.
72. Id. at 911.
73. 344 F.3d 1294, 1300 (11th Cir. 2003).
74. Id. at 1311 n.25.
75. Id. at 1309.
76. See id. at 1305-06.
77. See id. at 1300 (“Geneva agreed not to transfer or sell its rights
under its ANDAs, including its right to the 180-day exclusivity
period. Geneva also agreed to oppose any subsequent ANDA applicant’s attempt to seek approval of its application based on Geneva’s
failure to satisfy the then-existing successful defense requirement
and to join and support any attempt by Abbott to seek an extension
of the 30-month stay of FDA approval on Geneva’s tablet ANDA.”).
78. Id. at 1306 n.18.
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competing . . . drug, rather than the payment of money,
is the exclusionary effect,”79 highlighting the Eleventh
Circuit’s interest in the scope of the agreements rather
than the size of the payments or their practical effect.
The Second Circuit was the next court to decide
a pay-for-delay case, and it followed the Eleventh
Circuit’s approach. The Second Circuit made its
ruling on reverse settlements in In re Tamoxifen Citrate
Antitrust Litigation, when an innovator agreed to pay a
generic manufacturer $9.5 million dollars immediately
and $35.9 million over ten years for the generic to
change its Paragraph IV certification to a Paragraph III
certification, thereby allowing the generic to market the
infringing drug only after the innovator’s patent had
officially expired.80 The settlement occurred while an
appeal was pending after a district court had declared
that the patent was invalid,81 the agreement did not
cover non-infringing products,82 and the agreement was
made while the 180-day exclusivity period’s successful
defense requirement was in effect.83
The Second Circuit followed the Eleventh
Circuit and decided that reverse payments by a patentee
designed to protect its patent monopoly were not per se
antitrust violations,84 even though the settlement took
place after the patent was declared invalid but was on
appeal.85 The court noted that the successful defense
requirement meant the generic would not block other
competitors,86 but even if the agreement was “designed
to manipulate the 180-day exclusivity period,” any
injury was caused by the “valid patent and the inability
of other generic manufacturers to establish that the
patent was either invalid or not infringed.”87 As long as
the original infringement suit is not objectively baseless,
the settlement does not expand the patentee’s monopoly
beyond the patent’s scope, and there is no fraud, then
“[p]ayments, even ‘excessive’ payments, . . . [are] not
necessarily unlawful.”88 Like the Eleventh Circuit, the
Second Circuit’s analysis focused primarily on the scope
of the agreement, not the size of the payments or the
effect on competition.
In the most recent precedential case decided by
79. Id. at 1309.
80. 466 F.3d 187, 193-94 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
81. Id. at 193.
82. Id. at 213-14.
83. Id. at 219.
84. Id. at 205.
85. Id. at 206.
86. Id. at 214.
87. Id. at 219.
88. Id. at 213.
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an appeals court, the Federal Circuit also upheld a payfor-delay agreement. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride
Antitrust Litigation was the Federal Circuit’s chance
to speak on reverse payments, when it took an appeal
involving a settlement agreement worth $398.1
million.89 The generic agreed to change its Paragraph
IV certification to a Paragraph III certification,90
reserved the right to revert to Paragraph IV if a court
ever declared the patent invalid or unenforceable,91 and
agreed “not to market a generic version of Cipro until
the” patent at issue expired.92 Although the generic
retained its right to change certifications, the Federal
Circuit ignored this factor in its antitrust analysis
because the settlement agreement predated the change in
the successful defense requirement, and a prior court had
already determined the generic had lost its exclusivity
right under the law at the time.93
With this “bottleneck” element out of the way,
the Federal Circuit decided the agreement was not a
violation of antitrust law and essentially adopted the
Second and Eleventh Circuits’ holdings that reverse
payments alone were not per se antitrust violations.94
Also, it explicitly held that:
[when] all anticompetitive effects of the
settlement agreement are within the exclusionary power
of the patent, the outcome is the same whether the court
begins its analysis under antitrust law by applying a
rule of reason approach to evaluate the anti-competitive
effects, or under patent law by analyzing the right to
exclude afforded by the patent.95
With this statement, the Federal Circuit
foreclosed the possibility of using its exclusive
jurisdiction over patent cases96 to funnel Paragraph IV
antitrust cases away from the other circuits.97
89. 544 F.3d 1323, 1329 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
90. Id. at 1328-29.
91. Id. at 1329 n.4.
92. Id. at 1333.
93. Id. at 1339.
94. See id. at 1335-36.
95. Id. at 1336.
96. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2009).
97. See Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1336 (“[T]he court need not
consider the validity of the patent in the antitrust analysis of a settlement agreement involving a reverse payment.”). Because the basis
of a reverse settlement is a generic’s technical infringement of an
innovator’s patent by filing the ANDA and Paragraph IV certification, if the Federal Circuit had ruled that patent validity mattered
when analyzing a reverse settlement, the Federal Circuit’s exclusive
jurisdiction over patent cases would have brought all future pay-fordelay cases to it. The possible exception would be if a case somehow
did not raise substantial issues of patent law.
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There is confusion among the courts98 and even
strong disagreement among commentators99 concerning
the state of the law in each circuit on reverse payments.
Some commentators characterize the Sixth Circuit as
employing the per se approach against the practice of
the Second and Eleventh Circuits,100 others lump the
Sixth and Eleventh Circuits’ approaches together and
contrast them with the Second and Federal Circuits’
holdings,101 and still others argue that all the circuits’
holdings are consistent.102 One of the chief impediments
to comparing the different circuits’ approaches is that the
slightly different features of the settlement agreements
in each case may be significant to each court’s respective
holding, but the opinions do not disentangle and
separately analyze the elements of the agreements clearly
enough to allow for a convenient comparison. For
example, the Federal Circuit attempted to distinguish its
Cipro decision from the Sixth Circuit’s per se holding in
Cardizem by pointing out that in Cardizem the generic
had agreed not to market non-infringing versions of
98. See id. at 1335 (“To the extent that the Sixth Circuit may have
found a per se antitrust violation based solely on the reverse payments, we respectfully disagree.”).
99. Compare Wansheng Jerry Liu, Balancing Accessibility and
Sustainability: How to Achieve the Dual Objectives of the HatchWaxman Act While Resolving Antitrust Issues in Pharmaceutical Patent
Settlement Cases 18 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 441, 462-63 (2008) (“In
addressing the antitrust issues of the patent settlement agreements
between brand-name and generic pharmaceutical companies, the
federal courts have adopted two different approaches. The Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a settlement agreement
between a brand-name drug company and a generic drug company
to delay marketing until resolution of the patent infringement case
in exchange for a ‘reverse payment’ is classical restraint of trade and
per se illegal. The Eleventh and Second Circuits rejected this ‘per
se rule’ but instead considered the exclusionary power of the patent
and addressed whether the settlement agreements exceeded the
exclusionary power awarded by the patent law.) (citations omitted),
with Brief Amici Curiae of 54 Intellectual Property Law, Antitrust
Law, Economics, and Business Professors, the American Antitrust
Institute, the Public Patent Foundation, and the AARP in Support of the Petitioner, Arkansas Carpenters Health and Welfare
Fund v. Bayer, 129 S. Ct. 2828, 2 (2009) (No. 08-1194), 2009
WL 1144190, cert. denied, [hereinafter Brief Amici Curiae] (“The
Second/Federal Circuit Rule Is Unprecedented and Conflicts With
the Approaches of the Sixth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit, and the
Federal Trade Commission”). But see Christopher M. Holman,
Patently-O, Holman: A Contrarian Law Professor’s Two Cents on the
Arkansas Carpenter’s (Ciprofloxacin) Petition for Certiorari, http://
www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/05/holman-a-contrarian-law-professors-two-cents-on-the-arkansas-carpenters-ciprofloxacin-petitionfor-certiorari.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2009) (“[T]he decisions
by the Second Circuit and the Federal Circuit in Tamoxifen and
Ciprofloxacin are both entirely consistent with earlier decisions by
the other circuits . . . .”).
100. Liu, supra note 99.
101. Brief Amici Curiae, supra note 99.
102. Holman, supra note 99.

the drug.103 The difficulty with this approach is that the
Federal Circuit characterizes the settlement agreement
in Cipro as preventing the generic from manufacturing
or marketing “a generic version” of the drug, language
that appears to prevent non-infringing versions as
well.104 One way to reconcile the Federal Circuit’s
characterization of the Cipro agreement with its holding
is to assume the court was relying on the fact that the
patent in Cipro was on the underlying drug molecule105
and not the pharmaceutical’s formulation. Therefore,
presumably, a non-infringing generic was not possible,106
and the settlement agreement could cover all possible
generics without exceeding the scope of the patent.
Nevertheless, the exact basis for the court’s holding is
ambiguous.
An analysis of each circuit’s antitrust approach
reveals that, despite the conflicting interpretations,
there appear to be a set of settlement terms that would
satisfy each court, including the Sixth Circuit, whose
per se holding was the strictest. The Sixth Circuit’s per
se holding rests on only two facts: the reverse payments
to keep the generic off the market and the use of the
180-day exclusivity period to prevent additional entrants
to the market.107 The Sixth Circuit does not necessarily
declare all patent settlements per se illegal; rather, it
appears that the per se label attaches once the agreement
goes beyond enforcing patent rights and “bolster[s]
the patent’s effectiveness,”108 because, in Cardizem, the
103. Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1335.
104. See id. at 1329 (“In return, Barr agreed not to manufacture,
or have manufactured, a generic version of Cipro in the United
States.”). See also id. at 1333 (“[T]he generic defendants agreed not
to market a generic version of Cipro until the ’444 patent expired .
. . .”).
105. See id. at 1329.
106. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187,
214 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Like the patent for the compound ciprofloxacin hydrochloride, which was the subject of dispute in the Cipro
cases, and unlike the patents at issue in Cardizem and Valley Drug,
Zeneca’s tamoxifen patent is not a formulation patent, which covers only specific formulations or delivery methods of compounds;
rather, it is a patent on a compound that, by its nature, excludes all
generic versions of the drug.”).
107. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 907
(6th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he following facts are undisputed and dispositive. The Agreement guaranteed to HMR that its only potential
competitor at that time, Andrx, would, for the price of $10 million
per quarter, refrain from marketing its generic . . . the Agreement
also delayed the entry of other generic competitors, who could not
enter until the expiration of Andrx’s 180-day period of marketing
exclusivity, which Andrx had agreed not to relinquish or transfer.”).
108. See id. at 908 (“[T]he Agreement cannot be fairly characterized as merely an attempt to enforce patent rights or an interim
settlement of the patent litigation. As the plaintiffs point out, it
is one thing to take advantage of a monopoly that naturally arises
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“agreement’s restrictions extended to non-infringing
and/or potentially non-infringing versions of generic
Cardizem.”109 A reverse settlement agreement would
probably withstand the tests set forth by any of the
circuits, including the Sixth, if it promised only that the
generic would not infringe the listed patents, did not
block non-infringing generics from being marketed,
and forced the generic to abandon its Paragraph IV
certification and 180-day exclusivity period. In cases
where the listed patents included one on the drug
molecule itself, this settlement effectively prevents
the generic’s entry into the market without incurring
antitrust liability under the Sixth Circuit’s logic. The
result is that competitors and other affected parties
have little ability to challenge properly designed reverse
payments under an antitrust theory.
Part IV — Lessons from Hatch-Waxman for the
New Biosimilar Pathway

period to the first biosimilar.113 When a generic biologic
submits an application to the FDA, it must send detailed
information about the biogeneric and its production,114
and the reference product sponsor (i.e., the innovator
biologic) responds with a list of its patents115 and reasons
why they have been infringed.116 In turn, the biosimilar
either decides not to go to market before the innovator’s
patent expires, or certifies that it believes that the
innovator’s patent will not be infringed, is invalid, or is
unenforceable.117 The House bill makes submitting the
certification an act of infringement.118 Importantly, the
House bill only empowers the FDA to delay approval
of the generic biologic after a court has ruled against the
biosimilar.119
The new biosimilar pathway passed by Congress
is similar to the House bill but with two important
additions. First, it requires participation in negotiations
over which patent claims should be litigated before
the alleged infringer can be subject to an infringement
action.120 Second, the current biosimilar pathway offers
variable amounts of exclusivity for the first biosimilar to
be approved: the first biosimilar never has more than
one year of actual marketing exclusivity, but biogenerics
seeking approval afterward can be delayed up to fortytwo months if the first is involved in infringement
litigation and decides not to risk marketing its
product.121
Both the failed House bill and the enacted
biosimilar legislation make several important
improvements over the generic drug approval scheme.
First, they eliminate the delays associated with Paragraph
IV certification by allowing biosimilars to be approved
without facing a statutorily-mandated halt in the FDA’s
issuance of an approval in response to an innovator’s
infringement suit. Once approved, biogenerics can
market their potentially infringing products at their own

For over twenty years, drug companies have
lived with the compromises built into the HatchWaxman Amendments, but the new healthcare reform
bill passed by Congress created an approval pathway
for biosimilars110 and is the future of generic medicines.
Spending on biologic products is growing by fifteen to
twenty percent annually and has already risen to about
$40 billion in 2006.111 Congress failed to learn from
the weaknesses of the Hatch-Waxman regime when
designing the new biosimilar approval process, but
Congress still has the opportunity to amend the pathway
before biosimilars begin to utilize the new system.
Presently, the biosimilar pathway contains a set of
provisions that can be used together to facilitate reverse
settlements and to help justify them to courts.
For perspective, it is helpful to compare the
current biosimilar pathway with an older proposal that
was not enacted. During the 111th Congress, the House
of Representatives’ approach to biosimilars in H.R.
113. See id. (adding § 351(k)(6) to the Public Health Service Act).
1548 grants twelve years of marketing exclusivity to new
114. See id. (adding § 351(l)(4)(A)(i) to the Public Health Service
biologics112 and gives a twenty-four-month exclusivity
Act).
from a patent, but another thing altogether to bolster the patent’s
effectiveness.”).
109. See id. at 909 n.13.
110. In this Article, the terms “biosimilar,” “biogeneric,” and “generic biologic” are used interchangeably.
111. Congressional Budget Office, Congressional Budget Office
Cost Estimate S. 1695 Biologics Price Competition and Innovation
Act of 2007 5 (2008).
112. Pathway for Biosimilars Act, H.R. 1548, 111th Cong. §
101(a)(2) (2009) (amending § 351(k)(7) of the Public Health Service Act) (as introduced in the House on Mar. 17, 2009).
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115. See id. (adding § 351(l)(4)(A)(ii) to the Public Health Service
Act).
116. See id. (adding § 351(l)(4)(C)(i) to the Public Health Service
Act).
117. See id. (adding § 351(l)(4)(D) to the Public Health Service
Act).
118. See id. § 201(3) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)).
119. See id. § 101(a)(2) (adding § 351(l)(5) to the Public Health
Service Act).
120. Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec. 7002, § 351(l)(4), 124 Stat. 119, 811 (to
be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 262).
121. See id. § 351(k)(6)(C)(i) at 806.
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risk, similar to all other non-pharmaceutical products,
and the equitable injunctive power of the court hearing
the patentee’s infringement case will presumably ensure
that biogenerics with weak claims will not take away an
innovator’s rightful market share. Both bills have long
exclusivity periods for the first biosimilar, which provides
a strong incentive for these companies to develop their
products quickly.
Unlike the unsuccessful House legislation,
the actual biosimilar pathway affords innovators extra
incentives to game the system and gain extra exclusivity
time over second-to-file biogenerics. For example, if
the infringement action by the innovator against the
first biosimilar is dismissed or a final decision is reached,
the first biogeneric’s total potential exclusivity time is
actually extended to eighteen months after the dismissal
or decision, provided the biogeneric does not come to
market.122 Therefore, the strategy that is beneficial for
both the first generic biologic and the innovator is to
settle an ancillary patent to begin the reverse payment
process and then move toward a final decision or
dismissal. From this point, the parties would have a
reverse payment regime in place, with the biosimilar
qualified for the extended eighteen-month exclusivity
period. The settlement would provide the innovator
with at least eighteen months of exclusivity and the
first biosimilar with at least eighteen months of reverse
payments. Unless the economics of the biogeneric
market diverge dramatically from the traditional generic
drug market, reverse payments exchanged for eighteen
months of innovator monopoly should clearly result in
an improved financial outcome for both the biogeneric
and innovator when compared with the alternative:
twelve months of shared marketing exclusivity.
These reverse payments would avoid accruing
antitrust liability because the heightened exclusivity
period attaches even if the first biosimilar loses the
infringement suit brought by the innovator.123 There is
no certification analogous to Paragraph IV on file with
the FDA for the first biosimilar to amend that would
relinquish its right to exclusivity, so a biosimilar that
chose not to come to market may not be at fault for
delaying others. However, even if a court decides that
a biosimilar violates antitrust law if it accepts reverse
payments without beginning its marketing exclusivity
period as soon as permitted, the enacted biosimilar
approval pathway provides a way to escape liability. A
122. See id. § 351(k)(6)(B) at 806.
123. See id.

biogeneric could strategically use a statutorily-mandated
180 days notice to the innovator prior to commercial
marketing124 to ensure that its minimum of one year
of market exclusivity125 plus the additional 180 days of
required waiting results in exactly the same eighteenmonth delay126 for all other generic entrants regardless of
whether reverse payments are made. This prevents the
biogeneric from accruing antitrust liability for causing
a bottleneck in the approval of additional biogenerics.
In this situation, a court could not justly hold the
biosimilar responsible for the delay because the statute
requires the biogeneric to give the notice, which prevents
the biogeneric from initiating its marketing exclusivity
period sooner.
Under this strategy, all additional entrants can
be delayed eighteen months, but the only way for the
generic biologic to get eighteen months of heightened
profit instead of twelve months of shared exclusivity
is to enter into a reverse settlement. By providing a
longer exclusivity period for biogenerics that do not
immediately enter the market, the current biosimilar
law sets up an approval process that strongly incentivizes
reverse payments.
Conclusion
The ANDA process under Hatch-Waxman,
especially Paragraph IV, facilitates reverse settlements.
The result is an explosion of litigation: patent
infringement suits, followed by reverse payments,
followed by antitrust suits. Pharmaceutical companies
reasonably respond to the incentives created by the law,
and this process, beginning with an infringement suit
and ending in murky antitrust waters, is unlikely to
abate any time soon. It appears as though all the circuits
allow at least some reverse settlements, and short of new
legislation banning them, they will remain prominent
in pharmaceutical patent litigation. The new biosimilar
124. See id. § 351(l)(8)(A) at 813 (“Notice of commercial marketing. The subsection (k) applicant shall provide notice to the reference product sponsor not later than 180 days before the date of the
first commercial marketing of the biological product licensed under
subsection (k).”). The applicant can give notice after submitting an
application, and must give the innovator 180 days before marketing
the biogeneric, but the applicant should otherwise be able to choose
when to give this notice, and it reasonable for the biogeneric to wait
if it is embroiled in a lawsuit with the innovator. If the biogeneric
does not give notice until a settlement agreement with reverse payments is in place, the notice requirement can act to preclude the
biogeneric from ending its exclusivity period for eighteen months,
whether it does eighteen months of reverse payments or six months
of required waiting and then twelve months of shared exclusivity.
125. See id. § 351(k)(6)(A) at 806.
126. See id. § 351(k)(6)(B) at 806.
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approval process passed by Congress is designed in a
way that encourages reverse settlements, so biogenerics
will probably be subjected to the same quantity of
unnecessary litigation as ANDA generic drugs.
If Congress chooses to reexamine the biosimilar
pathway it passed as part of healthcare reform, it should
avoid incentivizing reverse settlements. Pay-for-delay
agreements should be discouraged by giving the first
biosimilar extra exclusivity time if it begins selling
its product immediately upon FDA approval. If the
biosimilar either accepts reverse payments and stays
off the market or waits for any infringement litigation
to conclude before coming to market, it should be
ineligible for extra exclusivity time. Under this scheme,
at least one generic product will reach the market
quickly, lowering prices for consumers. A longer
exclusivity period for the first biogeneric will partially
mitigate the loss to the innovator, because the innovator
will have half of a duopoly for the lengthened exclusivity
period and will be able to postpone the full onslaught
of generic competition. A longer exclusivity period for
the first biosimilar, applying only if it comes to market
quickly, will shift the economic incentives away from
reverse settlements.
The three-way intersection between patent,
antitrust, and drug law exists because the road to generic
drug approval was not ideally designed. The new
biosimilar pathway had the chance to become a detour
to innovation and efficiency, but is currently just another
road at the intersection.
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South Africa’s Move Piracy Challenge
By Matilda Bilstein1

South1Africa faces many challenges in the areas
of copyright protection and enforcement, especially in
combating movie piracy. According to the International
Intellectual Property Alliance (“IIPA”),2 South Africa
fails to reach the mandated levels of copyright protection
under the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) of the Uruguay
Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(“GATT”)3, especially regarding enforcement.4 South
Africa is a lucrative market for counterfeit goods due to
several key factors: its relatively high per-capita GDP
compared to other countries in the region; its high levels
of imported western media, technology, and lifestyles;
its under-resourced law enforcement agencies; and its
high unemployment rate.5 In 2006, pirated movie sales
accounted for 60% percent of South Africa’s DVD
market.6 This cost the South African film industry an
1. Matilda Bilstein, 2011 J.D. candidate at American University,
Washington College of Law, B.A. in International Relations, with a
minor in Spanish Language and Culture, in 2007 at Florida International University. Matilda was a 2009-2010 Articles Writer for The
Intellectual Property Brief and is the incoming 2010-2011 Treasurer.
2. IIPA is a private sector coalition of trade associations representing United States based copyright industries working to improve
international protection and enforcement of copyrighted materials.
3. From 1948 to 1994, the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) regulated world trade and presided over periods that
saw some of the highest growth rates in international commerce.
The Uruguay Round of GATT led to various international agreements, including the TRIPS agreement, and created the World
Trade Organization. See World Trade Organization, Roots: From
Havana to Marrakesh, available at http://www.wto.org/trade_resources/history/wto/roots.htm.
4. International Intellectual Property Alliance, Filing of the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) Re: African Growth and
Opportunity Act Implementation Subcommittee of the Trade Policy
Staff Committee; Public Comments on Annual Review of Country
Eligibility for Benefits Under the African Growth and Opportunity Act,
74 Fed. Reg. 48622-23, at 5 (Oct. 22, 2007), http://www.iipa.com/
pdf/IIPAAGOAfilingtoUSTRfinal10222007.pdf.
5. South African Federation Against Copyright Theft, Piracy in
South Africa, http://www.safact.co.za/piracy_facts.htm (last visited
Sept.7, 2009).
6. Bhavna Sookha, “Piracy costing SA industries R50m annually,”
Daily News (November 22, 2006); http://www.iol.co.za/index.
php?art_id=vn20061122095246188C185140&click_id=13&set_
id=1; accessed September 7, 2009.

annual R500 million, approximately $65 million.7 The
South African film industry loses approximately R50
($6.20) in local currency for every fake DVD sold on the
street.8 While South Africa’s local movie industries suffer
great revenue losses due to piracy, initiatives by private
organizations in conjunction with law enforcement
officials for stronger enforcement of intellectual property
protection will provide great benefits to both the foreign
and domestic film industries. Part I of this article will
discuss South Africa’s current levels of and societal views
on piracy. Part II will discuss South Africa’s awareness,
enforcement and remedial initiatives. Part III will
discuss current changes in legislation. Lastly, Part IV
will discuss the benefits of strong copyright enforcement
for the South African film industry.
I. South Africa’s Piracy Levels and Societal Views
The current invasion of pirated DVDs, especially
of movies not legitimately available on DVDs or in
theaters anywhere else in the world, accounted for over
50% of the pirated South African market in 2005.9
Before 2001, pirated DVDs accounted for 10% of the
pirated South African market.10 According to the South
African Federation Against Copyright Theft (SAFACT),
7. SouthAfrica.info, Fighting Fake DVDs – with Fakes, May 19,
2006, http://www.southafrica.info/ess_info/sa_glance/media/dvdpiracy-190506.htm. See also Bhavna Sookha, Piracy Costing SA
Industries R50m Annually, Daily News, Nov. 22, 2006, http://www.
iol.co.za/index.php?art_id=vn20061122095246188C185140&cl
ick_id=13&set_id=1 (discussing how legitimate video and DVD
rental stores, overwhelmed by the amount of piracy, are now being
accused of dealing in pirated products).
8. Tonight, DVD Piracy ‘is not cool’, June 10, 2009, http://www.
tonight.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=347&fArticleId=5029544.
See also Joe Karaganis, Program Director, Media, Technology and
Culture, Social Science Research Council in Beyond TRIPS: The
Evolving Law of International Enforcement of Intellectual Property,
Panel 2 – American Efforts to Strengthen International IP Enforcement, available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/events/
beyond-trips (discussing the disagreement on whether losses can be
measured and the problems regarding the delegitimation of some
industries and much of the research concerning losses is unnecessarily proprietary).
9. South African Federation Against Copyright Theft, Piracy in
South Africa, http://www.safact.co.za/piracy_facts.htm (last visited
September 7, 2009).
10. Id.
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a local industry-driven enforcement group, this level of
piracy equates to a loss of approximately 3 million unit
sales.11 In 2004, South Africa had an estimated trade
loss of $35 million due to motion film copyright piracy
alone.12
South African film distributors and cinemas
are not the only businesses feeling the effects of pirated
movies.13 Video shop owners complain about how they
cannot keep “customers happy if customers can easily
get a movie title that has not even appeared in cinemas,
for R100 ($16.59), across the road.”14 According to
SAFACT Chairperson Fay Amaral, despite that 50%
of DVDs in South Africa were pirated in 2005, there
were only 76 convictions.15 While enforcement raids
have increased and almost half a million pirated DVDs
have been taken off the streets, this figure represents
only 10% of the illegal products actually in circulation.16
Involvement with the pirated movie business remains
lucrative, with insubstantial risk of any repercussions.17
Since South Africans generally do not understand
what intellectual property rights entail, people seem
to disregard the fact that it is wrong to buy counterfeit
movies and “feel they would rather see a man selling
pirate DVDs on the street than breaking into their
houses.”18
SAFACT emphasizes that pirating of movies
causes considerable damage to the viability and
sustainability of thousands of jobs in South Africa at
a time when there is increased pressure on businesses
due to the economic slowdown.19 For example, “in the
US, it only takes six rentals for a video shop, with the
same customer base . . . to get back the money it’s been
11. Id.
12. International Intellectual Property Alliance, IIPA 2007 Special
301 Report Special Mention South Africa, at 521 (Feb. 12, 2007),
http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2007/2007SPEC301SOUTHAFRICA.
pdf.
13. Mzolisi Witbooi, Pirate DVDs Dealing a Huge Blow to Cinemas,
The Cape Argus, Jan. 14, 2005, http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_
id=1&click_id=13&art_id=vn20050114110948303C405481.
14. Id.
15. Barbara Cole, DVD Piracy Hard to Stop, The Daily News,
June 22, 2005, http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_
id=13&art_id=vn20050622092440567C697461.
16. See id., (discussing a special initiative, Business Action to Stop
Counterfeit and Piracy (BASCAP), launched by the International
Chamber of Commerce to fight movie piracy, which is costing companies around the world $600 billion a year).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. South African Federation Against Copyright Theft, Consumers Getting Ripped off Twice with Fake Mr. Bones 2, Dec. 12, 2008,
http://www.safact.co.za/press/PR_20081212.htm.
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purchased with. But it takes . . . 40 times in South
Africa.”20 But some vendors, desperate for a job, did
“not think it would be a problem selling pirated DVDs
because they are making money for food and supporting
their families.”21
II. Implementing Awareness, Enforcement, and
Remedial Initiatives
SAFACT is in almost daily contact with various
law enforcement agencies involved in combating piracy.22
The organization is currently implementing awareness
campaigns to reduce the demand for pirated movies
and increase the involvement of the general population
in combating this crime.23 In 2006, following the
success of the 2005 “Stop Piracy, Stop Crime” television
and radio campaign, SAFACT launched smaller
targeted campaigns.24 These initiatives include: (1) the
distribution of anti-piracy material at major areas where
street vendors selling pirated products proliferated; (2)
the launch of the “Fake Fakes” campaign, involving the
sale of DVDs containing anti-piracy messages disguised
as newly released films, with the proceeds donated to
the Anti-Piracy Foundation; and (3) the establishment
of Local Anti-Piracy forums, which brought together
parties like video rental and retail outlets, cinemas and
the police on a regular basis to discuss piracy problems
in their immediate areas.25
Video piracy’s devastating effect on South Africa’s
economy has led local copyright owners to mobilize and
take a stand against piracy.26 For example, producers
of the recent domestic film White Wedding created a
20. Mzolisi Witbooi, Pirate DVDs Dealing a Huge Blow toCinemas,
The Cape Argus, Jan. 14, 2005, http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_
id=1&click_id=13&art_id=vn20050114110948303C405481.
21. Janine du Plessis, Pirated DVD Sellers Dealt CrushingBblow,
The Pretoria News, Oct. 6, 2006, http://www.thestar.co.za/index.ph
p?fSectionId=&fArticleId=vn20061006042719185C235907.
22. International Intellectual Property Alliance, IIPA 2007 Special
301 Report Special Mention South Africa, at 520 (Feb. 12, 2007),
http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2007/2007SPEC301SOUTHAFRICA.
pdf.
23. South African Federation Against Copyright Theft, Awareness Campaigns, http://www.safact.co.za/media_awareness.htm (last
visited Sept. 7, 2009).
24. Id.
25. Id. See also SouthAfrica.info, Fighting Fake DVDs – with Fakes,
May 19, 2006, http://www.southafrica.info/ess_info/sa_glance/
media/dvd-piracy-190506.htm (describing how the “Fake Fakes”
campaign combats the problem of copyright theft, disrupts the
piracy market, and educates consumers about piracy).
26. International Intellectual Property Alliance, IIPA 2007 Special
301 Report Special Mention South Africa, at 520 (Feb. 12, 2007),
http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2007/2007SPEC301SOUTHAFRICA.
pdf (citing First Anti-Piracy Concert to Kick Off in Joburg, at http://
www.bizcommunity.com/Article/196/40/12012.html).
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series of public service announcements against movie
piracy.27 In the announcements, the co-writers and costars of White Wedding, Kenneth Nkosi and Rapulana
Seiphemo, announced that people buying pirated DVDs
were effectively stealing from them and harming not
only their business but also the local film industry.28
Moreover, on December 15, 2005, the National
Prosecuting Authority (South Africa’s Specialized
Commercial Crime Courts) and SAFACT signed a
Memorandum of Understanding, which established
relationships with local law enforcement agencies to
create judicial capacity for the effective prosecution of
piracy offenses, particularly films.29 In order to fulfill this
objective, SAFACT is currently training state employees
to engage in intellectual property protection.30 Specific
training included: (1) product identification workshops
to differentiate between genuine and pirated versions of
film for members of the police force and the prosecution
service; (2) training for customs officials at points of
entry to help recognize counterfeit products; and (3)
in-depth legal workshops for South African prosecutors,
held in conjunction with the Department of Trade and
Industry and the National Prosecuting Authority.31
Because South Africans purchase pirated DVDs off the
street,32 the South African Police Service (“SAPS”) and
the South African Revenue Service (“SARS”) have joined
SAFACT in conducting raids, inspections, and search
and seizure operations of markets selling and distributing
pirated products.33 In 2007 alone, there were 609 raids,
which resulted in the confiscation of 219,926 DVDs
and DVD-Rs.34 In 2008, approximately 175,699 DVDs
and DVD-Rs were confiscated by the first half of the
27. Tonight, DVD Piracy ‘is Not Cool’, June 10, 2009, http://www.
tonight.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=347&fArticleId=5029544.
28. Id.
29. Enforcement Partners, SAFACT, http://www.safact.co.za/about_
enforcement.htm; accessed September 7, 2009.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. My Broadband, Broadband and Piracy, Oct. 7, 2009, http://
mybroadband.co.za/news/Internet/9911.html. See also South
African Federation Against Copyright Theft, Statistics 2008, http://
www.safact.co.za/activities_2008.htm, available at http://www.
safact.co.za/images/Actions_Analysis_Q1_Q2_2008.pdf (last visited
Sept. 7, 2009) (demonstrating that most raids occur on street vendors and flea markets, thus showing copyright infringement consists
of pirated DVDs).
33. South African Federation Against Copyright Theft, Multi Million Rand Haul of Pirated Films, Feb. 15, 2009, http://www.safact.
co.za/press/PR_20090215.htm.
34. South African Federation Against Copyright Theft, SAFACT
Statistics Archives: Summary Statistics 1997-2007, http://www.
safact.co.za/statistics_archives.htm (last visted Sept. 7, 2009).

year.35 Between June 2008 and February 2009, the
total number of pirated films seized was over 550,000,
with a value of over R27.5 million ($2,768,563.22),
which deprived legitimate business of R49 million
($4,933,076.28).36
Although seizures of pirated films have increased,
with a greater number of arrests and criminal convictions
due to the increased commitment by law enforcement
agencies, enforcement problems remain in South African
courts.37 While an increasing number of cases are being
referred to either the High Courts or the Specialized
Commercial Crime Courts that have been established to
combat white-collar crimes38, prosecutors and judges in
the non-specialized courts fail to view piracy as a serious
crime.39 Under the Berne Convention, existence of a
copyright and copyright ownership by the claimant is
presumed unless the defendant alleges facts, which place
doubt on the claimant’s ownership.40 In South Africa,
defendants have been able to reverse the burden of
proving copyright ownership simply by bringing up the
issue of ownership in judicial proceedings, which is not
in line with the Berne Convention presumption.41
Another major issue with enforcing copyright
is that monetary remedies are insufficient to deter
infringement.42 South Africa’s “copyright laws should
provide (and courts should routinely award) financial
remedies that make piracy too financially risky” because
remedies that merely deprive the pirate of profits or even
35. South African Federation Against Copyright Theft, Content
Seizure Analysis Q1 & Q2 2008, http://www.safact.co.za/images/
Content_Seizure_Analysis_Q2_2008.pdf.
36. South African Federation Against Copyright Theft, Multi Million Rand Haul of Pirated Films, Feb. 15, 2009, http://www.safact.
co.za/press/PR_20090215.htm.
37. International Intellectual Property Alliance , IIPA 2007 Special
301 Report Special Mention South Africa, at 523(February 12, 2007),
http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2007/2007SPEC301SOUTHAFRICA.
pdf.
38. Republic of South Africa Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, Press Statement: Opening of the Johannesburg
Specialised Commercial Crime Court, January 24, 2003, available at
http://www.justice.gov.za/m_statements/2003/2003_01_24bac_
statement.htm.
39. International Intellectual Property Alliance , IIPA 2007 Special
301 Report Special Mention South Africa, at 523(February 12, 2007),
http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2007/2007SPEC301SOUTHAFRICA.
pdf.
40. Id. at 525.
41. Id. at 525 (“Expressing in the law a presumption of ownership
is needed to (sic) satisfy South Africa’s international obligations and
a presumption of subsistence of copyright will greatly reduce the
procedural burdens on rights holders in proving their cases.”)
42. Mark Schultz and Alec van Gelder, Creative Development:
Helping Poor Countries by Building Creative Industries, 97 Ky. L.J.
79, 139 (2008).
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of gross remedies are sometimes ineffective deterrents.43
However, even after winning a case and being awarded
costs, the chances of collecting from a defendant are
almost nonexistent. Following trial, the defendant will
likely dispose of or transfer their assets and leave the
country, thus leaving the right-holder without recourse
to collect the damages awarded in the judgment.44
III. Changing Current Copyright Legislation
Because South Africa is a party to most
international conventions protecting intellectual
property, it is determined to uphold its commitments
to the World Trade Organization and to support the
rights of local and foreign companies.45 South Africa
enacted the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment
Act and the Counterfeit Goods Act (“CGA”) to ensure
compliance with the TRIPS Agreement.46 However, the
Intellectual Property Alliance (“IIPA”) still has many
recommendations that the South African government
needs to implement in order to comply with TRIPS,
such as:
(1) Reinstating police powers under the CGA:
The IIPA recommends amending the CGA to clarify
and simplify police procedures; ease time limits that do
not allow cases to be reasonably prepared for the courts;
reinstate powers of arrest; and include complainant’s
right to submit evidence of economic damages for
consideration in sentencing.
(2) Running Ex Officio Raids: The IIPA states
that current on the spot raids amount to the cost of
doing business.
(3) Adopting copyright legislation that complies
with TRIPS and joining the WIPO Copyright Treaty
and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty:
The IIPA urges South Africa to enact copyright
legislation that would improve the enforcement
landscape and bring the national law in compliance with
the TRIPS Agreement.47 Others believe that “simply
honoring international obligations is not enough” and in
order to benefit local creators, South Africa’s intellectual
43. Id. at 140.
44. International Intellectual Property Alliance, IIPA
2007 Special 301 Report Special Mention South Africa, at 523 (February 12, 2007), http://www.iipa.com/
rbc/2007/2007SPEC301SOUTHAFRICA.pdf.
45. South African Federation Against Copyright Theft, Anti-Piracy
Legislation in South Africa, www.safact.co.za/piracy_legislation.htm
(last visited Sept. 7, 2009).
46. Id.
47. International Intellectual Property Alliance, IIPA
2007 Special 301 Report Special Mention South Africa, at 520 (February 12, 2007), http://www.iipa.com/
rbc/2007/2007SPEC301SOUTHAFRICA.pdf.
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property rights laws ought to include features beyond
the minimum TRIPS requirements.48 For example, enduser piracy (the copying of software without obtaining
a license49) is also not a criminal offense in South
Africa, giving rise to questions about South Africa’s
TRIPS compliance under Article 61, which requires
criminalization of at least all copyright piracy on a
commercial scale.50 The IIPA also recommends that
other modernizing measures should be taken in addition
to this legislation, including adequate protection of
copyright materials on the Internet, such as notice and
takedown measures and incentives for Internet service
providers to cooperate in fighting infringement.51
(4) Developing joint intellectual property rights
enforcement public awareness campaigns: The South
African Government should work with copyright
industries to inform the public on the detrimental effects
of piracy and illegal downloading on South Africa’s
domestic creative community.52
IV. Benefits of Strong Copyright Protection
Since the implementation of the TRIPS
agreement, there have been two major views regarding
intellectual property protection for developing countries.
First, that intellectual property protection is necessary
for the advancement of developing countries. Second,
that current international intellectual property laws do
not properly serve developing countries’ needs.53 The
arguments supporting the first view states that strong
protection “is essential to the successful operation of a
system that promotes global innovation” because the
economic nature of intellectual property strengthens the
incentive for domestic innovation and creativity, and
encourages foreign direct investment, thus promoting a
country’s development.54
The primary advantages for a film industry with
a strong copyright system are that it:
(1) decentralizes and widely distributes control
48. Mark Schultz and Alec van Gelder, Creative Development:
Helping Poor Countries by Building Creative Industries, 97 Ky. L.J.
79, 139 (2008).
49. http://www.corel.com/servlet/Satellite/us/en/Content/1152796558890
50. International Intellectual Property Alliance, IIPA
2007 Special 301 Report Special Mention South Africa, at 524 (February 12, 2007), http://www.iipa.com/
rbc/2007/2007SPEC301SOUTHAFRICA.pdf.
51. Id.at 520-21.
52. Id. at 520-21.
53. Lauren Loew, Creative Industries in Developing Countries and
Intellectual Property Protection, 9 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 171, 17980 (2006).
54. Id. at 180.
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over decisions about producing and paying for creative
works, making it more likely to foster a popular,
commercially successful industry;
(2) vests ownership in the original creator of
the work, with the resulting independence and control
providing greater economic and creative opportunities;
and,
(3) enables creators and their collaborators in the
film industry to use their own resources to finance their
own creativity.55
“Intellectual property protection benefits
indigenous creativity in developing countries,” and the
South Africa’s local film industry is an example of the
indigenous creativity argument that intellectual property
protection can assist countries escape lesser-developed
status.56
The alternative suggestion, made by those against
imposing the current system of intellectual property
protection on developing countries, is “that piracy
helps lay the foundation for a developing country’s
infrastructure, and, once in place, the developed
infrastructure enables the developing country to benefit
from increased protection.”57 Piracy permits access to
the technology needed for growth at low prices, develops
critical skills in a developing country’s workforce, earns
foreign exchange, produces and mobilizes domestic
capital, and provides employment and cheaper products
for the population.58 Piracy, however, is one of the major
problems, along with a host of infrastructure problems,
which hinder indigenous creativity. Since almost all
African countries have a piracy level over 25%, with
some estimates reaching 85% to 90%, artists are hesitant
to create new works.59 Lack of effective enforcement
against piracy hurts local creators and the development
of local creative clusters since piracy:
deprives creators and legitimate distributors of
sales, and it also creates a number of other deficiencies
that impeded the development of local creative clusters,
including preventing creators from securing capital to
finance their work, pushing the surviving movie industry

to developed countries, and undermining local trade.60
Thus, “a commercial industry that supports the creation
of mass market films, books, and recorded music has
little prospect of developing without its copyright and its
enforcement.”61
Strong, effective copyright enforcement is the
institution that best serves the basis for the development
of South Africa’s commercial film industry.62 Some
policymakers in developing countries question the
value of strong copyright since it will inevitably displace
workers in industries that involve piracy.63 However,
when the discussion is framed as a trade-off between
local jobs and greater profits for foreign movie studios,
it disregards local South African filmmakers, whose
efforts will benefit the local economy and culture if
protected by copyright.64 Because the works of foreign
movie companies will still be produced, developing
markets with high rates of piracy, such as South Africa,
are flooded with pirated foreign works “subsidized” by
profits from foreign consumers.65
The new business generated by greater domestic
protection of copyright is likely to benefit local creators
and creative industries the most because without
effective copyright protection, the market for local
creative works in less-developed countries is likely to be
undermined by pirated foreign works.66 Additionally,
copyright enforcement is likely to generate additional
local jobs that compensate for any job losses in piracy
industries because it gives talented, creative people the
opportunity to remain in their native countries rather
than fleeing to more hospitable business climates.67
Furthermore, even those involved in the piracy industries
will be able to redeploy their skills to more creative,
higher-paying work in legitimate copyright-based
industries. They can thus move from being adversaries
to business partners of local creators, creating a win-win
situation for their home countries.68
South Africa will reap financial and cultural
benefits from increasing enforcement against its
current pervasive levels of movie piracy. Foreign movie

55. Mark Schultz and Alec van Gelder, Creative Development:
Helping Poor Countries by Building Creative Industries, 97 Ky. L.J.
79, 119 (2008).
56. Lauren Loew, Creative Industries in Developing Countries and
Intellectual Property Protection, 9 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 171, 181
(2006).
57. Id. at 183.
58. Dru Brenner-Beck, Do As I Say, Not As I Did, 11 UCLA Pac.
Basin L.J. 84, 102 (1992).
59. Lauren Loew, Creative Industries in Developing Countries and
Intellectual Property Protection, 9 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 171, 182
(2006).

60. Mark Schultz and Alec van Gelder, Creative Development:
Helping Poor Countries by Building Creative Industries, 97 Ky. L.J.
79, 127 (2008).
61. Id. at 119.
62. Id. at 119.
63. Id. at 120-121.
64. Id. at 120-121.
65. Id. at 121.
66. Id. at 121.
67. Id. at 121.
68. Id. at 122.
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companies will be encouraged to invest in South Africa’s
film industry, domestic filmmakers and producers will
be able to protect their current movie projects, and the
South African film industry as a whole will benefit from
the ingenuity that copyright protection incentivizes.
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Settling for Less? An Analysis of the Possibility of Positive Legal Precedent
on the Internet if the Google Book Search Litigation Had Not Reached a
Settlement
By Brooke Ericson1
I. Introduction1
A final hearing held in early February will lead to an
opinion by U.S. District Judge Denny Chin for the
Southern District of New York, determining whether the
Google Book Search Settlement is upheld or rejected.
Google’s competitors argue antitrust violations,2 the
National Writers Union
calls the settlement “grossly
unfair”3 and library
associations worry about the
lack of guarantees to current
and future access.4 This
article will focus on another
critique of the Google Book
Settlement: that by settling,
Google is avoiding the fight
for a positive legal precedent
for copyright fair use on
the Internet and is only
concerned with its own business interests.5 This logic
1. Brooke Ericson, 2011 J.D. Candidate at American University,
Washington College of Law , B.A. in Journalism in 2008 at University of North Carolina. Brooke was a 2009-2010 Articles Writer
for The Intellectual Property Brief and is the incoming 2010-2011
Copyright Section Editor. Brooke is also a junior staff member for
the Administrative Law Review and will serve as a 2010-2011 Note
& Comment Editor.
2. See Jacqui Cheng, Microsoft, Amazon Join Opposition to Google
Books Settlement, Ars Technica, Aug. 21, 2009, http://arstechnica.
com/tech-policy/news/2009/08/microsoft-amazon-join-oppositionto-google-books-settlement.ars.
3. See Ryan Singel, National Writers Union Opposes Google Book
Settlement, Wired.com, Aug. 13, 2009, http://www.wired.com/
epicenter/2009/08/national-writers-union-opposes-google-booksettlement/.
4. See John Timmer, Google Book Settlement Has Librarians Worried,
Ars Technica, May 5, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/
news/2009/05/libraries-weigh-in-with-worries-on-googles-booksettlement.ars.
5. See Juan Carlos Perez, In Google Book Settlement, Business
Trumps Ideals, PC World, Oct. 30, 2008 http://www.pcworld.com/
businesscenter/article/153085/in_google_book_settlement_business_trumps_ideals.html; see also Fred von Lohmann, Google Is Done
Paying Silicon Valley’s Legal Bills, Recorder, Nov. 14, 2008, available
at http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2008/11/further-thoughts-googlebook-search-settlement.

stems from the fact that many scholars believed Google
would succeed on its fair use defense and “blaze a trail
on behalf of many, less wealthy Internet companies.”6
Instead, Google entered a settlement providing
itself with a strong advantage over its book scanning
competitors and a monopoly over millions of orphan
books.7
This article will look at this
argument and analyze whether
Google’s settlement was based on
self-interest or a strategic costbenefit analysis. Part II of this
article will explain the Google
Book Search Settlement. Part III
will analyze the effects a Google
win would have on copyright
law. Then, Part IV will compare
the Ninth and Second Circuits’
precedents to determine if Google
really could have set this “positive legal precedent.”
Finally, Part V will conclude that it is likely Google
would have failed in the Second Circuit leaving Google
with two options – to appeal to the Supreme Court or
single-handedly bring an end to online book scanning.
II. The Google Book Settlement
In 2004, Google entered into agreements to digitize
books with several libraries and universities, including
the New York Public Library, Harvard University,
Stanford University, Oxford University and the
University of Michigan. Seven million books were
scanned until issues arose concerning the digitization
of books protected by United States copyright law. In
2005, several authors and publishers brought a lawsuit
against Google, asserting copyright infringement.
Google denied such allegations, claiming that its display
of “snippets” or a few lines was protected under the
6. See Perez, supra note 4.
7. Miguel Helft, Opposition to Google Books Settlement Jells, N.Y.
Times.com, Apr. 17, 2009 available at http://bits.blogs.nytimes.
com/2009/04/17/opposition-to-google-books-settlement.
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doctrine of fair use. In 2007, however, rather than
going forward with its fair use defense, a settlement was
reached between the parties.
The proposed settlement establishes a $125 million
fund, providing authors who sign on to the agreement
a onetime nominal payment, plus future royalties. The
settlement also sets aside $34.5 million for a Book
Rights Registry, to locate rightsholders and create a
database of their contact information and the copyright
interests in their works. In exchange, Google will be
released from liability for its scanning, searching, and
displaying of books online.
Google will dedicate 63% of its net revenues from
the advertising that it shows on search results and
book display pages to authors. Thus, Google gets to
show 20% of the book online and sell digital copies
of it, keeping 37% of all revenues. Further, Google
has the right to scan books in print and use them for
research purposes. For books with no known authors,
orphan works as they are called, Google may scan these
works and hold a share of the revenues in trust for the
copyright owners, if they are ever exposed. These orphan
works, which according to UC Berkeley Professor
Pamela Samuelson constitute 70% of books that are
still in copyright,8 are at the center of the settlement’s
controversy.
III. What Could Have Been, the Consequences of a
“Positive Legal Precedent”
Mixed feelings surround the Google Book Settlement,
as Google’s competitors point to its unfairness and
researchers point to its potential. One journalist went as
far as to state, “by settling a lawsuit with book authors
and publishers this week, Google is looking out for itself
and has avoided fighting for and possibly establishing
a positive legal precedent for copyright fair use on
the Internet.”9 This section explores this assertion and
imagines a copyright world where fair use is a solid
defense for search engines.
A. Copyright in the Digital Age
Copyright scholars often find themselves unsatisfied
with the Supreme Court’s holding in MGM Studios,
8. Ryan Singel, The Fight over the Google of All Libraries: A Wired.
com FAQ, Wired.com, Apr. 30, 2009, http://www.wired.com/
epicenter/2009/04/the-fight-over-the-worlds-greatest-library-thewiredcom-faq/.
9. Perez, supra note 4.
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Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,10 and are left longing for more
clarity in an increasingly digital world. In Sony Corp.
v. Universal City Studios, Inc,11 the Court held that
“the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other
articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory
infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate,
unobjectionable purposes.”12 Originally the Ninth
Circuit applied Sony broadly in Grokster, finding that
producers could never be contributorily liable for third
parties’ infringing uses “even when an actual purpose to
cause infringing use is shown . . . unless the distributors
had specific knowledge of infringement at a time
when they contributed to the infringement and failed
to act upon that information.”13 The Supreme Court
unanimously rejected this holding, but instead applied
the inducement theory of secondary liability to reach
its conclusion.14 Thus, if the Supreme Court took the
Google Book Search case, not only would there be hope
for more clarity after Grokster, but new questions that
have arisen and new issues that have formed since 2005
could now be answered.
Beyond clarity, a positive legal precedent could provide
a road map for how innovative technologies such
as Google act on the Web. As Google continues to
develop, a variety of possibilities await it on the Web and
copyright law thus far has not been able to keep pace
with technology.15 A precedent holding that Google’s
fair use defense is viable may help both Google and its
competitors understand what they can do online and
what they can’t. Without such precedent, Internet
companies are rapidly experimenting and expanding
on the Web, but at their own risk. Not only would a
10. 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
11. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
12. Id. at 442.
13. 545 U.S. at 933-34; see Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added).
14. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 934 (“we do not revisit Sony further,
as MGM requests, to add a more quantified description of the point
of balance between protection and commerce when liability rests
solely on distribution with knowledge that unlawful use will occur.
It is enough to note that the Ninth Circuit’s judgment rested on an
erroneous understanding of Sony and to leave further consideration
of the Sony rule for a day when that may be required.”).
15. See Steven Hetcher, The Half-Fairness of Google’s Plan to Make
the World’s Collection of Books Searchable, 13 Mich. Telecomm. &
Tech. L. Rev. 1, 9 (2006) (noting that “changes in technology are
creating market opportunities for Google on a global scale” and the
law hasn’t had a chance to respond. “Thus, Google finds itself in a
legal free zone and is seeking to do its best to exploit its opportunities. Rather than waiting for the law to adapt, Google is adopting a
proactive approach, seeking to create ‘private law’ that stands to be
maximally favorable to its interests.”).
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positive legal precedent induce innovation because it
would wipe out the fear of potential lawsuits, but it also
would serve judicial efficiency in preventing numerous
test cases from arising.
Further, a positive legal precedent could help copyright
law catch up with technology. “In the digital world,
controlling copying is less important than controlling
access to a work.”16 If this is the case, then a positive
legal precedent could go as far as rewriting copyright law,
focusing on preventing distribution to the public.17 Such
a decision could stem out of the fact that while Google is
copying entire works, the general public will only be able
to access a mere snippet of the work. The positive legal
precedent would allow copying or scanning of works,
provided that access to the public remained limited.
B. A Change in Ownership
i. Publishers
Why do we have the Google Book Search litigation to
begin with? Although publishers and authors contend
it is because their livelihood is being tested, scholars
argue that the answer is more basic: publishers want
their fair share of the profits Google will receive from the
Book Search project.18 With a positive legal precedent
in Google’s favor, content ownership shifts from the
possession of the publishers, to the possession of the
scanners. Further, without the settlement, all Internet
search engines, including Yahoo and Microsoft, would
become owners and distributors of content. While
many scholars understand the implications this has
for publishers, they note that the purpose of copyright
law is not to protect the publishers. Pursuant to the
Constitution, works are protected “to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts.”19 Books will only
promote progress if they are read and will only be read if
they can be located. Thus,

16. Emily Anne Proskine, Note, Google’s Technicolor Dreamcoat:
A Copyright Analysis of the Google Book Search Library Project, 21
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 213, 238 (2006).
17. See id. (explaining that Copyright law should be rewritten to
focus on preventing distribution to the public, rather than to continue promoting a system “that impedes ‘normal use’ and technological advancement.”).
18. See id. at 239 (“What is certain is that a publishing house
bringing suit against Google is not in the battle to uphold its
constitutional right ‘to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts,’ but rather to obtain what it perceives to be its fair share of the
Google Library Project’s profits.”).
19. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

The Google Library Project advances the public interest
by making information globally accessible regardless
of a user’s income, geographic location, and proximity
to a library . . . The Project also simultaneously drives
publishers’ incentives to create by increasing their profits
based on increased exposure to book titles. Thus, the
Google Library Project is consistent with copyright law.20
Therefore, a positive legal precedent would not
only allow Google to continue the dissemination of
information and provide incentives for creation, but
other companies would be able to do this as well.
Essentially, the more digital libraries there are, the more
the goals of copyright will be promoted.
ii. Libraries
Not only could a positive legal precedent shift the role
of publishers, it also shifts the roles of public libraries:
public being the key word. Google is not the first
entity to want to collect the world’s knowledge. Once
upon a time, the Library of Alexandria was created
under this same notion, “to bring the sum total of
human knowledge together in one place at one time.”21
If Google is allowed to create a “digital Library of
Alexandria” it will be doing so as a private company.
Although many may take for granted that libraries
are publicly run, critics fear that a private company,
ultimately driven by profit maximization, could
drastically change the notion of libraries for everyone.22
Further, with legal precedent allowing the scanning,
numerous digital libraries could arise. However, instead
of these libraries being congenial partners on a mission
to locate books and distribute them to those who seek
them, these new private libraries will be competitors.
Private libraries will not reach out to other digital
libraries for support, instead they could be driven to oust
one another. Thus, although competition could bring
prices down and allow greater access to knowledge, it
also could drastically change the concept of the library.
While this could be a negative side to a positive legal
precedent, it is important to note that no matter how
drastically competition could change the landscape of
libraries, it usually always alters the landscape in a better
20. Proskine, supra note 15, at 239.
21. Hetcher, supra note 14, at 1.
22. See id. at 6 (“An important question raised by the Google Print
lawsuits, both domestically and internationally, is whether something as important as the digital Library of Alexandria should be in
the control of a private company . . . . driven by the motive of profit
maximization.”).
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way than a monopoly would. Without a positive legal
precedent there will likely only be one digital library.
The world does not exist under the regime of one public
library. Likely, it should not exist under the regime of
one digital library.
C. A Chance for Competitors
Also of importance, and mentioned throughout this
section, is that with a positive legal precedent Google’s
competitors will also be able to scan books and create
their own digital libraries. This, of course, would not
only include the larger companies, Yahoo and Microsoft,
but also numerous smaller companies who could
never fight the copyright battle in court due to smaller
budgets, but who indeed want a piece of the pie once
Google adds solidity to the flimsy fair use doctrine. 23
Alas, Google was the only entity willing to risk scanning
books and potential copyright infringement claims.
Further, Google would be the only company paying for
an extensive litigation on the fair use doctrine. Thus,
Google would have to go through extensive expenses
in order to get this positive legal precedent, only to
find that its competitors and many no name companies
could then do exactly what Google was doing before the
precedent. This fact alone could explain why Google
opted for the settlement over the litigation and how
a positive legal precedent could benefit everyone, but
Google.
D. The Unstoppable Google
Of course, the statement above is not entirely true.
While a positive legal precedent would certainly fuel
competition, competition shouldn’t and doesn’t scare
Google. Through Google’s constant creation of new
applications, it has found a way to continuously be
ahead of the curve and its competitors. Thus, a positive
legal precedent may create more book scanners, but by
the time the litigation would have ended, Google likely
would have set its sights on other potentials realized after
the Supreme Court held that Google’s fair use defense
was viable.
Google has already said it wants to collect all the
information in the world. With a positive legal
precedent confirming the fair use defense, what would
stop Google from next putting every movie in the world
on its databases, or every song? If the Court ruled in
23. See id. (“Should Google prevail, risks will be dramatically
decreased and one can expect competitors to rush in.”).
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favor of Google getting permission to scan books from
the libraries but not the copyright owners, why wouldn’t
the Court rule in favor of Google getting permission
from libraries but not copyright owners to scan DVDs
and CDs?24 Thus, if Google’s Book Search database is
approved, the amount of copyrighted work that Google
could exploit on its databases is infinite.
IV. But Could Google Win?
After a discussion of the positive legal precedent a
Google win could set on the copyright landscape, the
larger question unfolds: could Google even win? This
section analyzes relevant precedent in the Ninth and
Second Circuits. As the case would ultimately be
litigated in the Second Circuit, only cases from this
Circuit are binding. However, several opinions by the
Ninth Circuit have dealt with cases sharing similar facts
with the one at hand and this article will also explore
those holdings. Further, many who argue that Google
would succeed on its fair use defense have relied on cases
not from the Supreme Court or Second Circuit, but
from the Ninth Circuit, specifically, Kelly v. Arriba Soft
Corp.25
If Google proceeds in its litigation it will assert a fair
use defense. Under the affirmative defense of fair use,
Google is essentially admitting to copying, but claiming
that it is permitted under the doctrine. When analyzing
fair use, courts ultimately balance four factors. These are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use (including if it is
commercial in nature or a “transformative” use); (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount of the
work used; and (4) the effects or potential effects on the
market for the original work.26
A. Ninth Circuit Decisions
This section will analyze cases that many Google
advocates are arguing would support Google’s position.
However, it is important to keep in mind, that at most,
this is persuasive authority only, as the Second Circuit
is free to ignore the precedent established outside its
jurisdiction.
i. The Ninth Circuit and Fair Use
24. See id. at 6–7 (pointing out that libraries do in fact loan out
DVDs and CDs).
25. 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992); see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (“All four factors are to be explored, and
the results weighed together, in light of the purpose of copyright.”).
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In 2003, the Ninth Circuit decided Kelly v. Arriba
Soft Corp. The case was brought when Leslie Kelly, a
professional photographer, found thumbnail images
of his photographs on Arriba Soft’s search engine.
The court concluded that the “creation and use of the
thumbnails in the search engine is a fair use.”27 Going
through the analysis, the court first noted that “the more
transformative the new work, the less important the
other factors, including commercialism, become.”28 To
make this assertion, the court cited the Supreme Court’s
decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.29 In
Campbell, the Court analyzed the transformative nature
of the work under the first prong, noting that
The central purpose of this investigation is to see . . .
whether the new work merely supersedes the objects of
the original creation . . . or instead adds something new,
with a further purpose or different character, altering the
first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks,
in other words, whether and to what extent the new
work is “transformative.”30
Applying Campbell, the court found that “although
Arriba made exact replications of Kelly’s images, the
thumbnails were much smaller, lower-resolution images
that served an entirely different function than Kelly’s
original images.”31 Thus, while Kelly’s images were
“artistic works intended to inform and to engage the
viewer in an aesthetic experience,” Arriba’s search engine
used the images “to help index and improve access to
images on the Internet and their related web sites.”32 The
court also noted that users were unlikely to enlarge the
thumbnail images, as there constituted a much lowerresolution than the originals and an enlargement would
result in a significant loss of clarity. Further, while
evidence pointing towards transformative use was high,
the commercial use was low, as Arriba did not profit
from selling the image or use the images to directly
promote its website.33
Turning to the other prongs, the court found that
although photographs are generally considered creative
in nature, because Kelly published its images on the
27. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 815, 822 (2003).
28. Id. at 818.
29. 510 U.S. 569 (1994)
30. Id. at 579 (internal citations omitted).
31. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818.
32. Id.
33. See id. (“Because the use of Kelly’s images was not highly
exploitative, the commercial nature of the use weighs only slightly
against a finding of fair use.”).

Internet before Arriba used them in its search engine,
the second prong only weighed slightly in favor of Kelly.
The third prong was found to favor neither party, as
it was reasonable to copy the entire image in light of
Arriba’s use.34 Finally, the court found that not only did
Arriba’s use of Kelly’s images not harm the market of
Kelly’s images; it actually helped it. By displaying the
thumbnails of Kelly’s images, the search engine would
guide users to Kelly’s website, rather than detract from
it.35
In 2006, the Ninth Circuit decided Field v. Google.36
The case centered on Google’s main search engine,
which scans the web using a “web crawler” known as the
“Googlebot.”37 The web crawler scans the Internet to
locate, analyze, and catalog the webpages into Google’s
searchable index, making a temporary repository of each
webpage it finds called a “cache.”38 When clicked, the
cached link directs an Internet user to the archival copy
of a webpage, rather than to the original website for that
page.39 Field contended that allowing Internet users to
access archival copies of 51 of his copyrighted works
stored by Google in an online repository violated Field’s
exclusive rights to reproduce copies and distribute copies
of those works.40
Looking at the purpose and character of the use, the
court used Kelly to find that Google’s cached links
were transformative.41 Further, the court noted that
although Google is a for-profit corporation, no evidence
demonstrated that Google profited from Field’s
work.42 The court concluded, “the fact that Google is a
34. See id. at 821 (noting that “it was necessary for Arriba to copy
the entire image to allow users to recognize the image and decide
whether to pursue more information about the image or the originating web site. If Arriba only copied part of the image, it would be
more difficult to identify it, thereby reducing the usefulness of the
visual search engine.”).
35. Id.
36. 412 F.Supp.2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006).
37. Id. at 1110; see also Cameron W. Westin, Is Kelly Shifting Under
Google’s Feet? New Ninth Circuit Impact on the Google Library Project
Litigation, 2007 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 2, 26 (2007) (discussing how
Google’s search engine uses its web crawler to scan pages online and
catalogue these pages into Google’s searchable database.).
38. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1110–11.
39. Id. at 1111.
40. Id. at 1109.
41. See id. at 1118–19 (“Because Google serves different and
socially important purposes in offering access to copyrighted works
through ‘Cached’ links and does not merely supersede the objectives
of the original creations, the Court concludes that Google’s alleged
copying and distribution of Field’s Web pages containing copyrighted works was transformative.”).
42. See id. at 1120 (noting that Field’s work was among billions of
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commercial operation is of only minor relevance in the
fair use analysis. The transformative purpose of Google’s
use is considerably more important, and, as in Kelly,
means the first factor of the analysis weighs heavily in
favor of a fair use finding.”43 Although balancing the
other three factors led the court to rule in the favor of
fair use, the court added an additional prong to its fair
use analysis: Google’s good faith. The court noted that
Google honors industry-standard protocols that site
owners use to instruct search engines not to provide
cached links for the pages of their sites. Field both
failed to inform Google to not cache his site and took
a variety of steps to get his work included in Google’s
search results. “Comparing Field’s conduct with Google’s
provides further weight to the scales in favor of a finding
of fair use.”44
Finally, in 2007, the Ninth Circuit decided Perfect 10,
Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,45 a case focusing on Google’s
“Google Images” feature. Perfect 10 markets and sells
copyrighted images of nude models. The issue arose
in this case when Google’s search engine automatically
indexed the webpages of websites that republished
Perfect 10’s images without authorization. Thus, Google
users could click on the thumbnail image provided by
Google’s search engine and access third-party webpages
with full-sized infringing images.46
Under the fair use analysis the court used Kelly to
hold that “Google’s use of thumbnails is highly
transformative.”47 Thus, per Kelly, “even making an
exact copy of a work may be transformative so long as
the copy serves a different function than the original
work.”48 The court further rejected the district court’s
finding that since Google’s thumbnails “lead users to
works in the Google database and no advertisements were placed on
the cached pages).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1122–23.
45. 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007).
46. Legal action was sought against Amazon.com because of the
agreement between Google and Amazon.com, in which Amazon.
com is allowed to in-line link to Google’s search results. As the
court explains, “Amazon.com gave its users the impression that
Amazon.com was providing search results, but Google communicated the search results directly to Amazon.com’s users. Amazon.com
routed users’ search queries to Google and automatically transmitted
Google’s responses (i.e., HTML instructions for linking to Google’s
search results) back to its users.” Id. at 712.
47. See id. at 721 (noting that “a search engine puts images ‘in
a different context’ so that they are ‘transformed into a new creation.’”).
48. Id. at 721–22 (citing Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp, 336 F.3d at
818–19).
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sites that directly benefit Google’s bottom line,” the
AdSense program increased the commercial nature
of Google’s use of Perfect 10′s images.49 Instead, the
court concluded that the “significantly transformative
nature of Google’s search engine, particularly in light
of its public benefit, outweighs Google’s superseding
and commercial uses of the thumbnails in this case.”50
Balancing the other factors led the court to hold in favor
of fair use.
ii. The Google Book Search and Fair Use
Kelly has already allowed Google to prevail in Field
and Perfect 10, and many advocates argue it could have
likely given the Google Book Search the capacity to
prevail on its fair use defense. If these cases were used
as controlling, on the first factor it is very likely that the
court would have found Google’s use transformative in
nature. Google is not simply reproducing the books
and allowing the public to access them in their entirety.
Instead, Google displays “snippets” of the books used
for locating materials relevant to search queries and
“keyword” searches. It, therefore, serves a purpose
and function very different than that of the original
book. Further, the ability to search for keyword results
has enormous potentials for researchers, making the
project a clear public benefit.51 Therefore, it is likely
that the court would find, as it did in Perfect 10, that
the “significantly transformative nature of Google’s
search engine, particularly in light of its public benefit,
outweighs Google’s superseding and commercial uses of
the books in this case.”52
Moving to the nature and character of the use, while
many of the books Google copies are creative, they
have all been published and therefore do not encroach
on the author’s right of first publication.53 Further,
49. Id. at 722–23; see Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d
828, 847 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
50. Perfect 10, 487 F.3d at 723; see also id. (“Accordingly, we disagree with the district court’s conclusion that because Google’s use
of the thumbnails could supersede Perfect 10′s cell phone download use and because the use was more commercial than Arriba’s,
this fair use factor weighed ‘slightly’ in favor of Perfect 10. Instead,
we conclude that the transformative nature of Google’s use is more
significant than any incidental superseding use or the minor commercial aspects of Google’s search engine and website. Therefore, the
district court erred in determining this factor weighed in favor of
Perfect 10.”).
51. See Westin, supra note 36, at 48.
52. Perfect 10, 487 F.3d at 723.
53. Westin, supra note 36, at 49; see Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp, 336
F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The fact that a work is published or
unpublished also is a critical element of its nature. Published works
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while as in Kelly, Google copies the works in full, such
wholesale copying is necessary to create a functional
search engine.54 Finally, while it is arguable whether the
content-owners of library books may lose the licensing
value of their works due to Google’s actions, the searchengine is not created to replace the demand for full
books and is instead designed to lead users to locations
for purchasing the original works. As in Kelly, it can
be argued that this not only does not detract from the
market, it instead enhances it.55 Finally, the court could
choose to look at the additional good faith prong added
by the court in Field. Such good faith efforts in the
Google Book Search include the opt-out provision that
Google has designed. Thus, while providing an “optout” method alone would not immunize a defendant
from copyright infringement claims, “volunteering
a relatively simple and effective method for content
owners to prevent their works from being included in a
vast project may lessen the image of authors’ works being
wrestled from their grasp.”56
B. Second Circuit Decisions
While Google defenders rest on Kelly and subsequent
case law, it is important to remember that it is the
Second Circuit, and not the Ninth Circuit, that would
decide this case. Thus, there is a different body of case
law that the Second Circuit would look to in order to
reach its decision. Further, the East Coast’s Second
Circuit has proven much less pragmatic than the West
Coast’s Ninth Circuit.57 This section will analyze relevant
precedent set in the Second Circuit and analyze how
such precedent would have guided the court in the
current Google litigation.
are more likely to qualify as fair use because the first appearance of
the artist’s expression has already occurred. Kelly’s images appeared
on the Internet before Arriba used them in its search image.”); see
also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 723 (9th
Cir. 2007) (“Once Perfect 10 has exploited this commercially valuable right of first publication by putting its images on the Internet
for paid subscribers, Perfect 10 is no longer entitled to the enhanced
protection available for an unpublished work.”); Field v Google,
412 F.Supp.2d 1106, 1120 (D. Nev. 2006) (holding that the nature
of the copyrighted works weighed only slightly in favor of Field
because “even assuming Field’s copyrighted works are as creative as
the works at issue in Kelly, like Kelly, Field published his works on
the Internet, thereby making them available to the world for free at
his Web site.”).
54. See Westin, supra note 36, at 49
55. See id.
56. Id. at 54.
57. Siva Vaidhyanathan, The Googilization of Everything and the
Future of Copyright, 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1207, 1225 (2007).

In the Google Book Search Settlement, the East Cost
and West Coast house two different interests. In this
case, the East Coast is home to authors and publishers.58
Here, “content is king,” and therefore its protection is
a powerful interest.59 Across the country, however, the
West Coast is home to Google and content distributors,
rather than content creators.60 Thus, Google’s litigation
in the Second Circuit gives its adversaries – authors and
publishers – home court advantage.61 With this natural
bias in mind, it is then important to turn to case law and
binding precedent.
i. The Second Circuit and Fair Use
In the same year that the Supreme Court was debating
contributory liability in Sony, the Second Circuit
reached its decision in Fin. Info., Inc. v. Moody’s Investors
Servs., Inc.62 In this case, Financial Information Inc.
(“FII”), a publisher of financial information, contended
that Moody’s stole its copyrighted material from its
Bond Service. At trial, FII demonstrated that there
was a 95% certainty that Moody’s had copied at least
40–50% of FFI’s information in the years 1980 and
1981.63 Laying out the fair use factors, the court found
that Moody’s did not make out a proper defense. The
court began its analysis by finding “there is no argument
and of course can be no doubt but that Moody’s use is
commercial, and thus presumptively unfair.”64 Further,
the court rejected the “public function” of Moody’s use.65
Thus, based on the presumption of unfair use, the court
found in favor of FII on the first factor.
Placing little emphasis on the second factor, which
the court found to favor fair use, the court placed
significant emphasis on the third factor. The court
found significant evidence offered at trial by Professor
Herbert Robbins, Professor of Mathematical Statistics
at Columbia University, that it was statistically certain
(95–99% probable) that Moody’s had copied at the
40–50% level.66 The court considered this “substantial,
if not wholesale copying by Moody’s from FII.”67 Finally,
with respect to the fourth factor, the court found that
58. Westin, supra note 36, at 12.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 13.
62. 751 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1984).
63. Id. at 503.
64. Id. at 508.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 509.
67. Id.
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FII might be in a position to license the infringed use for
a fee and noted that harm to the copyright owner “may
be presumed.”68
In 2000, the Southern District of New York found itself
faced with a copyright infringement claim concerning
downloading music on the Internet. In UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc.69 the court began by
asserting that, “The complex marvels of cyberspatial
communication may create difficult legal issues; but
not in this case. Defendant’s infringement of plaintiffs’
copyrights is clear.”70 Employing the fair use factors,
the court found the purpose and the character of the
use to be commercial.71 Further the court found that
retransmitting the copies into another medium was
insufficient to constitute as transformative.72 Thus, as
MP3.com failed to add “new aesthetics, new insights
and understandings” to the original music recordings it
copied, but instead “simply repackages those recordings
to facilitate their transmission through another
medium,” its works could be considered innovative, but
not transformative.73 Balancing the other three facts, the
court found MP3.com’s fair use defense indefensible as a
matter of law and ruled in favor of the copyright owners.
More recently, the Second Circuit has ruled in favor
of fair use. In 2005, Blanch v. Koons74 decided an
infringement claim of a copyrighted photograph. In
this case, Andrea Blanch, copyright owner of her
photograph “Silk Sandals by Gucci,” alleged that Jeff
Koons copied the model’s legs, feet, and Gucci sandals
from the photograph in his painting entitled, “Niagara.”
Undertaking a fair use analysis the court first found
Koons’ use of the work to be transformative, finding
“no original creative or imaginative aspect of Blanch’s
photograph . . . included in Koons’ painting.”75 Under
68. Id. at 510 (citing Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417 (1984)).
69. 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
70. Id. at 350.
71. See id. at 351 (“for while subscribers to My.MP3.com are not
currently charged a fee, defendant seeks to attract a sufficiently large
subscription base to draw advertising and otherwise make a profit.”).
72. See id. (“Here, although defendant recites that My.MP3.com
provides a transformative ‘space shift’ by which subscribers can
enjoy the sound recordings contained on their CDs without lugging
around the physical discs themselves, this is simply another way
of saying that the unauthorized copies are being retransmitted in
another medium–an insufficient basis for any legitimate claim of
transformation.”).
73. Id.
74. 396 F.Supp.2d 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
75. Id. at 481.
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the nature of the copyrighted work, the court found
that the photograph was sufficiently creative and its
publication in a magazine throughout the United States
favored fair use. On the third factor, the court found
that because the quality of the copyright protection for
crossed legs is weak, the third factor was neutral between
the parties. Finally, on the fourth factor the court found
in favor of defendants as “Niagara” was not a substitute
for Blanche’s photograph and was in no way competitive
with it.
In 2006, the Second Circuit found in Bill Graham
Archives. v. Dorling Kindersely Ltd.76 a viable fair use
defense. In 2003, Dorling Kindersley Ltd (“DK”)
published a 480-page coffee table book entitled
“Grateful Dead: the Illustrated Trip.” Issue arose
when Bill Graham Archives (“BGA”) claimed to own
the copyright to seven images displayed in the book.
Employing the fair use test, the court found that by
placing the photographs in chronological order, DK’s use
was “transformatively different from the mere expressive
use of images on concert posters or tickets.”77 Regarding
the second fair use factor, the court found against DK
because BGA’s images were creative artworks. However,
the court noted that where the work is found to be
transformative under the first factor, the second factor
becomes of limited use.78
Next, the court found that even though the images
were reproduced in their entirety, “the third fair use
factor weighed in favor of DK because the images were
displayed in reduced size and scattered among many
other images and texts.”79 In reaching this decision, the
court noted that sister circuits “have concluded that
such copying does not necessarily weigh against fair use
because copying the entirety of a work is sometimes
necessary to make a fair use of the image.”80 Similar to
Kelly, the court noted that while the copyrighted images
were copied in its entirety, the visual impact of its artistic
expression was significantly limited due to its reduced
size. This led the court to conclude, “that such use by
DK is tailored to further its transformative purpose
76. 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006).
77. Id. at 609.
78. Id. at 613; see also id. at 612–13 (“Accordingly, we hold that
even though BGA’s images are creative works, which are a core concern of copyright protection, the second factor has limited weight in
our analysis because the purpose of DK’s use was to emphasize the
images’ historical rather than creative value.”).
79. Id. at 613.
80. Id. (citing Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 821 (9th
Cir. 2003)).
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because DK’s reduced size reproductions of BGA’s
images in their entirety displayed the minimal image size
and quality necessary to ensure the reader’s recognition
of the images as historical artifacts of Grateful Dead
concert events.”81 Finally, looking to the fourth factor,
the court first recognized that it did not find harm to
BGA’s license market simply because DK did not pay a
fee for the copyrighted images.82 Then, because DK’s use
of BGA’s images was transformative, the court concluded
that BGA did not suffer market harm due to the loss of
license fees.83
ii. Google Book Search and Fair Use
Looking at the Second Circuit’s binding case law as
a whole demonstrates that Google would likely not
fair well against copyright owners and publishers of
books. While newer Second Circuit decisions have
allowed the fair use doctrine to prevail, its application
of the transformative standard differs significantly
from that held in the Ninth Circuit.84 Both the Ninth
and Second Circuits have used Campbell to support
its transformative analysis. However, Bill Graham
Archives and Blanch appear to have adopted a different
transformative standard than did Kelly, Field and Perfect
10. The differences between the standards is based
on different weights to different values, “whereas the
Campbell opinion recognized the value of new creative
expression containing commentary that depends of
previously created expression, the Ninth Circuit saw
value in improving ‘access to information on the
Internet.’’85 Thus, although Bill Graham Archives goes
as far as citing to Kelly, both Bill Graham Archives and
Blanch involved the unauthorized uses of copyrighted
material to create new authorship.86 Further, “both
opinions indicate that uses, such as Google’s, that do
not involve the creation of new expression containing
commentary are not transformative.”87
81. Id.
82. Id. at 614.
83. Id. at 614-15.
84. Matt Williams, Recent Second Circuit Opinions Indicate that
Google’s Library Project Is Not Transformative, 25 Cardozo Arts &
Ent. L.J. 303, 319 (2007).
85. Id. at 305–06.
86. See id. at 319 (noting that even though Bill Graham Archives
cited Kelly, both Bill Graham Archives and Blanch “involved unauthorized uses of copyrighted material to create new authorship
containing commentary, and both opinions indicate that uses that
do not involve the creation of new expression containing commentary are not transformative.”).
87. Id.

Thus, applying the fair use doctrine in the Second
Circuit comes down to how the Second Circuit
will rule on the transformative nature of Google’s
use. Since Google’s use is commercial, it will have to
make a strong showing of transformation in order to
overcome this prong.88 In Blanch, the Second Circuit
did not hold Koons’ work to be transformative solely
because it found a new purpose or function for Blanch’s
photograph. Instead, the court cautiously explained
that Koons’ repurposing of Blanch’s work involved the
creation of new expression containing commentary.89
Further, in Bill Graham Archives, the defendant was
able to prevail because it presented its readers with
information that augmented the value and effectiveness
of the commentary in its new work.90 Thus, Bill Graham
Archives, cites Kelly for the narrow principle that it
is important to use copyrighted material for a new
purpose that provides the public with information.91
The court did not cite Kelly for the broad principle that
a use can be transformative for altering the function
in order to increase access to information.92 In fact, in
MP3.Com the court found that retransmitting copies
into another medium was insufficient to constitute as
transformative.93 In the Google Book Search, Google
did not create new authorship with commentary.
Despite the new webpages, databases, and search engine
programs provided by Google, none of these features
provide the public with new information. Thus, because
Google adds no new commentary, it likely will not be
found to be transformative. The lack of transformation
coupled with the commercial nature of Google’s use
would likely lead Google to fail under the first prong.
Succeeding on the first prong is not always critical.94
88. See Fin. Info. Inc. v. Moody’s Investors Servs., Inc., 751 F.2d
501, 508 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that commercial use is “presumptively unfair”).
89. Williams, supra note 83, at 319.
90. Id. at 323.
91. Id. at 321.
92. Id. at 323–24.
93. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F.Supp.2d
349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Here, although defendant recites that
My.MP3.com provides a transformative ‘space shift’ by which
subscribers can enjoy the sound recordings contained on their
CDs without lugging around the physical discs themselves, this is
simply another way of saying that the unauthorized copies are being
retransmitted in another medium-an insufficient basis for any legitimate claim of transformation”).
94. But see Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, 150
F.3d 132 (2d Cir 1998) (determining that the a trivia game of the
television show Seinfeld was not transformative because its purpose
was not to educate, criticize or expose viewers to the “nothingness”
of the show, but to “repackage Seinfeld to entertain Seinfeld viewers.”
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The test balances each factor, and therefore if Google
can come up strong on the other factors it can still
succeed on fair use.95 Unfortunately, not even Google
advocates argue that Google will succeed on the second
prong that looks at the nature of the work. Books are
highly creative works and rest at the heart of copyright
protection. Further, while the copying of an entire
work has not bothered the Second Circuit, it has
allowed such wholesale copying only when the work
is transformative.96 Because Google’s use is probably
not transformative by nature, the Second Circuit will
likely compare such copying to Moody’s rather than Bill
Graham Archives. Finally, on the fourth factor, unlike
in Blanch where the court found that the defendant’s
photograph was not a substitute for the plaintiff’s
photograph and was in no way competitive with it, it
can be argued that Google is directly competing with
books. Further, Bill Graham Archives will be of little
use to Google, as the court concluded that BGA did not
suffer market harm due to the loss of licensing fees only
because DK’s use of BGA’s images were transformative.
Here, as mentioned above, Google’s use of the books
is likely not transformative.97 Therefore, although
Google advocates argue it can make a strong showing
that Google will not harm the copyright owners and
publishers’ market, based on Second Circuit case law,
such a win is unlikely.
V. Conclusion
Failure at the Second Circuit might not be the end
of the road for Google. With a split between the
Ninth and Second Circuit on how to qualify a work as
transformative, the Supreme Court may agree to take the
Ultimately, the determination that the work was not transformative had a significant role in determining the other three factors.
When looking at the second factor the court held that, “the fictional
nature of the copyrighted work remains significant in the instant
case, where the secondary use is at best minimally transformative.”
On the third prong the court specifically noted, “The SAT does not
serve a critical or otherwise transformative purpose.” Finally, on the
fourth factor the court stated “the more transformative the secondary use, the less likelihood that the secondary use substitutes for the
original.”).
95. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994)
(“All four factors are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purpose of copyright.”).
96. See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448
F.3d 605, 613 (2d Cir. 2006) (concluding that where the work is
found to be transformative under the first factor, the second factor
becomes of limited use. “Even though the copyrighted images are
copied in their entirety . . . such use by DK is tailored to further its
transformative purpose . . . .”).
97. Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 614–15.
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case. However, following the holding in Campbell it is
likely that the Court will side with the Second Circuit.98
Further, it is interesting to note that the Second Circuit
is a very well respected Circuit when it comes to
copyright issues, and the Supreme Court may be more
willing to take its interpretation of the transformative
prong seriously. Already the Supreme Court has taken
copyright cases from both the Ninth Circuit (Grokster)
and the Second Circuit (Tasini v. New York Times Co.,
Inc.99). The difference, however, is that the Supreme
Court upheld the Second Circuit’s ruling and sided with
the writers while it unanimously overruled the Ninth
Circuit that favored the infringers.100
Ultimately the question of whether the Supreme Court
would take the Google Book Search case and whether
it would rule in Google’s favor is a question for another
article. This article’s focus was to ponder the possibility
of a positive legal precedent, and then conclude that
despite the sweeping changes that would come with new
precedent, the likelihood of actually getting the Second
Circuit to rule in Google’s favor is slim. Thus, if the
Second Circuit ruled against Google and the Supreme
Court took the case and agreed with the Second Circuit,
the Ninth Circuit would have to change its pattern
of ruling in favor of fair use, at least to the extent of
deeming a work transformative merely because it has
been placed online. What would be the effects of a
negative legal precedent?
Before Google entered settlement negotiations in 2007,
a scholar described Google as “an intellectual property
owner’s worst enemy: a risk-taking iconoclast with deep
pockets, seemingly unafraid to litigate licensing issues all
the way to the Supreme Court.”101 Perhaps the scholar
got it wrong; perhaps Google was afraid to litigate fair
use “all the way to the Supreme Court.” Or maybe
Google realized that this was a battle it could only win
98. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583 (finding a parody transformative because the song at issue “reasonably could be perceived as
commenting on the original or criticizing it to some degree.”); see
also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S.
539, 543 (1985) (noting that defendant “attempted no independent
commentary, research or criticism”).
99. 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
100. See also Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc, 464 U.S.
417 (1984) (reversing the Ninth Circuit’s holding that petitioners
were liable for contributory infringement); Accord Harper & Row,
471 U.S. at 542 (reversing the Second Circuit’s decision that The
Nation’s act constituted a fair use.)
101. James Gibson, Accidental Rights, 116 Yale L.J. Pocket Part
348, 349 (2007).
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by settling rather then fighting.102

102. See Hetcher, supra note 14 at 9. (“Google may believe that,
by engaging in an all-out legal battle, the publishing industry will be
forced into submission through a settlement on terms favorable to
the Google Print project.”).
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Regulation of Medicine Patents by the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement to Broaden Access to Medicine
By Daniel Lee1
One1of the most concerning areas of recent
patent enforcement is a life or death matter for
thousands of people around the world. Restricted access
to vital medicines in developing countries is one of the
most controversial international intellectual property
issues today. There is a new international treaty called
the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)
being negotiated among developed countries, and it is
expected to bring a huge impact on access to medicine in
developing countries.2
This article proposes what ACTA should include
in order to protect access to medicine in developing
countries. It discusses the need to allow broader
compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical patents to
encourage increased production of generic drugs and
bring down the overall prices of essential medicine in
developing countries. It also examines the need to
regulate counterfeit drugs in order to promote research
and development from pharmaceutical companies, while
correctly distinguishing generic drugs from counterfeit
drugs. Lastly, this article concludes by suggesting
the need for a provision in ACTA that recognizes
the importance of access to medicine provisions in
multinational treaties over the regional and bilateral
agreements.
The most recent major agreement on
international intellectual property rights enforcement
is the World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS)
Agreement.3 The TRIPS Agreement is an international
agreement that sets the basic norms of international
intellectual property standards along with other
1. Daniel Lee, 2011 J.D. Candidate at the Washington College of
Law at American University, B.S. in Biochemistry/Cell Biology in
2007 at University of California, San Diego. Daniel is a 2009-2011
Articles Writer for The Intellectual Property Brief.
2. Margot Kaminski, The Origins and Potential Impact of the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement, 34 Yale J. Int’l L. 247, 247 (2009).
3. See Maxwell R. Morgan, Medicines for the Developing World:
Promoting Access and Innovation in the Post-TRIPS Environment, 64
U. Toronto Fac. L. Rev. 45, 48 (2006) (explaining that the access to
medicine issue transcends the recent heated debate on the implementation of TRIPS Agreement and its impact on medicine prices).
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international agreements such as the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) agreements.4 The
TRIPS Agreement extends patent terms in all fields of
technology to twenty years, and requires that all WTO
states provide patent protection for all inventions.5 This
requirement also applies to pharmaceutical patents,
resulting in a significant restriction on vital medicines in
developing countries.6
While every party involved agrees that large
populations of developing countries lack meaningful
access to health-related technologies, approaches to this
problem differ significantly between developed countries
and developing countries.7 The International Bill of
Human Rights acknowledges that access to medicine is a
fundamental right of every person.8 On the other hand,
pharmaceutical companies must also protect their patent
rights in order to secure their profit to keep producing
medicines and seeking out innovations.9
There are some provisions in the TRIPS
Agreement and the subsequent Doha Declaration
that provide some flexibility to the restricted access to
medicines resulting from TRIPS. Article 6 of TRIPS
allows for “Parallel Importation”, which happens when a
patented good sold by the patentee is imported without
his consent10; Article 2 of TRIPS recognizes continued
application of the Paris Convention, which forces patent
4. Susy Frankel, Challenging TRIPS-plus Agreements: The Potential
Utility of Non-Violation Disputes, 12 J. Int’l Econ. L. 1023, 1039
(2009).
5. Morgan, supra note 2, at 48.
6. Id.
7. See Tina S. Bhatt, Amending TRIPS: A New Hope for Increased
Access to Essential Medicines, 33 Brook. J. Int’l L. 579, 598-599
(2008) (discussing the lack of meaningful access to AIDS/HIV
medicine in African countries due to high price while addressing the
need of profit from patent by pharmaceutical companies to promote
research and development).
8. Siddartha Rao, Closing the Global Gap: A Pragmatic Approach
to the Access to Medicines Problem, 3 J. Legal Tech. Risk Mgnt.1, 3
(2008) (citing to Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 25
(1)).
9. See Bhatt, supra note 5, at 601 (arguing that “patent protection
is necessary for the continued availability of drugs”).
10. Morgan, supra note 2, at 61.
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holders to file foreign patent applications within a
year from their domestic filing date in order to acquire
an international patent;11 Paragraph 7 of the Doha
Declaration extends the TRIPS implementation for
pharmaceutical products in the least developed countries
until January 1, 2016;12 and most importantly, Article
31 of the TRIPS Agreement allows for the compulsory
licensing of pharmaceutical patents and for exportation
of medicines produced under compulsory licenses to
eligible importing member nations.13
Recently, there have been rounds of new
bilateral trade agreements that impose additional
enforcement of patent rights between developing
nations and developed nations.14 These bilateral and
regional trade agreements are called “TRIPS-plus,” and
include additional intellectual property provisions in
the Free Trade Agreements (FTA) among developed
and developing countries.15 The TRIPS-plus agreements
deter developing nations from taking full advantage of
the flexibility provisions in the TRIPS, by forcing them
to adopt stricter intellectual property provisions.16
ACTA is still a work in progress, and thirteen
countries, including the United States, have joined in
the negotiations. Although the negotiation process
has been kept confidential, some released material
indicates that the new agreement will contain even
stricter enforcement measures, including increased
criminal sanctions for infringement and stronger border
measures.17 Considering ACTA’s purpose and nature, it
can be predicted that the agreement will further decrease
access to medicines in developing countries.18
I. Broader Compulsory Licensing and More
11. Id.
12. Id. at 63.
13. See id. at 60 (quoting F.M. Scherer & J. Watal, “Post-TRIPS
Options for Access to Patented Medicines in Developing Countries”
in Commission on Macroeconomics and Health Working Paper Series (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2001) Paper No. WG4:1
at 13).
14. See Bhatt, supra note 5, at 617-618 (arguing that new FTA
Agreements made by the United States “contain provisions that far
exceed the protections offered by TRIPS”).
15. Id. at 618.
16. See id. (explaining that American bilateral and multilateral
FTAs include provisions that limit exclusions of patentability,
require broader definition of patents, prevent parallel importation,
limit scope of compulsory license, and permit prosecution of nonviolation claims).
17. Kaminski, supra note 1, at 247.
18. See id. (arguing that ACTA will likely be the strictest enforcement measures among many countries).

Generic Drugs: Profit Maximizing Pricing of Medicine by
Pharmaceutical Companies Creates Deadweight Loss
Pharmaceutical companies holding drug patents
have almost monopolistic control over the price of their
medicine.19 When pharmaceutical companies set a price
for their medicine in a market, they usually pursue a
profit-maximizing strategy, rather than considering
what would allow for greater access to the medicine.20
This strategy works because the demand for essential
medicine is likely inelastic in theory, in that the demand
by the consumers for the medicine will tend not to
decrease as the price of the medicine increases.21 This
profit-maximizing pricing strategy consequently creates
a large dead weight loss in developing countries.22 Since
the majority of the population in the least developed
countries earns an income below the poverty line, a
small increase of a medicine price can make medicines
inaccessible for an enormous amount of people in
need.23 However, it is often more profitable and more
efficient for the pharmaceutical companies in developing
countries to impose a high price on their medicine
and target the top percentage of a rich population,
rather than selling the maximum possible quantity in a
market.24 Sometimes these medicine prices in developing
nations are even higher than comparable drug prices in
developed countries.25
An example is illustrated by Professor Sean
Flynn of American University in Washington, D.C.
According to 2006 UNAIDS data, there are 5.5 million
HIV/AIDS patients in South Africa.26 Assuming that
HIV prevalence is uniform in the population, with
each decile containing 550,000 people in need of
antiretroviral treatment, if the price of an anti-retroviral
is set at $1,481 per patient per year, only 550,000
people (10% of total HIV patients) can afford it.27
The total revenue earned at this price point is $814.6
19. See Morgan, supra note 2, at 56 (arguing that in return for
granting medicine patent holders monopolistic control over their
patents, society gains full disclosure of the invention).
20. Sean Flynn, Aidan Hollis & Mike Palmedo, An Economic
Justification for Open Access to Essential Medicine Patents in Developing Countries 8 (U. of Calgary Dep’t of Econ. Working Paper No.
2009-01).
21. Id. at 10.
22. Id. at 8.
23. Id. at 10.
24. Id. at 12.
25. Id. at 18.
26. Flynn, supra note 18, at 17.
27. Id.
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million.28 However, if the price of an antiretroviral is
set at $396, about half of the total HIV patients can
afford the anti-retroviral with total revenue of $435.6
million.29 Further calculation by Professor Flynn shows
that revenues keep falling as pharmaceutical companies
reduce prices and increase production.30 Thus, in South
Africa, pharmaceutical companies will profit the most if
they price their antiretroviral at $1,481, so that only the
top ten percent of the population can afford it.31 This
is higher than the profit-maximizing price of $1,468 in
Norway, where 80% of the population can afford the
same medication at this price level due to their relatively
uniform high income.32
II. Broader Compulsory Licenses Can Bring
in More Generic Competition and Reduce the Price of
Medicine and the Deadweight Loss
One of the most effective ways to bring down
the cost of high priced essential medicine is to bring
in more generic competition through more aggressive
compulsory licensing.33 Compulsory licensing means
that a patent holder is compelled to grant a license
to third parties to use the patent. It is often used in
antitrust law and patent law.34 As mentioned earlier,
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement contains procedural
requirements to obtain compulsory licenses. The
unauthorized user must make a reasonable effort to
obtain a license from the patent holder and provide
adequate remuneration based on the economic value of
the use.35 However, TRIPS also waives these procedural
requirements in case of a national emergency or other
extreme urgency.36
The problem with the compulsory licensing
flexibility is that only some developing countries have
the infrastructure to take advantage of the provision and
produce generic drugs under the compulsory license.37
Most developing countries rely on the export and
import of generic drugs produced by the few capable
developing nations.38 The August 30th Agreement,
28. Id. at 18.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Flynn, supra note 18, at 20.
33. Rao, supra note 6, at 15.
34. Id. at 8.
35. Morgan, supra note 2, at 60.
36. Id. at 61.
37. Id. at 64.
38. See id. (explaining that the Article 31(f ) of TRIPS allows a
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adopted by the TRIPS council in 2003 in addition to
the TRIPS Agreement, outlines this import and export
system procedure, but its “ad hoc, case-by-case, countryby-country procedural system” creates segmented
markets.39 This results in a substantial inefficiency to
the compulsory licensing system and high transaction
costs.40 Entry of generic drugs into the market then
becomes burdened, because demand for a generic
drug by one particular segmented market often shows
insufficient incentives for an overall generic entry.41
In addition, there is a growing concern regarding
the seizure of generic drugs being transported from
a developing country to other developing countries.
European countries tend to impose local intellectual
property laws on pass-though cargos, which pause briefly
in these countries to refuel or change their mode of
transportation on the way to their final destination.42
These “transit countries” take the view that passthrough generic drugs are in violation of their local
intellectual property laws and can be seized, regardless
of their destination.43 For example, in December 2008,
Dutch customs authorities seized several cargos of the
generic drug Losartan Potassium in transit from India
to Brazil.44 The Dutch customs authorities released the
cargos after 36 days, but they released the cargos back to
India instead of allowing the cargos to ship to Brazil.45
In order to encourage more efficient exportation
and importation of generic drugs produced under
compulsory license among developing countries, ACTA
should simplify burdensome procedural requirements
as much as possible. It should allow the generic drug
market in developing countries to be viewed as a
whole, in order to create enough demand for generic
entry. Furthermore, ACTA should prohibit the transit
countries from applying their local intellectual property
laws to generic drugs in transit to developing countries,
WTO member nation that has shown insufficient or no manufacturing capacities to import medicines produced under compulsory
license).
39. Id. at 84.
40. Id.
41. Morgan, supra note 2, at 84.
42. ConsumerInternational.com, European Countries Imposing
Local Intellectual Property Laws on Cargo Passing Through, http://
www.consumersinternational.org (follow “member information”
hyperlink; then follow “member news” hyperlink; then follow “generic drugs seized in transit: IP laws threatening access to affordable
medicine” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 1, 2009).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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to ensure the fast and efficient supply of essential
medicines to developing countries.
III. Funding for Innovation by Stronger Regulation
on Counterfeit Drugs
Research and development of new drugs cost
substantial amounts of money and involves high risks
of unsuccessful products.46 On the other hand, generic
drugs bear little to no research and development costs
and involve substantially fewer risks, since the drug
is already proven to be successful.47 This is why the
introduction of generic alternatives of more expensive
patented medicines in markets is often said to be
the deterrent to research for innovative new drugs.48
Pharmaceutical companies often view high profits as
incentives for their patented technology, and when
these incentives are low, they are reluctant to make
investments to enter into the market and experiment
with new drugs.49

line between generic drugs and counterfeit drugs and
imposing strict regulations to eliminate counterfeit
drugs. Regulating counterfeit drugs through ACTA
can have two positive effects. First, casualties caused by
dangerous counterfeit drugs can be eliminated. Second,
by gaining back the market share held by counterfeit
drugs, pharmaceutical companies can increase their
revenue and thus have more financial support for their
research and development. However, it is important
not to confuse generic drugs with counterfeit drugs
since elimination of generic alternatives can only cause
restricted access to medicine in developing countries.

A counterfeit drug is a medicine “which is
deliberately and fraudulently mislabeled with respect to
identity and source.”52 Unlike generic drugs, counterfeit
drugs can have incorrect or inactive ingredients that can
cause injuries or even death, instead of curing a disease.53
Counterfeit drugs are extremely profitable because there
is a high demand for affordable medicine from the
54
In order to promote research and development of large poor populations in developing countries. Many
new drugs and vaccines for neglected diseases, incentives customers in developing countries cannot distinguish
between counterfeit drugs and generic drugs.55 In Africa,
to pharmaceutical companies are needed while keeping
counterfeit drugs encompass up to thirty percent of all
generic competition in place.50 There have been many
56
mechanisms proposed to help research and development, medicines sold among developing African nations.
Inadequate knowledge and insufficient regulations
such as public and private research funding, advance
continue to contribute to the expansion of counterfeit
purchasing, and bulk purchasing.51 However, these
drugs.57
mechanisms are separate from ACTA since they involve
voluntary funding and are not geared toward altering
In 2006, the World Health Organization
enforcement mechanisms.
formed an international partnership called IMPACT
One way that ACTA can help increase research
and development of new drugs is by drawing a clear
46. See Bryan Mercurio, Resolving the Public Health Crisis in the
Developing World: Problems and Barriers of Access to Essential Medicines, 5 Nw. U. J. Int’l Hum. Rts. 1, 53 (2006) (explaining that
research and development cost of drugs account up to thirty percent
of total production costs: only 5 of every 250 compounds enter into
clinical trials where over half of the compounds fail, and additional
large numbers of fail at the regulatory stage).
47. See Morgan, supra note 2, at 82 (explaining that a generic drug
company does not incur front-end investments cost associated with
researching and developing new drugs even though there are still
transaction costs and capital costs).
48. See id. at 56 (introducing an existing theory that monopolistic incentives from patent stimulate research and development by
pharmaceutical companies).
49. Flynn, supra note 18, at 6.
50. See Morgan, supra note 2, at 99 (arguing that in addition to
keeping medicine prices down in developing countries, new strategies to incentivize innovation are required).
51. See id. at 99-105 (explaining financial strategies such as pull
and push mechanism, advance purchasing and orphan drug laws to
promote innovation).

to combat counterfeit drugs.58 IMPACT’s goal is to
“eradicate counterfeit drugs by influencing legislation
and increasing awareness”.59 There has not yet been
an international treaty to regulate counterfeit drugs.60
ACTA can be the first international treaty to regulate
counterfeit drugs by imposing criminal and civil
penalties for the production and distribution of
counterfeit medicines, while keeping a wide door open
to the production of generic drugs and compulsory

52. Amanda Chaves, A Growing Headache: The Prevalence of
International Counterfeit Pharmaceutical Trade in Developing African
Nations, 32 Suffolk Transnat’l Rev. 631, 633 (2009).
53. Id. at 637.
54. Id. at 635.
55. Id. at 637.
56. Id. at 636.
57. Id. at 637.
58. Chaves, supra note 45 at 644.
59. Id. at 645.
60. Id. at 646.
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licensing.61

Thus, TRIPS-plus add-on intellectual property
provisions, such as the intellectual property provisions
IV. Preemptive Power of TRIPS Over Regional
in FTAs, are international agreements that must obey
Treaties
the minimum standard and frameworks of the TRIPS
Agreement to comply with basic international law.71 It
As mentioned in the introduction, flexibilities
can then be said that by enforcing stricter intellectual
in multinational treaties such as TRIPS and ACTA
property standards and taking benefits of the TRIPS
can be jeopardized by bilateral and regional TRIPSAgreement away from developing nations, the TRIPSplus agreements.62 TRIPS-plus agreements include
intellectual property provisions in Free Trade Agreements plus provisions deteriorate the72TRIPS Agreement in
violation of international law.
between developed countries and developing countries,
and they usually impose stricter domestic intellectual
By continuing to push TRIPS-plus provisions,
property enforcement than the multinational treaties.63
the U.S. and EU are violating an international treaty
The TRIPS-plus provisions are usually unfair
negotiations resulting from unequal economic power
between the negotiating nations.64 Developing nations
are forced to agree upon the TRIPS-plus provisions in
obtaining other bigger trade benefits.65 The U.S. and
the EU are known to have non-negotiable ‘template’
intellectual property chapters for the FTAs.66
For example, TRIPS-plus provisions in the U.S.
bilateral and multilateral Free Trade Agreements include
“limiting the potential exclusions from patentability,
requiring the grant of patents for ‘new uses’ of
known compounds, requiring the extension of patent
terms under certain conditions, preventing parallel
importation, limiting the ground on which compulsory
licenses can be granted, and permitting the prosecution
of non-violation nullification or impairment claims.”67
Any country that agrees to a Free Trade Agreement with
the U.S. is bound by this term, which clearly limits
or eradicates the flexibility provisions provided in the
TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration.68
It is true that the TRIPS Agreement allows
the member nations to enact stricter enforcement
provisions.69 However, international law allows nations
to make an international agreement with other nations
under a condition that such agreements do not conflict
with other international agreements of these nations.70
61. Id. at 647.
62. Bhatt, supra note 5, at 618.
63. Id.
64. Frankel, supra note 3 at 1024.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See also Bhatt, supra note 5, at 618.
68. Id.
69. Frankel, supra note 3 at 1040.
70. Id.
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and standards that are viewed necessary by the rest of
the world.73 One way to resolve the problems caused by
the TRIPS-plus agreements can be adopting a provision
in ACTA that requires all of the negotiating nations to
abide by the international treaties, such as ACTA and
the TRIPS Agreement, prior to regional TRIPS-plus
agreements. This provision will provide preemptive
power to ACTA and the TRIPS Agreement over the
TRIPS-plus provisions and deem conflicting TRIPS-plus
provisions unenforceable.
Concerns regarding access to medicines in
developing countries keep growing each day. The
upcoming Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
needs to demonstrate a new way to enforce intellectual
property rights while preserving adequate access
to medicine for developing countries. One way of
supporting access to medicine is to provide wider access
to generic drugs by allowing more compulsory licensing.
Introduction of generic drugs in a market brings down
drug prices and can offer greater access to essential
medicine.
Introduction of generics lowers drug prices but
also deters research and development of new drugs by
pharmaceutical companies. There needs to be global
research support mechanisms in place to encourage
further innovation. In addition, by eradicating
counterfeit drugs while carefully distinguishing them
from generic drugs, ACTA can increase total revenue for
pharmaceutical companies, and thus more money can be
used for more research and development of new drugs.
However, all of these flexibilities and efforts
for greater access to medicine can only be successful
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Bhatt, supra note 5 at 619.
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if all the parties to the treaty abide by it prior to other
bilateral and regional agreements. If the U.S. and other
members of the WTO are dedicated to increase access
to medicine and the right to health, they should agree
to adopt and abide by multinational treaties such as
TRIPS and ACTA over the provisions in the TRIPS-plus
agreements.
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Online Auction Sites and Inconsistencies: A Case Study of France, China,
and the United States
By Won Hee Elaine Lee 1

Globalization1and the proliferation of Internet
use have diluted the concept of national boundaries.
Consequently, it is increasingly difficult for brand
owners to enforce and protect their trademarks on the
Internet, and online auction sites in particular. For
instance, the leading online auction site eBay had over
90.1 million active users worldwide at the end of 2009,
and generated over $770.6 million of operating cash
flow during the fourth quarter of 2010.2 However, while
online auction sites give consumers a wide range of
choices, they have increasingly become a battleground
for trademark disputes because of their sales of
counterfeits.
In an attempt to protect their brands from
counterfeit goods sold on online auction sites, brand
owners increasingly seek relief from third-party sites such
as eBay, rather than directly from sellers of counterfeits.3
Despite the global nature of Internet websites, brand
owners generally need to acquire trademark rights on
a country-by-country basis.4 Thus, in the absence of
binding multilateral treaties or international law that
regulates the sale of counterfeits on online auction
sites, ownership of a trademark in one country does
1. Won Hee Elaine Lee, 2011 J.D. Candidate at the Washington
College of Law at American University, B.A. in Geography and Economics in 2006 at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver,
Canada. Elaine was a 2009-2010 Articles Writer for The Intellectual
Property Brief and is a member of Glushko-Samuelson Intellectual
Property Law Clinic for 2010-2011.
2. Press Release, eBay, eBay Inc. Reports Fourth Quarter and Full
Year 2009 Result 1, 11 (Jan. 20, 2010), http://files.shareholder.com/
downloads/ebay/896102080x0x345224/b455630d-4bb9-4ba5adb1-40dcf29e82ce/eBay_Q409EarningsRelease.pdf.
3. Eric P. Schroeder, Trademarks, the Internet, and the New Social
Media: A Fresh Battleground for Old Principles, in Recent Trends
in Trademark Protection: Leading Lawyers on Analyzing Recent
Decisions and Adapting to Evolutions in Trademark Law, 1 (2009).
Such claims are known as secondary liability in which the complainants sue “secondary” infringers, such as distributors, in addition to
or instead of the direct infringer. See Mark Bartholomew & John
Tehranian, The Secret Life of Legal Doctrine: The Divergent Evolution
of Secondary Liability in Trademark and Copyright Law, 21 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 1363, 1364 (2006).
4. Robert W. Sacoff, Trademark Law in the Technology-Driven
Global Marketplace, 4 Yale Symp. on L. & Tech. 8, 8 (2001).
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not guarantee ownership in another unless the national
prerequisites for acquiring such rights are satisfied.5
Such differences have recently yielded inconsistent
court decisions in France, China, and the United States
regarding counterfeit claims against eBay and Taobao.
These inconsistent holdings suggest the need for a
coherent international enforcement agenda to address
counterfeit concerns in the context of e-commerce.
This article will discuss the French, Chinese,
and the United States courts’ inconsistent judicial
interpretation over eBay and Taobao for the same
conduct, namely allowing counterfeit goods to be sold
on their auction sites. The article will also delineate
current international protective mechanisms for brand
owners to protect against counterfeits, and it will
suggest possible enforcement mechanisms to resolve
inconsistency in the courts’ decisions regarding online
auction sites.
I. The French Approach
France is home to a number of the world’s most
famous luxury brands, including Louis Vuitton, Chanel,
and Christian Dior. Accordingly, “French regulations
established a broad system to protect luxury brands
from counterfeiting.”6 The National Anti-Counterfeiting
Committee was created in 1994 to “apprise the public
of the ‘dangers’ of counterfeiting, and to ensure public
compliance with anti-counterfeiting laws.”7 Moreover,
current French law not only “requires mandatory
forfeiture of counterfeit goods,” but also imposes fines
and jail time.8 Consequently, trademark owners in
France work closely with the French government to
5. Id.
6. Sofia H. Ahmed, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Luxury: eBay’s
Liability for Contributory Trademark Infringement in the United
States, Germany, and France, 5 BYU Int’l L. & Mgmt. Rev. 247,
250 (2009).
7. Id.
8. Id. In France, buying or carrying a counterfeit product is a
criminal offense that can result in up to three years in prison or fines
up to 300,000 euros. Id.
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fight counterfeits at every level of the distribution chain,
including the consumer level.9 Overall, the French courts
provide strong trademark protection for the many highend designers that are based in France.10
In 2006, Louis Vuitton Moet Hennessy (LVMH)
filed a lawsuit against eBay in the Paris Commercial
Court (PCC).11 Although France has statutory
protections for online auction sites that merely act
as a host for the sale of counterfeit goods,12 the PCC
found against eBay in this matter on June 30, 2008,
reasoning that eBay had not taken sufficient measures
to prevent transactions involving counterfeiting goods
on its site.13 The PCC held that eBay was acting not just
as a host, but also as a broker, because eBay received
commissions from transactions between sellers and
buyers. The PCC also stated that eBay facilitated the
selling and marketing of counterfeit products on a large
scale through electronic means, and such conduct made
eBay responsible for the infringement that occurred on
its website. The PCC particularly faulted eBay for its
failure to prevent illegal sales, stating, “eBay defaulted its
obligation of insuring that its business does not generate
any illicit actions like] infringement.”14 In addition to
equitable remedies against eBay, LVMH was awarded
about eight million euros in compensatory damages for
eBay’s tortious use of the rights of the owner, ten million
euros for damage to the image of LVMH, and one
million euros in moral damages, totaling almost twenty
million euros.15

scourge of the legal economy . . . .”16 The PCC’s decision
could be interpreted as a judicial initiative to prevent the
proliferation of counterfeit goods in the online context
and to protect brand names and their accompanying
values in creative industries like fashion, which are a
crucial part of France’s economy and national heritage.
II. The Chinese Approach
The counterfeiting of trademarks and brands in
the People’s Republic of China is one of the most serious
counterfeiting problems in the world. Trademark and
brand owners suffer estimated losses of billions—or
even tens of billions—of dollars per year as a result of
the counterfeit trade in China.17 Moreover, China is
one of the fastest-growing markets for online auctions.
For instance, in March 2007, there were no less than
601,145 auctions for seven leading brands at Taobao,
and most of them were presumably counterfeit goods.18
Taobao has implemented a system in which brand
owners can ask the auction site to take down auctions
under certain conditions.19 However, due to the large
number of auctions at any given time, the system is not
sufficient to protect brand owners.

Despite a large number of counterfeits sold on
China’s online auction sites, Chinese courts have been
unwilling to hold auction sites, such as Taobao and
eBay, liable for trademark infringement.20 For instance,
in Puma AG Rudolf Dassler Sport v. Taobao.com,21 the
Guangzhou Intermediate People’s Court dismissed the
brand owners’ claim and held for online auction sites.22
The PCC recognized the problems resulting
Puma registered its Puma word mark, a figurative mark,
from the imbalance between the rapid expansion of
and its Puma word and device mark in China in 1978.23
e-commerce due to globalization and the relatively
Before filing a lawsuit in 2006, Puma sent a warning
slow development of enforcement in both national and
international e-commerce contexts. The PCC stated that letter to Taobao requesting that Taobao terminate the
accounts of infringing online stores.24 However, Taobao
“the globalization of trade and the appearance of new
means of communication connected with free trade have did not reply to the letter and continued to provide its
fostered the marketing of fraudulent products, among
16. Id. at 9.
them those that are the result of infringement, that
9. Id.
10. David P. Miranda, Protecting Trademarks in the Global Marketplace, 81 N.Y. St. B.J. 50, 51 (2009).
11. See SA Louis Vuitton Malletier v. eBay, Tribunal de Commerce
de Paris T.C.] Commercial Court] Paris, June 30, 2008.. Also note
that, in Christian Dior Couture SA v. eBay, Inc. et al., the Paris Commercial Court (PCC) made a decision identical to the holding of
Louis Vuitton.
12. See Miranda, supra note 9, at 51.
13. See SA Louis Vuitton Malletier at 10.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 13, 15.

17. Daniel C.K. Chow, Counterfeiting in the People’s Republic of
China, 78 Wash. U. L.Q. 1, 3 (2000).
18. Asia and the Internet Top Challenges for Brand Owners, News
(Marques/The Association of European Trade Mark Owners, Leicester, U.K.), Mar. 2007, at 1.
19. Id.
20. Xenia P. Kobylarz, Looking For Deep Pockets: Brand Owners
Look to Shift Enforcement Burdens to Third Parties, 5 Internet L. &
Strategy 4, 4 (2007).
21. See Kangxin Partners PC, China, World Trademark Review,
Feb./Mar. 2009, at 60.
22. Kobylarz, supra note 21.
23. Kangxin Partners PC, supra note 22.
24. Id.
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services to the online stores.25
In June 2006, Puma took action against Taobao’s
refusal to comply with its request and sued a store
owner listed on Taobao. Puma also named Taobao
as a defendant because the website provided online
services to the store owner, thereby enabling the store
owner to sell counterfeit goods via Taobao’s website.26
Puma alleged that Taobao provided network services for
43,932 online stores to sell counterfeit Puma products.27
Although the court found the store owner liable for
trademark infringement, the court did not hold Taobao
liable for any infringement, reasoning that Taobao does
not have direct involvement in the sale of counterfeit
goods. Puma alleged that Taobao has a duty to check
whether the users of Taobao’s services have the legitimate
right to sell a trademarked product. The court, however,
found that there is no legal basis for Puma’s claim
because the duty sought by Puma would extend far past
Taobao’s capabilities. The judges further held that online
auction sites have a legal duty to remove auctions after
proper notice by the trademark holder, but they have
no duty to proactively monitor and investigate all the
auctions or users.
In recent years, China has made significant
progress toward enhancing trademark protection for
brand owners in the offline context.28 However, the
Puma v. Taobao.com decision demonstrates the relatively
weak and undeveloped Chinese trademark enforcement
law for preventing infringement resulting from Internet
sales. Currently, China has 253 million Internet users,
constituting only 19 percent of the total Chinese
population.29 Thus, there is a reasonable expectation
that the number of Internet users and activities on
online auction sites will continue to rise. Consequently,
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. For instance, in 2001, China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), which obligates China to adhere to the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).
In order to meet the TRIPS requirements, the Chinese legislature
amended the existing trademark laws. For example, the amended
Article 13 of the 2001 Chinese Trademark Law closely resembles
Article 16 of the TRIPS’ provision regarding the recognition and
protection of well-known marks. Moreover, China signed bilateral
treaties with many foreign countries, such as Canada, France, and
the United States, to facilitate and protect trademark registration
and protection in each other’s territory. See Robert H. Hu, International Legal Protection of Trademarks in China, 13 Marq. Intell. Prop.
L. Rev. 69, 91-93 (2009).
29. Kangxin Partners PC, supra note 22.
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developing stronger protective mechanisms will become
increasingly important in the context of e-commerce to
protect brand owners from trademark infringement.
III. The American Approach
In the United States, the protection for
trademark owners is largely based on the provisions
of the Lanham Act,30 which imposes civil penalties
for trademark infringement but does not account
for trafficking in counterfeit goods. However, in
2006, Congress enacted the Stop Counterfeiting in
Manufactured Goods Act, which incorporates criminal
laws in the Lanham Act to prevent the proliferation of
counterfeit goods, especially those from Asia.31
Despite the heightened enforcement mechanism
for trademark infringement, there are no laws that
govern the selling of counterfeit goods on online auction
sites. Online auction sites often do not have permission
from the trademark holders to sell the products
advertised on their sites. These products are frequently
counterfeit, but are sold under the pretense of being the
real thing, thereby confusing consumers and damaging
the manufacturer’s brand.
The most recent case deciding third-party
hosting websites’ liability for trademark infringement
in the United States was the Southern District of New
York’s 2008 decision in Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc.32
Tiffany & Co., a luxury jewelry brand, sued eBay,
alleging that thousands of pieces of counterfeit jewelry
were offered for sale on eBay’s website. Tiffany sought
to hold eBay liable for trademark infringement, false
advertising, and trademark dilution, on the grounds
that eBay allowed and facilitated the sale of counterfeit
goods on its website. The main issue in the case was not
whether counterfeit Tiffany jewelry can appear on eBay,
but rather, who has the burden of policing Tiffany’s
trademark in an e-commerce context.33 The court held
for eBay, concluding that Tiffany failed to bear its
burden of protecting its trademark.34 The court held
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 et seq. (2005).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2008); see also Ahmed, supra note 5, at
252-53.
32. 576 F. Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
33. Id. at 469. Tiffany also claimed that eBay was directly liable
for trademark infringement. Tiffany alleged that the use of registered Tiffany’s trademark on eBay’s website constitute illegal use of
its mark. However, the court held that such use of eBay constituted
nominative fair use and thus, eBay is not directly liable for the
trademark infringement.
34. Id. at 470.
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that Tiffany must show that eBay had direct control and
monitoring over the sale of counterfeit items.35 Thus,
the court rejected Tiffany’s notion that liability could be
premised on the generalized knowledge that eBay’s site
might be used as a venue for trademark infringement.36
Regarding Tiffany’s claim of trademark
infringement, the court found that eBay was not liable
for selling counterfeit goods on its website.37 The court
determined that the correct test was not whether eBay
could reasonably anticipate possible infringement, but
whether eBay continued to supply its services to sellers
once it knew or had reason to know of infringement
by such sellers.38 Thus, following the Ninth Circuit’s
persuasive authority established in Lockheed Martin
Corp. v. NSI,39 the Southern District of New York held
that if liability is premised on the conduct of a user of a
venue, as opposed to that of a manufacturer or seller of
a product, the plaintiff must make a threshold showing
of direct control and monitoring over the means of
infringement.40 The court in Tiffany decided that eBay
did not infringe Tiffany’s trademark because it did not
have sufficient knowledge of specific acts of infringement
on its site and it acted appropriately to discontinue
an infringing listing when it discovered a counterfeit
product on its site.41
The Second Circuit recently affirmed the district
court’s decision that denied Tiffany’s third party liability
claim against eBay.42 Like the district court, the Second
35. Id. at 506.
36. Id. at 513.
37. Id. at 469.
38. Id.
39. 194 F.3d 980, 986-87 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that contributory trademark infringement does not occur when the defendant
neither intentionally induces a third party to infringe the plaintiff’s
mark nor supplies a product to a third party with actual or constructive knowledge that the product is being used to infringe the service
mark).
40. Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 509.
41. eBay was also relieved of liability partly because of its protective measures against counterfeiting goods, such as a Verified Rights
Owner (VeRO) Program. See eBay, Summary of Our Privacy
Policy – Our Disclosure of Your Information (eBay’s Verified Rights
Owner (VeRO) Program), http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/
privacy-policy.html. The Program allows brand owners, such as
Tiffany, to report and have unauthorized items be removed from
the site. However, unlike eBay, many other online auction and ecommerce sites do not actively deter the sale of counterfeit goods. It
is unclear whether the VeRO Program effectively deters and prevents
the sales of all the counterfeits on eBay.
42. Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc, __ F.3d __, 2010 WL 1236315 (2d
Cir. Apr. 1, 2010). The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s
decision and dismissed Tiffany’s direct trademark infringement

Circuit delineated that for contributory trademark
infringement liability to lie, a service provider must
have more than a general knowledge or reason to know
that its service is being used to sell counterfeit goods.
The Second Circuit noted that some contemporary
knowledge of which particular listings are infringing
or will infringe in the future is necessary. The Second
Circuit took into consideration that eBay does not
have such contemporary or specific knowledge, and
held that eBay is not contributorily liable for trademark
infringement.
The decision in Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc.
demonstrates the difficulty of holding online auction
sites liable for trademark infringement because operators
of these websites often do not have specific knowledge of
counterfeiting activity on their sites. The decision also
shows the lack of adequate protective measures available
to brand owners to protect their trademarks in an online
context under U.S. law.
IV. What Resulted in the Different Holdings on
Rights for Trademark Owners
Recent court decisions in suits against online
auction sites in France, China, and the United States
have resulted in differing decisions, creating uncertainty
and confusion about trademark infringement cases in
an online context. These three countries each reached
different conclusions based on the application and
analysis of their respective national trademark laws.43
The Puma court in China and the Tiffany court
in the U.S. both found for the online auction sites;
however, their reasons for reaching the decisions were
relatively different from one another. The Chinese court
did not find Taobao liable for infringement mainly
because the court was unwilling to impose a burden on
the online auction sites to proactively monitor online
infringement. On the other hand, the U.S. court held
claim against eBay. However, unlike the district court, the Second Circuit did not dismissed Tiffany’s direct infringement claim
based on normative fair use doctrine. Instead, the Second Circuit
“recognized that a defendant may lawfully use a plaintiff’s trademark
where doing so is necessary to describe the plaintiff’s product and
does not imply a false affiliation or endorsement by the plaintiff or
the defendant” and agreed with the district court that eBay’s use
of Tiffany’s mark on its website and in sponsored links was lawful.
The Second Circuit noted that eBay used the mark “to describe
accurately the genuine Tiffany goods offered for sale on its website.
And none of eBay’s uses of the mark suggested that Tiffany affiliated
itself with eBay or endorsed the sale of its products through eBay’s
website.”
43. See Ahmed, supra note 5.
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for eBay in Tiffany because the court believed that
Tiffany failed to show that eBay had direct control and
monitoring of the selling of counterfeit goods in its
auctions.44 Thus, the Tiffany holding demonstrates that
the Second Circuit will not hold online auction sites
liable based on a mere showing of general knowledge
of counterfeit goods sales or on a showing of simple
negligence on the part of the online auction sites.
Further, the Second Circuit’s decision demonstrates
that although the court requires eBay to engage in
self-monitoring, it recognizes that trademark rights are
private rights most effectively enforced by trademark
owners.45
Contrary to the Guangzhou Intermediate
People’s Court and the Second Circuit, the PCC court
enforced stricter rules against eBay and found in favor of
the brand owners. In Louis Vuitton, the court considered
eBay a broker rather than mere host of the sale of
counterfeits. The PCC believed that eBay’s interactive
features such as marketing tools for sellers that provides
information on brands, user-created virtual stores,
and PowerSeller program for users46 were sufficient
to consider eBay a broker.47 The PCC stated that the
interactive features eBay offers its users demonstrate
that eBay has sufficient control over the sellers on its
site and was not acting merely as a host. The PCC also
noted that eBay received commission from the sellers,
thereby acting as an intermediary rather than just a
44. Although both the Puma and Tiffany courts held for Taobao.
com and eBay, respectively, the approaches of the two courts seem
different. The Puma court seems more lenient toward the online
auction site because even though Taobao.com did not respond to
Puma’s letter requiring Taobao.com to terminate services to the
virtual stores selling counterfeits, the court held in favor of Taobao.
com. On the other hand, in Tiffany, when Tiffany sent a complaint letter to eBay, eBay promptly removed the auctions involving
trademark infringement and counterfeits. However, eBay rejected
Tiffany’s request to remove “apparently infringing” auction listings,
such as a multiple listings of Tiffany items by a seller. Thus, the
Tiffany court seems to view that eBay does not have intent to create
a forum for selling counterfeits because eBay acted promptly upon
the Tiffany’s complaint to remove counterfeit auctions. See Kangxin
Partners PC, supra note 22; Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 506.
45. See Ahmed, supra note 5, at 248.
46. A PowerSeller is an eBay seller who achieves a sustained total
trading volume above a set cut-off for several months in a row.
PowerSellers can be identified by a “PowerSeller” logo shown after
their eBay User ID in their auction listings in eBay.
47. See Ahmed, supra note 5, at 266. Like the U.S., France also
has statutory protections for Internet websites that merely act as
hosts for counterfeit sales. However, the PCC saw eBay not merely
acting as a host but rather as a broker. Consequently, the PCC did
not apply the statutory protections for eBay and held it liable. See
Miranda, supra note 9, at 51.
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host. The PCC concluded that eBay’s knowledge of
improper activity was sufficient to establish that eBay
was negligent in taking adequate measures to prevent the
sales of counterfeits on its website.
These contrasting opinions recently decided in
French, Chinese, and American courts indicate their
different approaches to trademark infringement in the
online context. While the PCC believes that the online
auction site should bear the responsibility of monitoring
its own site, the Chinese and the U.S. courts believe that
trademark owners should be responsible for monitoring
and protecting their own marks. These inconsistent
holdings suggest a need for coherent international
measures to govern trademark infringement cases in
an online context because online auction sites are not
confined by national boundaries.
V. Possible Methods to Resolve Inconsistent Holdings
in the E-Commerce Context
The international trademark community has
continuously made efforts to facilitate the registration
and protection of trademarks. As of December 2009,
more than 84 countries have signed the Madrid
Protocol, which aims to reduce obstacles and costs
associated with registering trademarks in multiple
countries.48 In addition, the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) provides remedies for trademark
owners who were injured by bad-faith registrations and
the illegal use of their marks in domain names.49 Despite
the aforementioned protections for trademark owners,
effective enforcement of trademark rights in the context
of e-commerce still remains difficult.50
Moreover, the inconsistencies in national
trademark law regarding trademark infringement and
counterfeiting on online auction sites have yielded
inconsistent holdings among different countries.
Currently, in the United States and China, trademark
owners bear a larger burden of protecting the reputation
and use of their marks than the online auction sites
on which their goods are sold. On the other hand,
in France, the burden of protection falls on Internet
auction sites who act as brokers. These inconsistencies
not only disadvantage trademark owners but also
confuse online auction sites because the sites have
difficulty reconciling their conduct with the trademark
48. See Miranda, supra note 9, at 50.
49. See id.
50. See id.
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laws of every country in which they have a presence. In
order to alleviate and reduce inconsistencies regarding
trademark infringement and counterfeiting on online
auction sites, the development of binding international
mechanisms with both flexible and tailored standards
should be implemented.

not bound by a specific jurisdiction and its domestic
laws. Thus, the parties would have more choices
in terms of applicable laws, possible solutions, and
enforcement agendas, eliminating some of the confusion
about who bears the burden of policing the sales of
counterfeits in an e-commerce context.

VI. The International Trademark Association
(INTA)’s Alternative Dispute Resolution System

VII. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(ACTA): A Possible Solution?

Applying a national standard to an online
auction site, which is a borderless medium for
commercial activities, is difficult and inadequate.
Instead of litigating under domestic laws, brand
owners and online auction sites may settle trademark
disputes and arrive at a solution more efficiently and
effectively through a mediation process supported by
the International Trademark Association (INTA).51
Although INTA’s mediation program currently only
settles disputes regarding trademark registrations and
domain names, the program could be expanded to
address disputes between trademark owners and online
auction sites.

In addition to the mediation process,
implementation of binding international law to protect
brand owners against the mass sale of counterfeit goods
in online auction sites could alleviate the effect of
inconsistent international enforcement of trademark
infringement disputes between brand owners and
online auction sites. The international law would only
apply to infringement in the online context, creating
an international standard for countries to follow when
applying trademark law to online auction sites selling
counterfeit goods. The standard would provide a
consistent standard for courts and online auctions sites
to follow in cases involving online sales of counterfeit
products.

While litigation is often bound by specific
domestic laws, a mediation process is flexible in terms of
the choice of law. Mediation allows the involved parties
to reach a more satisfactory solution in a relatively short
period of time. A mediation process may also cover
a broad range of trademark disputes, ranging from
trademark infringement claims to misappropriation.
Neutral panels comprised of broad geographical diversity
facilitate the mediation process, which is not limited by
any court or statutory restraints. Consequently, when
a dispute between brand owners and an online auction
site arises, mediation could function as an effective
alternative to litigation because the involved parties are
51. Mediation is one form of Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR) for avoiding or settling litigation. It is “a non-binding
negotiation between adversaries that is conducted with the assistance of, and often through, an experienced neutral third party.”
See Thomas M. Onda, Navigating Trademark Trial & Appeal Board
Practice 2002, 689 PLI/Pat 61, 63, 67 (2002); one of the roles of
the International Trade Association (INTA) is to protect trademark
globally by curtailing counterfeiting problems in various regions and
countries. INTA has developed various Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Programs, such as mediation and arbitration, to provide
customized options and more flexibility for parties with conflicts involving trademark and related issues. See David C. Stimson, INTA
and ASEAN or Around the World in a State-Free Haze, 93 Trademark
Rep. 105, 109 (2003); see also International Trademark Association,
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), available at http://www.inta.
org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=71&Itemid=2
19&getcontent=4 (last visited on November 13, 2009).

The proposed multilateral Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement (ACTA) would implement stronger
enforcement in response to the increase in global trade
of counterfeit goods and pirated copyright protected
works.52 The scope of ACTA is broad, addressing
not only counterfeit physical goods but also Internet
distribution and information technology. Although
the secrecy and no-open-negotiation process of ACTA
generate criticism about the document, its broad scope
could create a uniform and coherent enforcement
mechanism regarding trademark infringement on online
auction sites.
ACTA seeks to impose a stronger international
enforcement agenda than that of the existing bilateral
agreements. For instance, ACTA aims to create an
agreement not between several countries, but rather,
a global standard on copyright infringement without
going through a multilateral process.53 ACTA attempts
to apply enforcement mechanisms from the top down
rather than allowing individual countries to select their
52. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, European Commission Trade, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/january/
tradoc_142039.pdf.
53. See Margot Kaminski, The Origins and Potential Impact of the
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), 34 Yale J. Int’l L. 247,
250 (2009).
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own adequate levels of prevention and protection.54

Trademark Owners

Although the main focus of ACTA is copyright
protection, ACTA could also be used as a tool for
heightened enforcement mechanisms in the trademark
realm. ACTA’s goal is to establish global standards that
effectively enforce intellectual property rights in order
to fight the growing problem of counterfeiting and
piracy more efficiently. Further, ACTA’s focus is on
counterfeiting and piracy activities that significantly
affect commercial interests, rather than on the activities
of ordinary citizens. Online auction sites are a growing
hub for counterfeiting activities in the commercial
context and a new battleground for trademark
infringement. Thus, ACTA could set up a standard for
stricter enforcement measures for trademark protection,
especially on the Internet. For instance, according to the
Office of the United States Trade Representative, ACTA
would impose strict enforcement of intellectual property
rights related to Internet activity. If ACTA proposes
or implements global enforcement mechanisms for
trademark infringement similar to those for copyright,
then ACTA could facilitate the development of coherent
or uniform standards for trademark infringement
in online auction sites. Further, because ACTA is
based on the rationale of heightened enforcement
of intellectual property rights, creating a trademark
infringement protection mechanism in the online
context would encourage courts in member countries
to consider the worldwide effect of their decisions and
strive for globally consistent decisions. Consequently,
if ACTA implemented a binding global standard to
prevent trademark infringement in the online context,
future decisions in online auction site cases would
likely be more similar to the decision of the PCC than
Guangzhou Intermediate People’s Court or the Second
Circuit.55 However, one should note that stronger
enforcement mechanisms that favor brand owners may
place unreasonable burdens on online auction sites
and on consumers who wish to sell or purchase legal
products.

In addition to implementing a uniform
enforcement mechanism in the global context, online
auction sites should take more vigorous measures to
prevent the sale of counterfeit goods on their websites.
After eBay’s loss in France, John Pluhowski, eBay’s Vice
President of Corporate Communication, stated that
eBay “devotes] more resources to fighting] counterfeits
than most brands.”56 He further contended that eBay
“invests] more than $20 million a year and has] some
20,000 employees worldwide involved in monitoring
eBay] . . . to fight fraud.”57 Mr. Pluhowski also pointed
out that eBay shut down nearly 2.1 million listings and
suspended 30,000 sellers who sold “suspicious” goods in
2008.58 In order to prevent selling counterfeits on online
auction sites, it is important to provide their users with
incentives to not engage in the selling of counterfeit
goods. Thus, stronger and stricter mechanisms, such
as imposing fines or holding credits, could deter people
from engaging in illegal activities.

VIII. Responsibilities of Online Auction Sites and
54. Feds Release Info on Plans to Stop Theft of Intellectual Property,
26 Andrews Computer & Internet Litig. Rep. 5 (2009).
55. Currently, the French court imposes stricter enforcement
in such context than the Chinese or the U.S. courts. One of the
rationales for stricter holding in France is to dissuade online auction
sites from selling counterfeits on their websites by imposing strict
liabilities and burdens upon them. Such rationale seems similar
to ACTA’s objective, which is to pursue globally binding, stronger
intellectual property protection for online counterfeiting and piracy.
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Furthermore, trademark owners should
acknowledge that online auction sites are the world’s
largest and fastest growing channels of commerce.
Trademark owners must use these websites to promote
brands rather than trying to suppress the proliferation
of online auction sites simply to prevent the sale of
counterfeit goods. Open communication between
trademark owners and online auction sites is essential
because online auction sites often act as “online
ambassadors of the brand.”59 Trademark owners must
also leverage the reporting systems implemented by the
online auction sites and offer additional solutions, if
necessary. Preventative steps taken by the trademark
owners would at least minimize, if not prevent, the sale
of counterfeit goods on online auction sites.
IX. Conclusion
Over the past two years, eBay has been involved
in numerous lawsuits in multiple countries. Three
courts in France, China, and the U.S. each reached
conflicting conclusions on trademark infringement in
the online context, and they fundamentally disagreed
on the whether eBay’s anti-counterfeiting efforts were
56. Robert Klara, The Fight Against Fakes, Brandweek, Jun. 27,
2009.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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sufficient. Protecting trademark owners and reducing
the sales of counterfeit goods on online auction sites
are important goals. These goals, however, should
not be achieved by destroying the business model of
online auction sites. If a consistent international legal
standard were created to protect trademark owners
from counterfeits sold on online auction sites and to
strengthen the interdependency between online auction
sites and trademark owners, the sale of counterfeits
could be prevented without sacrificing a burgeoning
channels of commerce. Thus, brand owners and online
auction sites must work together to propose a concrete
way to effectively prevent the sale of counterfeit goods
on online auction sites. Although litigation based on
domestic laws may sometimes provide adequate remedies
for trademark and brand owners, domestic laws often
do not keep up with the pace of globalization. Means
of commerce are constantly changing in the integrated
economic world. Consequently, in order to effectively
prevent trademark infringement on online auction sites,
brand owners and online auction sites should try to
resolve disputes through a mediation process designed
for an international context rather than litigation based
on domestic laws. Further, to prevent counterfeiting
activities in e-commerce, the development of binding
international laws is also necessary to protect brand
owners, online auction sites, and consumers.
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